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PE-i-699 Austria 
Part  I 
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
~~!~~-~~~~~~-~~~~~ 
I.  GOVERNMENTS AND  PARLIAMENTS 
1.  Competence of the Ministry of External Affairs to deal with European 
integration policy 
In the process of dealing with the question of the overlapping of the 
powers of various Austrian ministries, that of competence to deal with inte-
gration policy has been settled anew.  On 1 February a joint statement of the 
Federal Chancellor laid down that integration policy, which since 1962 had been 
dealt with by the Ministry of Trade, would again be put in the hands of the 
Ministry  of External Affairs. The statement contained  the following obeervations : 
1.  The position reached in Austria's discussions with the European 
Economic Community suggested that the emphasis in tackling the 
outstanding issues lay in considerations of external policy and inter-
national law; 
2.  It would accordingly be for the Ministry of External Affairs to 
satisfy external policy requirements even in sectors falling within 
the province of another ministry; 
3.  On this legal basis, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would take the 
the necessary steps in connexion with the EEC in agreement with 
the Ministry of Trade, which it would keep constantly informed of 
the results; 
4.  The Ministry of Trade would discharge the economic policy tasks 
connected with integration,  in agreement with the Ministry of 
- 1-External Affairs,  as soon as the results of the external policy steps 
were known. 
2.  Speech by Mr.  Mitterer, Federal Minister of Trade and Industry. 
on Austrian economic questions 
At the ZUrich general meeting of the Swiss Chamber of Commerce 
in Austria, Mr.  Mitterer spoke on 'economic questions without illusions'.  He 
dwelt particularly on the decline in Austria's economic growth, the slow rise 
in productivity and the increase in wages.  The fact that economic growth had 
lagged further and further behind wages for over ten years was a source of 
concern, not least because it might threaten competitiveness and therefore 
full employment.  The excessive demand made on economic growth was clearly 
reflected in price indices.  The volume of investment in industry had shown a 
sharp decline, having dropped between 1961 and 1967 from 26 to 13 per cent 
of the total gross investment. 
The maintenance and expansion of exports to the EEC countries was 
of crucial importance for Austria,  and trade with EFTA, the Eastern bloc or 
overseas countries could provide no substitute. 
The aim of Austrian integration policy - to enter into an economic 
agreement with the EEC as rapidly as possible -therefore remained  unchanged. 
On no account, however, would Austria leave EFTA without first having con-
cluded a reliable and satisfactory agreement with the EEC. It followed that 
Austria's attempts to come to an arrangement with the EEC called neither for 
optimism nor for pessimism but only for sober realism. 
3.  Visit to Moscow of Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim 
On 19 and 20 March Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim had politi-
cal talks with the Soviet Government in Moscow.  Detailed discussions took 
place on the plan,  already referred to by Foreign Minister Gromyko for a 
European security conference which,  in Austria's view,  ought to be  ... attended 
by all the powers concerned, the United States included.  Mr. Waldheim and 
Mr. Gromyko want to sign in Moscow an agreement on economic and technical 
co-operation and a further document on the prolongation of cultural and eco-
nomic exchanges. 
- 2-President Kossygin told Mr. Waldheim that Soviet Russia continued 
to oppose any link between Austria and the European Economic Community. 
According to Austrian circles in Moscow,  Mr.  Kossygin left no 
doubt that the Soviet attitude remained unchanged and that there were no 
grounds for expecting any change. 
In his talks with  Mr.  Kossygin,  Mr. Waldheim pointed out  that 
Austria's State Treaty permitted her to acquire modern arms, including anti-
ballistic missiles.  The Kremlin's attitude in the past had been that this was 
not the case.  It is understood that Mr.  Kossygin did not on this occasion com-
ment on Mr.  Waldheim's observations. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  1 February and 21 March 1968; 
Industriekurier,  5 March 1968; 
Die Welt,  21 March 1968) 
Belgium 
1.  Senate debates  - Britain's accession to the European Community 
On 17 January, Mr.  Housiaux (Socialist) put a question in  the Senate 
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the refusal of the EEC Council of 
Ministers to enter into negotiations with the United Kingdom on its application 
for membership, and on the consequences that must be drawn from this fact 
for Europe's future. 
Mr.  Housiaux stigmatized the attitude of the head of the French 
State, who is always opposed to any relinquishing of sovereignty and always 
anxious to ensure his country's hegemony over western Europe.  Mr. Housiaux 
considered that it should be made clear to Belgium's partners in the Commu-
nity that ~his country categorically rejected the hegemony of any country what-
ever. This position, however,  should not lead the Belgian Government to en-
visage retaliatory measures.  The achievements of the Common Market were 
quite considerable and it would be unjustifiable to jeopardize these results. 
Moreover, it would be regrettable to endanger French interests in the agri-
cultural common market or to refuse to renew the Yaound~ agreement by 
making Africa pay for the consequences of the dispute between the member 
States of the Communities.  The Socialist Senator suggested, on the other 
- 3-hand, that Belgium should adopt the idea of a European  technological Commu-
nity : 'This should initially have a marked supranational character, to enable 
it to take the essential political and financial options on which our future 
hinges.' 
' The proposed technological community would continue the work 
which Euratom did not fulfil.  It could pursue the task which the European 
Space Research Organization (ESRO)  and the European Launcher Development 
Organization (ELDO) have not carried out,  and it could complete what the 
European Nuclear Research Centre (CERN) has been prevented from doing. ' 
' It should encourage private initiatives,  such as the agreement that 
has just been concluded between two German firms,  a Dutch firm and a 
Belgian firm for the construction of a booster reactor prototype.' 
'It should,  in certain peak sectors of its choice, promote further 
research and carry out their industrial exploitation. ' 
'But, politically,  at least to begin with,  its members should only 
belong to the Common Market. If  the necessary abandonment of sovereignty 
prevents initially certain accessions, then everything should be brought into 
play in order to facilitate such accessions, if found of interest. ' 
'  Finally, the European technological Community would give active 
consideration to the possibility of membership of States that do not belong to 
the Common Market. ' 
For Mr.  Ballet (Volksunie),  from the moment when the conditions 
laid down by the Five to Britain's accession to the Common Market have been 
met, that country's accession should become a reality, in spite of France. No 
doubt, this alternative would be a last resort solution but then one should not 
have to wait eternally for a sign of France's goodwill.  Mr.  Ballet stressed 
the need for a more concerted attitude than hitherto on the part of the Benelux 
States in order to achieve "a common front" in international negotiations. 
Mr.  Harmel, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  replied that whilst it 
had not been possible at present to enter into negotiations, the fact remained, 
nevertheless that the applications were still on the table and that the Treaty 
procedure had not been interrupted but merely suspended.  The applications 
for accession had been examined within the framework of the Treaty and Com-
munity life should, likewise, not merely continue but make great strides.  The 
-4-Government did not, therefore, have to consider any procedure or proposal 
for an alternative Community.  Belgium will make a number of proposals for 
the internal progress of the Community, particularly with a view to progress 
towards economic union.  With regard to enlarging the Community, the 
Belgian Government deemed it necessary, in the absence of negotiations, that 
an examination, preferably on a Community basis, be conducted with a view 
to ascertaining whether existing disparities may be reduced. It should also be 
necessary to consider whether measures adopted to reduce these disparities, 
mainly in  Britain,  would be  added to that country's present difficulties by 
creating  distortions between Community actions and those of the United King-
dom. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs also felt that liaison instruments 
should be introduced between the Community countries and the States that 
have applied for membership in order to arrive at a rapprochement in the 
political course pursued by these two groups of States.· It may be assumed 
that the elaboration of suitable forms of words would make it possible for 
membership to follow by a period of a few months the effort of rapprochement 
and liaison engaged upon by the Community. 
In the meantime the Belgian Government would endeavour to seek 
wider measures extending to those States with which the accession procedure 
has already been initiated, for example in the field of peak industrial produc-
tion,  through the execution in common of State orders for military or civilian 
equipment,  in the field of co-operation and development with the third world 
and also in regard to technological development.  The Government was of the 
opinion that 'overhauling Euratom and bringing about a close association be-
tween the Six and the four candidate States was a long-term task which must 
be given priority-attention. '  The best support would be found in an enlarged 
industrial Community, that is, in an industrial market having ten member 
States. 
However,  Mr.  Harmel went on to say,  if this should be found impos-
sible or at least difficult to achieve within the short period of time within 
which it should be done,  then one might consider partial solutions such as 
those to which he specifically referred earlier on.  They would be started upon 
in the member States that have already declared their readiness to consider 
such European action. 
The Minister then referred to the talks that were held between the 
three member States of the Benelux : 'These three States have,  as a matter 
of fact,  decided to consolidate their political co-operation and to consult with 
one another before taking any decision on matters of common interest and on 
all important questions of foreign policy with a view to reaching similar posi-
- 5-tions.  Naturally, these consultations would be carried out in compliance with 
engagements subscribed to, particularly the Paris, Rome and Washington 
Treaties and they would bear on a list of items drawn up beforehand by the 
Benelux States. This list should not be too long but it should be perfectly clear 
so that the three States, having undertaken not to take decisions of an inter-
national nature without prior consultation would retain full freedom in respect 
of any sovereign international action if such agreement between them were not 
possible. ' This did not mean that the Belgian Government_wished to create a 
new institution for the time being. It was merely endeavouring to improve the 
consultation procedure in order to harmonize the different positions. He added 
that this was a matter of some significance and that he hoped that other Euro-
pean States would join Belgium and produce additional evidence of their  re-
solve to achieve European political unity. 
Mr.  Dehousse (Socialist) endeavoured, in spite of' France's ex-
tremely anti-European policy• to make the voice of reason heard.  He, too, 
brushed aside the idea of any reprisals or taking the case before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities.  The first of these two courses would 
only lead to absurd situations.  As for a recourse to the Court of Justice, it 
would most probably be declared inadmissible.  Moreover, Mr.  Dehousse ex-
pressed some misgivings as to the projects of' parallel constructions' referred 
to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs : 'I should like to know what are, in 
precise terms, the matters over which you think that parallel arrangements 
are possible.  You may have some difficulty in finding them,  and even if you 
should succeed, they would gradually all lose some of their importance. If I 
had the time,! could tell you about a modest attempt I made. It shows that your 
programme will boil down to very little indeed,  even in the field of technology 
which involves the constant risk of taking action that would be in conflict with 
the stipulations of the Euratom treaty and its annexes.' 
The speaker believed that the idea of a boycott on the Council of 
Ministers was hardly a better one, particularly in connexion with social ques-
tions.  He was therefore in favour of positive solutions : 'There is a point to 
which no reference has been made up to now,  namely the numerous cases in 
which the Treaty makes it possible for a vote to be taken not unanimously but 
by a qualified majority.  Admittedly, there are the 1966 Luxembourg agree-
ments, but for my humble part I have always disputed the legality of these 
agreements.  I have said so in the European Parliament, I have written it in 
scientific publications.  The Luxembourg agreements revise,  in fact,  the 
European Treaties.  They should,  therefore, have been concluded in accord-
ance with the revision procedure laid down in the Treaties themselves.  This 
has not been done and,  in my view, the Luxembourg agreements are not valid. 
Assuming that, for political reasons, you may be unable to justify  the illegality 
of the 1966 Luxembourg agreements, the fact remains that in those agreements, 
France made it clear that it would only request a unanimous vote when it felt 
that its vital interests were in question.  There are numerous cases in which it 
- 6-would be unthinkable,  indeed contrary to common sense, to defend such a 
theory.  I \vould only mention one,  namely that of the European University. 
could mention many more.  The matter has ]"Jecome quite topical since we know 
from Mr.  Servan-Schreiber' s  book what the American challenge means,  and, 
particularly,  since British participation has been postponed to a later date.' 
'You could create this European University by a qualified majority 
,·ate.  This would only require a  proposal from the new Commission presided 
oyer by Mr.  Jean Rey.  :iVIake  that proposal without France.  I  say this fairly 
and squarely : if need be,  you could do without France's advice and without its 
agreement in all cases where this is permitted by the Treaty.  It is rather 
unlikel~· that the Gaullist Government would declare that the creation of a Euro-
pean Unh·ersity is against the vital interests of France.  This is such an absurd 
theory that I cannot enYisage for a  moment that it could be put forward.' 
Following  that debate.  the Senate, by 118 votes in favour,  4 votes 
against and 1 abstention. passed the text of a  motion introduced by members of 
the Christian Democrat.  Soc:ialist.  Liberal and Volksunie groups. The Senate 
declared its com·iction that the higher interests of Europe required as soon as 
possible 0n enlargement of the Community of the Six. The Senate deplored the 
fact that the Six had been unable to come to an agreement on the opening  of 
negotiations \\'ith Britain and the other countries that have applied for member-
ship of the Common :\Iarket.It emphasized that the grave and courageous deci-
sions  recent!~· taken by the Dritish GO\·ernment had welded Britain to Europe 
as it has ncn'r been in the past.  The Senate fi1wlly took note of the statement 
of the :\Iini stcr f:>r  Foreign Affairs expressing the intention of the Benelux 
Gon_'rnments jointly to formulate precise proposals designed to prepare an 
enlargement of the  Communit~· through closer links between its members and 
the candidate States.  part  il'ularl~· through co-operation in matters not covered 
b.\·  the nome and Paris T rcaties.  such as technological development and mane-
tar~· quest ions.  \\·hil st pursuing  r~.t  the same time the strengthening and devel-
opment of the Community of the Six. 
1\Ir.  Lagasse ,:Front oi  French-Speaking Belgians)  abstained  from 
voting on the motion.  He hoped. of course. that contacts would be made with a 
view to enlarging the C ommtmit.\· but he also hoped that the Belgian Government 
would tighten its bonds with the other fh·e member States of the EEC. This was 
a political question,  in the speaker's yiew,  not merely an economic question. 
It was therefore not the concern of the Benelux. The Six should make joint pro-
posals if it was intended to pre\·ent a  wider breach in the bloc of the six mem-
ber States. 
Like the other Members of the Communist group, Mr.  Terfve voted 
against the motion.  'It is possible that we may in the near future arrive at a 
unanimous vote on the European problem but this is not yet the case. The time 
- 7  -has not yet come for such a vote ..... Voting on a text such as the one before 
us would mean voting on an abstract concept of Europe.  At the moment.  the 
key to Europe and its justifications  - I am speaking for us.  Belgians - is to 
shake off the yoke of American domination and some of us were not far.  in 
private conversations,  from  accepting this interpretation.  But no one or at 
least very few indeed would be prepared to mention this fact .ior the time being. 
in a black and white text. It is precisely because this has not yet been clearly 
stated that I cannot support the motion. And I shall not e\·en resort to an unnec-
essary political escape such as an abstention.  I prefer to say no  and reserYe 
the right to say yes for when what is being suggested now will be regarded as 
fair and acceptable by all. ' 
(Belgian Senate, parliamentary annals,  17  and 18 J anuar~· 19G8) 
2.  The Senate's Committee on Finance reports on European scientilic: 
co-operation 
The report drawn up by the Belgian Senate's Committee on  F inancc 
on the bill comprising the budget of thePrimeMinister'sclepartmentsfor l~Hi"' 
quotes a  statement made on 29 November last by the Head of the Go,·ernment 
regarding European scientific co-operation and its likely lines of deYeloplW:·nt. 
In this the Prime Minister recalls the meeting held in Luxembourg 
on 31 October 1967 at which the European Governments recog11ized the need to 
broaden the scor:e of measures for co-operation in the scientific and technolo-
gical fields. 
'The Belgian Government, plainly supported by some of its partners 
and followed by others, has stated that : 
- European scientific and technological co-operation must be properly 
integrated and extend not only to research and ·leveloproeni but also to 
industrial and commercial applications and to the co-ordination of public 
contracts; 
- Co-operation should extend more especially to large-scale technology 
programmes  - nuclear energy.  space travel.  aviation.  computers-
,,·hich require a heavy outlay and which act as an effecti\·e spLtr  to othet· 
fields of technology. 
These requirements are far from satisfied in the existing conditions 
of scientific and technological co-operation in Europe. 
- 8-Belgium has been engaged with its partners : 
-in ambitious and costly programmes restricted to the research and devel-
opment sector; 
- programmes put into  execution by a large  number of organizations of 
varying membership and often in direct competition; 
- programmes not involving  - and for a good reason  - industrial 
measures or joint application of the results. 
It is therefore hardly to be wondered at that national or bilateral 
programmes have been successively added to,  or substituted for,  the common 
programmes,  all the more so since France and Germany appear to be seeking 
isolation or joint technological leadership in the European market (open inside 
and protected from the outside world). 
Under these circumstances it is understandable that Belgium, while 
preferring common programmes,  cannot afford not to resort to any bilateral 
measures which,  pending better times,  make a contribution to our scientific, 
technological and industrial potential that we cannot lightly brush aside. 
The difficulties ahead are therefore considerable, particularly for 
the small countries which cannot pursue a national policy beyond their means, 
and for which integrated co-operation alone can provide access to advanced 
technology and therefore to industrial redevelopment and economic expansion. 
For all these reasons the Government's policy during 1968 will be 
dictated by the following main requirements : 
1.  Active participation in all activities planned at European level for the 
preparation of a new programme of scientific and technological devel-
opment: 
- Euratom (third five-year plan); 
-Space Conference (spring 1968); 
- other spheres where co-operation may appear to hold out 
promise. 
The essential need for an integrated programme will, however,  be con-
stantly insisted upon. 
- 9-2.  Limitation of our budget commitments in 1968 to projects in hand (ESRO, 
ELDO) or to a transitional programme (Euratom) so  as to  show. our 
readiness not to engage in any form  of co-operation  whose sole effect 
would be to transfer funds to the international level without any benefit 
to our own industries and expansion. 
3.  Exploration of possibilities of co-operating with other countries so as 
not to wind up in a position of isolation. ' 
(Belgian Senate 1967-68, Session Doc.  No.  103) 
3.  Statement by  Mr.  Harmel,  Minister for Foreign Affairs,  on the 
Government's European policy and the enlargement of the Community 
Following the French Government's refusal to enter into negotiations 
on the question of Britain's accession to the EEC,  a Brussels daily interviewed 
Mr.  Harmel,  Minister for Foreign Affairs,  on his  Government's European 
policy.  It was, first of all,  a matter of deciding whether it would not be more 
expedient for the Government to pursue with greater  deterrrcit~ation than up to now, 
a Community policy as a prerequisite for a Community of ten member States. 
'  You are entirely right,' answered the Minister.  'The Community 
can neither steam ahead at cruising speed nor disintegrate.  Very aptly indeed, 
Mr. George Brown himself pointed out at the last meeting of Western  Euro-
pean Union Council that Britain wished to join a live and united Community and 
that it would not take any action likely to disrupt the Community .....  there is 
no question in our mind of checking at the moment any Community activity.  It 
is rather the contrary that we are concerned with.' 
The second question put to Mr.  Harmel related to the conciliatory 
part traditionally played by Belgium and the apparently restrictive aims of the 
Benelux memorandum.  The Minister answered as follows  : 
'  The Benelux suggestions do not aim in the least at reducing the Com-
munity's action and responsibilities.  We have stated and,  if need be, we shall 
repeat that everything which comes under the Community's purview,  directly 
or indirectly must be tackled by the Community.  We have also made it clear 
that anything concerning the Community can only be discussed by the  Six  to-
gether and that it would therefore be inconceivable for any one of the Six to be 
excluded.' 
- 10-'  It is true  that where we are  seeking co-operation with  candidate 
States, pending their full and complete accession, this con':!erns co-operation 
of an intergovernmental type, but such co-operation must only bear  on specific 
matters. This means that it must be-limited.  On the other hand, a supranational 
Europe cannot be achieved unless all the candidate States have adhered to the 
Rome Treaty and until that Treaty has been completed by the supranational 
clauses which it now lacks.' 
With regard to the criticism voicedbythosewhowonderwhy Belgium 
has taken up  a position  that is  strictly in line  with that of the Netherlands, 
Mr. Harmel refused  to compare  the diplomatic positions  of Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  In the Minister's opinion, these positions remained in accordance 
with traditions that are not identical, and each of these two diplomatic traditions 
was governed by their respective Parliament and people. 
(Le Soir, 4-5 February 1968) 
1.  The prospects of  Britain's entry into the Common Market as seen 
by members of the French Government 
~~·-R.~IEPl~~~ 
The French Prime Minister took part on 11 January in a discussion 
with journalists on the French TV.  After having stated that the French Govern-
ment wished to co-operate with Britain, Mr.  Pompidou made a distinction be-
tween America's allies, which include the United Kingdom,  and others,  the Six 
in particular : 
' This enables me therefore to say  that Britain is not so much  " in 
Europe ". The problem connected with the negotiations is not so much a matter 
of deciding  whether,  among the people around the table,  some are stronger 
or weaker than the others.  The problem of Britain's entry is that  of knowing 
when that country will be in a position to join the Common Market,  that is to 
say when  it will  make the necessary changes  and be prepared to  accept the 
obligations of the Common Market and  when it will have turned  its back, if I 
may say so, on everything that attracts it elsewhere than in Europe. 
It is therefore  up to Britain  to decide  on the  date when it  will be 
ready for negotiations and this does not depend on the strength on the wealmess 
of the French Government. ' 
-11-With regard to possible reprisals on the part of France's partners, 
Mr.  Pompidou stated : 'If Qur partners should consider  tomorrow that  this 
Community cannot go on then let them make alternative proposals.  We shall be 
glad to look into them. 
We have commitments within the Common Market.  It is for  us to 
adjust our interests to those of the others,  and for the others to  adjust their 
interests to ours. We  shall then see whether our partners do not wish to apply 
the agricultural regulations for it is quite clear that in such a case there would 
be a very serious crisis in the Community and,  possibly, its collapse. But do 
you think we have reached that point ? 
The problem is not one of knowing what one wants.  It is  one of 
finally knowing what one prefers. Will they choose the Common Market or  will 
they choose the death of the Common Market ? Well, I am convinced that they 
will choose the Common Market because it is in the interests of all the Six. 
And if they should make another choice, we would adapt ourselves. ' 
(Combat,  12 January 1968; Le Monde,  13 January 1968) 
Mr. Olivier Guichard  --------------------
The French Minister of Industry categorically stated in an interview 
granted on 15 January to the daily 'L'  Aurore ' that British industry  did not ap-
pear to be dangerous for France. 
If there were  such a danger  then it would  have appeared  already 
since Britain's external tariff is still very  protectionist and  several  British 
firms could  have become quite  aggressive on the  market of the Six  without 
running any risks on their own market. 
There remained the fact  that the nature and  the size of extremely 
powerful American-financed concerns on British soil do create a special problem. 
' I would add,'  Mr. Guichard concluded,  'that it seems to me  quite 
possible to prevent  any danger of domination whenever there is a true desire 
for co-operation either at the level of European governments or at the level of 
industries.  Work on the Concorde clearly shows that that resolve is likely to 
bear fruit even before Britain's future relations with the European Community 
have been definitely settled. ' 
- 12  -~E~-~~~Eg~~-~~E~~ 
At the close of a Council of Ministers meeting on 17 January 1968 
when Mr.  Couve de Murville introduced Britain's recent budgetary decisions, 
Mr. Georges Gorse, the French Minister of Information, declared that the 
Council had observed that'  these measures seemed to indicate that Britain had 
assigned itself an aim  and had made some progress towards Europe in rela-
tion to another part of the world where it has commitments but it is difficult 
to say at the moment much more on the subject.' 
Mr. Gorse recalled (with reference to the Federal Republic of 
Germany) that 'the most practical and realistic of our partners is seeking, 
with regard to the possible arrangements to which reference has been made, a 
way that might lead to Britain's entry into the Common Market without any 
danger of destroying the latter.' He added that General de Gaulle had pointed 
out that 'in the present state of things, there is nothing more reasonable and 
more attractive for the Six than to stay together.' 
(Combat,18 January 1968; Le Monde,  19 January 1968) 
2.  Mr.  Couve de Murville's  statement on  the occasion  of the  fifth 
anniversary of  the Franco-German Treaty 
In a statement made on 22 January on French television Mr.  Couve 
de Murville, French Foreign Minister,  said that the special importance ofthe 
Treaty lay first and foremost in the final reconciliation between the two coun-
tries,  and secondly in the fact that Franco-German co-operation was clearly 
an essential element in the organization of Western Europe. This was being 
borne out every day in the operation and development of the core of the organ-
ization  - the Common Market of the Six. 
The third reason was that  - as was becoming more and more ob-
vious  - the final settlement of the European problem,  and particularly of the 
German question,  still unsolved after more than twenty years, required not 
only an atmosphere of agreement and an easing of tension between all the 
parties concerned,  as France had been saying for so many years, but alsothe 
closest Franco-German collaboration to permit policies to be brought into line 
and the details of the final settlement to be defined in common on rational 
lines. 
Mr.  Brandt, Federal Foreign Minister, had pointed out that the 
Treaty had not smoothed over the difference in the attitude taken by the two 
Governments on a number of fundamental questions. Mr.  Couve de Murville stated that there was no objection in princi-
ple to the United Kingdom's admission to the EEC.  'It is on the question of 
negotiations that there have been differences among the Six.  In the circum-
stances it is essential that the Franco-German Treaty of co-operation  function 
normally, that is, the French and Germans must consult each other.  This is 
precisely what is happening and what is going to happen in the middle of next 
month when Chancellor Kiesinger meets General de Gaulle in Paris.' 
(Le Monde,  24  January 1968; Combat,  23 January 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Olivier Guichard,  Minister for Industry. on the constructionof 
industrial Europe 
Mr. Olivier Guichard, Minister for Industry,  speaking at a confer-
ence held in Brussels on 25  January, pointed out that customs structures had 
been set up before industrial structures,  and that, while perhaps necessary, 
this was certainly a matter for concern. 
It was essential first to frame a common industrial policy, pressing 
ahead, on the one hand,  with the commonmedium-termeconomicprogrammes, 
and acting in concert, on the other hand, in the field of trade-cycle policy. 
It would then be necessary to follow up with the utmost determina-
tion the efforts to introduce common transport, energy and taxation policies 
so as to bring the operation of the undertakings of the Six into line. 
The Minister then specified the joint industrial measures to be 
resolutely pursued : 
- adoption of the Statutes for the European trading company  j 
- adoption of a common approach to foreign investment; 
- the framing of a firmer and shrewder common commercial 
policy; 
- the introduction of a common science policy. 
Mr. Guichard concluded that if Europe was really faced with a 
challenge, it would have to be successfully met.  Only by pooling its efforts 
could Europe be built up into a major industrial power and overcome its tradi-
tional divisions. 
(Le Figaro,  26 January 1968; Le Monde,  27 January 1968) 
- 14-4.  Chancellor Kiesinger's visit to General de Gaulle and the guestionof 
Britain's accession 
Dr.  Kiesinger,  the Federal Chancellor and his Ministers  visited 
Paris on 15  and 16Februaryforthe semi-annual Franco-German  talks. During 
the plenary session, General de Gaulle expressed his satisfaction by stating 
that 'on the whole, the two Governments are agreed not to allow the develop-
ment of the European Community to be checked but rather to develop it further 
and merge the three constituent Communities.  We are determined to use every 
endeavour to this end.' 
'We are also agreed that it would be of great benefit to Europe if 
Britain could join it.  This would be beneficial for our economic power and, 
some day perhaps, for our political capacity.' 
In his reply Chancellor Kiesinger confirmed that he wanted the Com-
munity to grow : 'We  do  not want the difficulties created by the accession of 
new members to prevent the Community from progressing. ' On leaving the 
Elys~e, Dr.  Kiesinger added : 'There has been some progress in our talks on 
the further development of the European Community.  France and Germany 
desire the participation of the other countries of the Common Market.  We have 
agreed on a procedure for facilitating trade relations between the Six and the 
other European Countries. ' 
At the close of that visit a joint statement was issued of which we 
append hereunder some extracts : 'The two Governments are in favour of ex-
tending the Communities to other European countries and, in particular, to 
those that have already applied,  as soon as these countries are in a position, 
in each case effectively to join the Community or to become associated with it 
in some other form.  This applies in particular to the United Kingdom and 
means that the evolution already begun in that country must be continued. ' 
'Until such time as that enlargement becomes possible, the two 
Governments are prepared to consider that arrangements be entered into by 
the Community with the candidate countries with a view to developing trade in 
industrial and agricultural products.' 
In stating their position on the development and the extension re-
quested by the European Economic Community, the two Governments are 
aiming at an essential objective of their policies, namely that a strong and 
united Europe should play its full part and become an organized,  independent 
and active factor for world equilibrium and,  consequently, for peace.' 
- 15  -The French Minister of Information, Mr.  Gorse, reported on these 
talks after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 22  February : 'Theywere 
fully satisfactory both with regard to the question of bilateral co-operation in 
every field and with regard to exchanges of viewpoints on major problems and 
especially those raised by the new applications to the Common Market.' 
The Minister concluded in the following words : 'All this should 
serve as a denial to the pessimistic forecasts of those who thought that the 
Common Market would be definitely crippled and that Franco-German co-
operation would become cooler. ' 
Prominent British reactions were as follows :Mr. George Brown, 
the Foreign Secretary, described the joint Franco-German statement as 
'extremely vague' in the House of Commons on 26 February.  He added, how-
ever, that the British Government was prepared to consider any proposal that 
would be made regarding Britain's candidature.  The British Government had 
no interest in trying to break up the Common Market or the Franco-German 
alliance for it would be absurd to try to destroy the Common Market if one 
wished to join it.  On the other hand an 'arrangement' that would involve obli-
gations for the United Kingdom without giving it any right of decision would be 
unacceptable. 
On 28 February, also in the Commons, Mr.  Harold Wilson stated 
that Britain's candidature depended in fact on France's attitude and that coun-
try's position on the matter was perfectly clear. 
(Combat,  Le Monde,  18- 19 February 1968,  22  February,  28 February; 
LeFigaro,  17 February, The Guardian,  17  February) 
Germany 
1.  The Federal Government's views on the admission of the United 
Kingdom to the European Economic Community 
In a television interview on 1 January Federal MinisterWillyBrandt 
expressed the hope that progress towards a European Community including 
Britain would be made in the next few months.  Alluding to a possible compro-
mise between the application put in by the United Kingdom and the French 
refusal to discuss it, he spoke of new opportunities that might shortly emerge. 
- 16  -The Foreign Ministry is thinking in terms of a phased plan,  in the 
initial stage of which the EEC and the United Kingdom would be brought to-
gether in the trade policy sphere.  The second phase would involve full mem-
bership of the United Kingdom and the other candidates.  An approach on these 
lines is being advocated in an attempt to skirt round the idea of 'association', 
an alternative flatly turned down during the past months by the British  Govern-
ment. 
The German Social Democrats remain in favour of the admission of 
the United Kingdom and other European States. On 5 January 1968 the SPD 
party executive, following a brief review by Mr.  Brandt of the current foreign 
policy position,  described the statement made in December by the Council of 
Ministers of the Economic Community on the applications received from the 
United Kingdom and other States  as  only an interim result. 
The SPD pointed out that the procedures could be resumed at any 
meeting of the Council.  In the weeks ahead the problems arising from the 
United Kingdom's application would have to be discussed on a bilateral basis 
between the EEC member States and the Governments of the applicant States. 
Mr.  Brandt had stated that the Federal Government would actively participate 
in these talks.  The SPD executive considered that the economic division of 
Europe could only be overcome once the existing European Communities had 
been enlarged and had established satisfactory relations with the other Euro-
pean States. 
On 10 January the Federal Cabinet was briefed by its Foreign 
Minister on the situation of the _European Communities at its first meeting of 
the year with Chancellor Kiesinger in the chair. 
The Cabinet's attitude to this question was summed up as follows by 
the Government spokesman, Secretary of State K. E.  Diehl : 
'The Federal Government sets out from the fact that the applications 
of the United Kingdom,  Denmark, Norway and Ireland,  as well as the special 
request from Sweden,  will remain on the agenda of the Council of Ministers 
following its decision of 19 December 1967,  and the countries in question will 
maintain their applications.  The Federal Government sees a need therefore to 
ascertain how further progress can be made,  at subsequent meetings of the 
Council, towards enlarging the Communities,  an aim to which the Federal 
Government adamantly clings.  The Federal  Government considers that this 
matter should now be given priority. 
It has entered into bilateral talks on the subject with the Governments 
- 17-concerned both within and outside the EEC. It intends to continue these talks 
with a view to clarifying the salient facts. ' 
In a statement made on 12 January Mr.  Brandt explained the Federal 
Government's attitude towards the Common Market.  The Foreign Ministry 
spokesman felt that Mr.  Brandt had been induced to make this statement be-
cause of the recent exploratory talks and to avoid possible confusion among 
the general public.  The statement reads as follows : 
' We pursue an independent policy.  We  are not concerned with 
"getting closer" to this or that Government or with being "obliging" in one 
way or another.  What we are trying to do is to get other Governments to under-
stand our point. of view.  This is determined by the interests of Germany and 
by the interests of Europe as we see them.  We are for enlarging the Commu-
nities because important economic and political interests of Germany require 
it.  We are quite certain that in adopting this line we  are acting in Europe's 
interest, for Europe can only play a fitting economic and political role along-
side the major world powers if it pools all its energies through unification. 
For us, therefore, the entry of the United Kingdom and the other 
countries is something to be taken very seriously.  The Council of Ministers 
unanimously decided in Brussels on 19 December last to keep the applications 
for entry from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland (and the spe-
cial request from Sweden) on the table and these four States have again made 
clear their intention to stand by their decision.  We regard both these circum-
stances not as mere formalities but as facts to be squarely faced.  It would,we 
feel,  be wrong to yield to an understandable feeling of disappointment and put 
the applications on one side pending better days.  No,  we are firmly in favour 
of taking the political steps that follow logically from the political decisions 
referred to. 
The question of entry was not discussed to its conclusion in Brussels 
on 18 and 19 December 1967.  The talks were about entry along specific lines, 
and no other ways and means of enlarging the Communities were considered. 
We  do not delude ourselves that the question of entry, even in this form,  is not 
beset with difficulties.  But it is important to know exactly what these difficul-
ties are and whether they can be overcome. Our French partner has not re-
jected the admission of new members as such.  The French side has stated  that 
it is opposed not to entry in principle but to immediate entry. This, incidentally, 
is also the case put forward by our British friends,  in the expectation, how-
ever, that negotiations would be opened up between the Governments.  The 
French have indicated, in this connexion  ,  that an "arrangement" with a view 
to .possible entry might meanwhile be considered.  Even if it is felt that this is 
not much to go  on,  its full implications must be investigated.  For this reason 
too, talks must be continued. 
- 18  -Suggestions have reached us from the United Kingdom and other 
European countries to the effect that co-operation should be established or 
stepped up with the U.K.  in fields not directly covered by the Rome Treaty. We 
did not reject the idea as has so often been alleged in the British press. The 
idea itself is not one lightly to be discussed.  On the other hand we naturally 
have to know to what fields and in what manner such co-operation is to be ap-
plied,  and this must be carefully looked into.  We believe that we must first 
concentrate our attention on another matter, that is, whether any real progress 
is possible .on the question of entry. If the final answer is no  - and for Europe's 
sake we hope it won't be- the question then to be decided will be whether ,  and 
in what other way, the links between the United Kingdom and the Continent can 
be strengthened.  But whatever ideas may be put forward about such a prospect, 
it can never be so effective as moving nearer to ultimate entry.  This is what 
the Federal Government means when it says that it now  -I repeat now-
regards this as a matter of priority. 
We have said this openly to our British friends.  We have also told 
them that,  in our view,  the difficulty of strengthening their economic and 
monetary position would be lightened if Britain could look forward to the pros-
pect of membership.  The latest measures taken by the USA  make this even 
more important and will bring out the nature of economic developments beyond 
the Common Market even more clearly.  The interests of the other applicants 
for membership also demand,  in our opinion,  that every real opportunity of 
bringing their entry nearer should be followed up. 
Frankness towards our British friends must be accompanied by 
equal frankness towards our friends in France,  We intend to do all we can to 
clarify the position in the interests - so we feel - both of Europe and of all 
concerned.  The applicant States and our other partners should welcome these 
efforts. Once we see the results,  we can see what should then be done. ' 
At a meeting of exiles held in Luxembourg on 18 January 1968 
Mr.  Brandt made a plea, in measured but unmistakable terms, for enlarging 
the Common Market.  He coupled his remarks with his personal thanks to 
England  and continued : 
'I believe that a practicable way must be found to ensure that Europe 
ceases to remain a torso.  I believe we must develop and enlarge our Commu-
nities.  This will also be to the advantage of East-West co-operation.  It will 
help our peoples and benefit the whole world.' 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  2,  10,  13  and 19 January 1968; 
Die Welt, 4,  13,  17  and 22 January 1968; 
Le Monde,  6,  13,  16  and 19 January 1968) 
- 19-2.  Visits to Bonn of Lord Chalfont and Foreign Minister Brown 
Lord Chalfont,  appointed by the British Government to look after 
the negotiations for EEC entry,  arrived in Bonn on 8 January 1968. 
Secretary of State Lahr first explained to him the details of the 
phased plan put forward by Germany, which is opposed by the British who in-
sist on full membership.  Each side had an opportunity of hearing the other's 
arguments but no agreement was reached.  Each promised, however,  to look 
carefully into the other's proposals.  Differences arose not as to British entry 
as the ultimate goal but in the assessment of the person of the French Presi-
dent and the bearing this had on the tactics to be adopted.  Bonn is looking for 
progress with the help of and within the EEC; London,  on the other hand,  is 
concentrating on  fiolrlR beyond the province of the EEC Treaty. 
Lord Chalfont took a highly sceptical view of the German plan,  a 
view shared by the Benelux and Italian Governments.  The British and the 
German Governments, however, both need the co-operation of the other EEC 
countries which favour British entry. So long as their views continue to diverge, 
Bonn and London will each prevent the other from making any progress. 
Lord Chalfont opposed the phased plan for two reasons.  First, he 
saw no change of General de Gaulle's entertaining it.  Moreover the British 
Government clearly feared that entry by instalments might mean that the Com-
munity underwent radical changes while Britain waited in the ante-room.  This 
could happen,  say, with the final arrangements forthefinancingof agriculture. 
Political observers in Bonn are, however,  rather dubious as to the weight of 
this argument. 
British newspapers were of one mind in describing Lord Chalfont's 
visit to Bonn as a complete failure.  There is not the slightest reason  to assume 
that the official British view differs, whatever polite phrases may be resorted 
to.  But even unsuccessful talks can be regarded as useful in that they give the 
partners a better idea of where they stand. 
On 12 January 1968 Foreign Minister Willy Brandt explained to 
Foreign  Minister Brown, during the latter's visit to Bonn, the latest devel-
opment in relations between Britain and the EEC.  The Federal Government 
intended to speak to Paris about the creation of a free trade area and the en-
largement of Euratom through the admission of countries seeking entry.  The 
Federal Government was assuming that both these aims could be pursued  with 
an eye on Britain's subsequent full membership of the European Community, 
-20-all six member States having expressed themselves,  in principle,  in favour of 
enlarging the Community and the British application having been kept on the 
agenda. 
London's argument that Britain could not indefinitely take on obliga-
tions without corresponding rights was countered on the German side by a 
reference to the ECSC  Council of Association in which four full members and 
four associate members worked together an arrangement that could serve as a 
model. 
Moreover the Eur'Jpean Commission could act as a channel through 
which the United Kingdom could be kept abreast of important Communitydevel-
opments and the Community of important developments in Britain. 
The British Foreign Minister attached great value to the statement 
that it was absurd to think that Britain wanted to cripple the EEC; on the con-
trary, it was very interested in a strong Community.  Brown was very dubious 
about the Federal Government's efforts in Paris; he described them,however, 
as useful and promised that Britain would not interfere. 
The basic issue for the English Government is not to be exposed to 
another French veto.  Mr.  Brown therefore hoped that the Federal Government 
would not close its eyes to other possibilities of achieving European unification. 
Mr.  Willy Brandt made it quite clear that the Federal Government 
thought it essential that the EEC continue to operate and therefore would  not 
entertain a Community of the Five holding special external and defence policy 
talks with England and the other applicant States rather than  with France, or 
co-operating with England  - or even with England,  Ireland, Denmark  and 
Norway  - in armaments production or other technological sectors. 
Mr.  Brandt pointed out that Western European Union,  to which the 
six EEC member States and the United Kingdom belong,  was the appropriate 
forum for discussions on common external and defence policy matters.  As re-
gards common armaments production and technological collaboration, the 
German view was that two-way agreements  - such as already existed  between 
London and Paris  - could be concluded between London and Bonn. 
The Federal Government feels that the forming of any kind of bloc in 
relations between the United Kingdom  and the EEC would be out of the question 
as it would severely hamper,  if not actually split, the European Community  -
- 21-something from which the United Kingdom would not benefit.  Moreover,  any 
prospect there might be of French f!.pproval of British membership would then 
be completely swept away. 
On his return to London,  Mr.  Brown repeated that his country was 
interested only in full membership.  None of the interim solutions,  such as 
membership of Euratom as suggested by Mr.  Brandt,  could be regarded as 
satisfactory to Britain. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  9,  10,  20  and 22 January 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Hocherl,  Federal Food Minister, discusses EEC's agricultural 
policy 
Writing in the 'Deutschland-Union Dienst', official organ of the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary party on 8 January, Mr.  Hocherl,  Federal Food 
Minister,  stated that the completion of the agricultural market was, from the 
agricultural and general economic policy point of view,  only one step towards 
the full merger of the six economies.  The wide measure of integration 
achieved  in the agricultural sector served indeed to highlight the gaps in the 
organization of other branches of the economy. If the achievements of the 
agricultural policy were not to be undermined by serious distortions of com-
petition, priority should be given to the systematic harmonization of taxes, 
transport and monetary and social policies. 
Mr.  Hocherl put the level of integration of agriculture after 1 July 
1968,  when the common market organization for sugar would come into effect, 
at over 90 per cent.  At the same time the EEC transitional period for agricul-
ture would come to an end one andahalfyears earlierthanoriginallyplanned. 
From Schleswig-Holstein to Sicily, the farmers of the Six would then enter in-
to free competition. 
This would increase the number of questions that could no longer be 
solved at national level alone.  Chief of these would be how to bring the produc-
tion and consumption of certain products closer into line than had so far been 
the case.  As production in the Community itself was in the main rising, the 
problem could only be partly solved by means of protection measures. 
Another problem which Mr.  Hocherl felt would have to be tackled 
jointly,  and with greater energy, by all EEC countries was that of relations 
- 22-with trading partners outside the Common Market.  The acute difficulties the 
EEC'  s  growing tariff protection presented for these countries must be recog-
nized and suitably taken into account.  Mr.  Hocherl quoted Denmark's vital 
exports of cattle for slaughter as an example. 
Changes in emphasis in the EEC's agricultural policy could also be 
expected as a result of the food aid  - 1 million tons of wheat due for delivery 
for the first time in 1968  - decided upon under the World Cereals Agreement 
These deliveries would affect not only relations with the developingcountries, 
but, owing to their magnitude,  also the Community's internal market. 
The decision to fix identical prices for EEC farm products, despite 
differences in production costs, had led to distortions in competitive conditions 
to remedy which the Federal Government ought to put forward a series of 
initiatives in Brussels in the Council of Ministers.  This view was shared by 
the Land Agricultural Committee of the CDU Slidwlirttemberg-Hohenzollern at 
a meeting presided over by Mr.  Bauknecht (member of the Bundestag) held on 
5 February 1968 in Sigmaringen. 
These initiatives should - the Committee felt -be aimed at main-
taining the milk market regulations to the fullest possible extent, at fixing beef 
and veal guide prices at DM  2. 80 per kilo to discourage low-priced imports,at 
revising the concessions contemplated in the final GATT agreement and at cut-
ting down pig imports from Eastern Germany and Denmark with a view to 
raising prices above their present insupportable level. 
The Committee also maintained that cereal prices for the next 
sowing period should be fixed before 1 August since the considerable rise in 
production costs had also been recognized by experts.  At the same time the 
price relationship between feed-grain and wheat would have to be still further 
improved.  The Committee also pointed out that if egg and poultry production 
was to be carried out economically the quantity of eggs for hatching would have 
to be controlled.  In addition,  German fruit and vegetable producers were also 
entitled to market interventions such as had taken place in other EEC countries, 
and to better measures to deal with imports from non-member countries. 
At national level the Committee called for the immediate payment to 
farmers of compensation for the fall in the cereals price to a total ofDM 560m 
Moreover, the new arrangements contemplated in the drinking-milk market 
should be put into effect by supplying top grade milk at a suitably adjusted 
price.  The Committee further urged that a special fund be immediately set up 
for price-support measures on the pig market. 
- 23-The Committee finally pointed out that, while it recognized the 
importance of the efforts being made to achieve European unification and to 
ease East-West relations,  it did not believe that the concessions these de-
manded should be borne exclusively by the farmers. 
(Deutschland-Union-Dienst,  8 January 1968) 
4.  The Federal Minister for Scientific Research, Dr.  Stoltenberg, 
calls for a European research policy 
On 7 February,  in the course of a debate in the Bundestag onparlia-
mentary questions regarding the promotion of science tabled by both the Coali-
tion groups,  Dr. Stoltenberg, Federal Minister for Scientific Research, called 
for a general European research policy. 
Europe's technological lag lay not  so much in research itself as in 
the scattered condition of the European market.  European co-operation in 
certain limited fields such as nuclear and space research was not enough, but 
had to be extended to new spheres and fitted into the framework of a general 
European research policy.  Here lay the chance of strengthening and expanding 
the European Community,  as the core of European unification,  in the research 
sector.  The Federal Government had therefore repeatedly underlined the need 
to admit Britain as a member because of its scientific potential and,  pending a 
definite decision on the question,  would support all efforts to step up co-
operation in the scientific field between the European Communities on the orie 
hand and England and other countries desirous of joining the EEC on the other. 
Dr.  Stoltenberg wound up by saying that the peoples of Europe could 
not safeguard or win back their freedom,  independence and national identity  by 
resorting to outmoded ideas and procedures.  They could achieve this great 
objective only through close institutional ties and by pooling their economic 
and political efforts.  This was nowhere brought out more clearly by the sober 
and unmistakable message of necessity and hard facts than in science and 
research.  It was to be hoped that these would set the pace for future develop-
ments. 
On 19 March Dr.  Stoltenberg spoke in Zurich at the general meeting 
of the Swiss-German Chamber of Commerce on the 'future tasks of European 
science policy'.  He stressed the need for general European co-operation, 
rendered all the  more urgent by the ascendancy of the United States.  For ex-
ample,  Europe could afford to lose no more time in the field of electronic 
- 24-data-processing if the gap separating it from the United States was not to grow 
even wider. 
America was also ahead in aviation and space travel and in the 
development of new materials.  In the chemical, pharmaceutical and optical 
industries as well as in mechanical engineering and in the nuclear energy sec-
tor Europe remained, however, fully competitive.  American industry in 
Europe was however stepping up its drive to get ahead in important technol-
ogical markets.  Thanks to its rates of profit -higher on average - and its 
advanced management and selling techniques, it exerted a considerable pull on 
European capital. 
A possible answer to the American challenge had long been tried in 
the E EC  - the creation of a large internal market freed from tariff and trade 
barriers, uniform patent and company legislation, progressive harmonization 
of taxes and joint government research and development programmes. Discus-
sions on the enlargement of the Community, however, partly blocked further 
progress in this direction.  All the same it was quite feasible tp allow non-
member States to participate in specific projects.  In the field of science and 
research particularly, it was essential however to adopt a down-to-earth ap-
proach.  In the long run, moreover, it would be an anachronism if the Channel 
were to remain yet another line of demarcation in Europe. 
The systematic shaping of the future could no longer be carried out 
on intuitive, let alone reactionary lines.  Dr. Stoltenberg called for priority 
measures for the promotion of science combined with general educational and 
science policies in an international context.  This would render supranational 
programmes and forms of organization indispensable, even from the point of 
view of the possible misuse of scientific knowledge.  One day,  perhaps, prob-
lems connected with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty would recede into the 
background and the hazards of the misuse of molecular biological techniques 
for manipulating genes would exercise men's minds.  This was, however,  no 
reason for refraining from tackling an important task of the future - the 
investigation of fundamental biological relationships. 
America had shown sound sense in recognizing the future as suitable 
material for research.  The interval between the new scientific and technol-
ogical discoveries and their application was constantly growing smaller and 
smaller, and the shorter this interval became, the more important it was to 
know their likely effects.  All this called for new and closer forms of institu-
tional co-operation between State, science and industry, and the sweeping away 
of conventional barriers and of the 'ivory tower' approach.  To attain this goal 
without surrendering  the freedom of science and the State's neutrality in economic 
competition, was one of the great tasks of modern political and social organiz-
ation which had not received enough attention in Germany and in Europe gener-
- 25  -ally, even in scientific circles.  Planning in  this sense, in matters corning under 
the main aspects of future science policy, needs institutional backing and syst~ 
rnatic improvement. 
Dr.  Stoltenberg singled out the following main items for special at-
tention : energy supplies,  regional and town planning,  suppression of air and 
water pollution,  development of new modes of transport, new communications 
systems (telecommunications satellites and the appropriate rockets), elec-
tronic data-processing, the world food problem.  A great deal had already 
been done by European organization. Joint efforts in Europe would, however, 
unquestionably have to be concentrated on nuclear energy, electronic  data-
processing and space travel. 
Common institutions had proved their worth :CERN for high  -energy 
physics, ESRO for the building and operation of research satellites.  EMBO, 
the European Molecular Biological Organization, was breaking new ground. 
Dr.  Stoltenberg saw in scientific and industrial co-operation a more 
and more effective means of breaking through the Iron Curtain.  Ultimately, 
only mind speaking to mind, in a context of strict, scientific reasoning, could 
sweep away deep-rooted clashes of view,  ideologies and mistrust. 
It was difficult to overestimate what science could do for the future 
of the developing countries and therefore its value as the key to a more settled 
peace in the world.  'We possess  - or shall shortly possess  - the scientific 
knowledge needed to enable us to solve the problem of feeding the world and of 
ensuring technological progress and economic growth in every quarter of the 
world.  But everywhere  - and particularly here - an immense gap still sepa-
rates theoretical understanding and its social and political application.  The 
crucial question is whether we shall be able to create throughout the world, 
and more particularly in the developing countries, the human,  social andpoli-
tical conditions needed if wider application is to be made of scientific and 
technological know-how.' 
During a visit to Stockholm on 11 February 1968 Foreign Minister 
Brandt discussed political and economic questions with Prime Minister 
Erlander, Foreign Minister Nilsson and Trade Minister Lange.  The talks 
mainly covered, in addition to East-West problems and the nuclear non-pro-
liferation treaty, the outstanding problems of European economic co-operation. 
Presumably reference was made to the Benelux States' memorandum on pos-
sible co-operation, as a  step towards ultimate membership, between the EEC 
States and countries which had applied for admission to the Common Market. 
- 26-Brandt welcomed the fact that Sweden was prepared to take part in a 
a discussion of these questions among  wider circles. He described a  Euro-
pean technological Community based on Euratom as a possible and,  at the 
moment, the most promising arrangement.  This could include,  in addition to 
the Six, the four countries thathad applied for membership  - the UnitedKing-
dom,  Ireland, Norway and Denmark  - and Sweden and Switzerland. It would, 
of course, be for Sweden to decide how far such a form of co-operation would 
be reconcilable with its policy of neutrality. 
Mr.  Brandt mentioned the Association Council provided for in the 
1954 Convention of Association between the United Kingdom and the ECSC  as a 
possible bridge.  This could, perhaps serve as a model for a co-operation 
council in a transitional period preceding the enlargement of the European 
Community. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  8 and 12  February 1968; Industriekurier, 
8 February 1968; Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  21 March 1968) 
5.  Bonn visit of Dr.  Luns,  Dutch Foreign Minister 
On 21 February Dr.  Luns arrived in Bonn to discuss European 
questions.  The day before, the Federal Foreign Ministry stated  that the talks 
would be on 'questions of the moment'.  · 
This was clearly an allusion to the British reaction to the Franco-
German consultations in Paris  - with which Dr.  Luns had been able tofamil-
iarize himself in London  - and the Federal Governments sizing-up of the 
situation.  Bonn is clearly unhappy about reaction in Great Britain,  and also in 
the Benelux countries, to the talks between the Federal Chancellor and his 
delegation and General de Gaulle and his colleagues in the French Cabinet. 
Diplomatic circles in Bonn speak of an 'unduly sceptical reaction'. 
It seems likely therefore that Mr.  Brandt's intention was to try to 
convince his Dutch visitor of the benefits derived from the meeting with G.en-
eral de Gaulle of which the Federal Government took,  on the whole,  a positive 
view.  It is not understood in Bonn why the advances made during the Franco-
German talks as regards immediate and future European policy are not fully 
recognized in Britain and in the Benelux countries. 
A measure of disappointment is of course understandable, particu-
larly in the Benelux countries whose latest plan for Europe was not given little 
- 27-consideration in Paris; but the feeling in Bonn is that parts of this plan may be 
regarded to have been  covered by the results of the Franco-German talks. 
After the talks between Mr.  Brandt and Dr.  Luns, the Government 
spokesman informed the press that in the event of negotiations on interim ar-
rangements with the United Kingdom the Community would have to 1 speak with 
one voice 
1  as in the Kennedy Round. 
This principle is violated  - at least in practice  - by the proposal 
of the Benelux States that questions not falling directly within the EEC 
1 s  prov-
ince should be discussed by five or four Community States with the United 
Kingdom, if necessary. 
Mr.  Brandt told Dr.  Luns that the German team in Brussels were 
not submitting a cut-and-dried plan but explaining their ideas which stemmed 
from the joint Franco-German statement.  These ideas also left room for the 
impressions gained from the London talks of Secretaries of State Duckwitz and 
Lahr and from fresh contacts before the conference.  Dr.  Luns toldMr.Brandt 
that the Benelux States would submit their plan on 29 February.  Bonn points 
out that the first part of this plan, which deals with closer economic relations 
between the Community and the United Kingdom,  can certainly be reconciled 
with German ideas on the subject. 
Dr.  Luns added,  however, that the proposal of the Benelux States 
would be kept on the table and,  in his opinion,  could retain their value even 
alongside interim economic arrangements with Britain.  The Federal Govern-
ment,  on the other hand,  is concentrating all its efforts on further negotiations 
within the EEC 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  21 and 22  February 1968) 
6.  Bonn talks of Mr.  Lyng,  Norwegian Foreign Minister 
On 27  February the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr.  John D. Lyng, 
arrived in Bonn on a two-day visit. The enlargement of the European Communi-
ty was the main theme discussed during a one-hour talk at the  Federal Foreign 
Ministry and a dinner at the home of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt. The Fed-
eral Government explained Franco-German ideas on an  1 arrangement 
1  between 
the EEC  and countries which,  like Norway, had applied for entry to the Com-
mon Market. 
- 26-On 2 8 February Mr.  Lyng reacted favourably to German ideas on 
tariff cuts as between the Common Market and EFTA countries desirous of 
joining the EEC.  According to well-informed circles, however,  he wanted an 
assurance that  such an interim arrangement would be only part of a process 
ultimately leading to admission to the Common Market. 
The German proposals provide for a gradual dismantling of customs 
barriers between the EEC and EFTA countries, talks with a view to facilitating 
trade in agricultural products between the two blocks,  and technological co-
operation between the EEC and the United Kingdom and other countries wishing 
to join the Common Market.  Mr.  Lyng made it clear that Norway stood firmly 
by its application for membership.  It is understood that Mr.  Lyng also stated 
that the Benelux proposals contained useful ideas which should be gone into 
further. 
(Die Welt,  28 February 1968; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  29 February 
1968) 
7.  Bonn visit of Mr.  Nyboe Andersen, Danish Economics Minister 
At the invitation of the Federal Government,  Economics Minister 
Nyboe Andersen arrived in Bonn on 12  March for talks with Foreign Minister 
Willy Brandt. 
The two ministers had a long discussion on the German proposals 
for a commercial arrangement between the EEC and the EFTA countries. This 
was then continued with Secretary of State Lahr of the Federal Foreign Minis-
try. 
Mr.  Nyboe Andersen's visit was yet another instance of the efforts 
of Scandinavian countries to work out their future relationship with the EEC 
pending membership or some form of co-operation.  The Danes, worried by 
their falling exports to EEC countries  - particularly to the Federal Republic-
are particularly keen to obtain firm promises for a transitional period.  This 
is why Mr.  Nyboe Andersen spoke with Mr.  Brandt about exports to the  Fed-
eral Republic of Danish cattle for slaughter which for some time had left a 
great deal to be desired. 
On 18 March Mr.  Nyboe Andersen continued these exploratory talks 
with the European Commission in Brussels. Mr.  Brown, the British Foreign 
-29-Minister, is expected in Copenhagen at the end of March,  and the Danes are 
very anxious to keep their policy in line with that of London. 
At the same time talks between the Nordic Governments are going 
ahead.  The ministers of trade of Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden and Finland met 
in Copenhagen and agreed that a final solution of market problems in Europe 
was still a long way off and that even transitional measures would take some 
time. The Ministers set up a committee of officials to prepare an expert 
opinion on future economic relations between the Nordic countries and the EEC 
and EFTA,  and more particularly on the possibilities of closer economic co-
operation between their countries. The emphasis is being laid onharmonization 
of customs duties and indirect taxes with an eye on customs union. All the drive 
is coming from Denmark and Sweden; Finland is hesitant and the Norwegians 
are displaying scepticism.  The decision is not an easy one because a radical 
political decision must now be taken going beyond the pragmatic form of co-
operation so far practised by these countries. 
The four ministers will meet again in Stockholm to make arrange-
ments,  on the basis of the expert opinion, for the conference of Nordic prime 
ministers to be held a week later in Copenhagen.  At the same time the Nordic 
countries will decide the approach to be adopted at the EFTA conference in 
London on 9 and 10 May.  It seems likely that the Federal Republic will be sup-
plied with more details when Mr.  Braunsgaard, the Danish Prime Minister, 
visits Bonn during the first half of May. 
EFTA membership of no advantage to Danish agriculture 
Denmark's membership of EFTA has brought no benefits to its agri-
culture.  Danish farmers therefore hope to see Denmark in the European 
Economic Community as soon as possible.  This argument was put forward by 
the first chairman of the Central Agricultural Association of the German mi-
nority in Southern Jutland, Hans-Heinrich Johannsen,  at its annual general 
meeting in Apenrade.  Membership of the EEC alone could serve as a satisfac-
tory basis for the future of Danish agriculture. Denmark produced food for 
16 million people so that its farmers had to rely heavily on exports.  Denmark 
did not fear the competition it would have to face on entry into the EEC and 
would give a good account of itself. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  13  March 1968; Le Monde,  21 March 1968) 
- ao-8.  Extracts from the report by the Federal Chancellor on the state of 
the nation in divided Germany and the ensuing debate 
On 11 March Dr.  Kiesinger, the Federal Chancellor-,  reported on 
the state of the nation in divided Germany before the Bundestag. 
On the policy of European unification, the Federal Chancellor said: 
'No matter how strong our links in the Atlantic Alliance may be or how friend-
ly our relations with the United States, we must not look for our future and, as 
we see it, the future of a united Western Europe in the fixed framework of a 
North Atlantic empire.  Such an arrangement would transform the demarcation 
line that divides Germany and Europe into a permanent barrier. It could also 
dramatically heighten the danger of a major world conflict. 
Since the end of the second world war the United States have always 
championed a policy of European unification.  A strong, united Europe could 
take part of the burden from America's shoulders and assume greater respon-
sibility for its own security.  A  Europe modelled on these lines, independent 
and bound to America by ties of friendship,  could do  a great deal for world 
peace and could help to bridge the gap between East and West.  A dependable 
partnership with America will continue to exist because, quite apart from our 
common spiritual and political values, we have the same interest in preventing 
Western Europe from falling under Soviet Russian influence. 
But where do we  stand with this European unification which can be-
come so important for the future of our nation and which is one of the major 
tasks of our century ? 
Considerable progress has been made in building up the European 
Communities.  They have not only brought great economic benefits to their 
members but also heightened the consciousness of solidarity and the standing 
and weight of Europe in the eyes of the world.  Unfortunately,  however,  we are 
still a long way from the goal of a politically united Europe. 
The United Kingdom and other European States want to join the Com-
munities and the Federal Government supports them in their wish.  We believe 
that our cautious but dogged handling of their applications for entry offers the 
best prospects of overcoming the obstacles to admission with full rights and 
obligations. We are determined to spare the Community a serious crisis  which 
might endanger what has been already achieved or cripple the further vigorous 
development of the Community. 
- 31-In our recent talks in Paris we again confirmed our desire for close 
co-operation with France. No one seeks to hide the fact that without  such co-
operation Europe cannot become united.  This is why the Federal Government 
immediately stepped up the collaboration provided for in the Franco-German 
Treaty, extended consultations to fresh fields and introduced closer co-opera-
tion between German and French industries.  Two special representatives were 
appointed to co-ordinate this wide-ranging co-operation.  Franco-German co-
operation is above all a prerequisite for the state of ordered peace in Europe 
for which we are striving and which will put an end to the division of  Germany.' 
In the ensuing debate Dr. Barzel stated that the CDU /CSU Group 
remained in favour of admitting the United Kingdom,  Ireland, Norway and 
Denmark into the Communities and took a positive view of the wishes of Sweden 
and Austria and of the neutral countries in general.  On some of these points 
France was of a different opinion.  'As nothing can be achieved by force here, 
we hold that the Federal Government is following the right policy in taking steps 
to make whatever progress is at present possible in Europe.' 
Mr.  Zimmerman (CSU)  criticized the Soviet-American draft of the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty.  'This treaty, which the two world powers 
have negotiated between them, is unfortunately also aimed against an independ-
ent Europe since, in its present form,  it appears to rule out the European op-
tion we desire. Once the treaty is signed in this form by the Europeans, there 
will be no hope of a Europe capable of safeguarding its own security and of 
shaping its own economic development.  The guarantee of security over which 
the USA and the Soviet Union reached agreement in the twinkling of an eye a 
few days ago,  unfortunately suggests this.  It is also  - whether one likes itor 
not  - a means of blocking a European option.  Moreover, the draft treaty 
opens up the possibility  - by no means theoretical  - of dissolving the Eura-
tom Community.  This would nip a European energy policy in the bud,  a proce-
dure to which signed acceptance of dependence on non-European nuclear fuel 
monopolies would put the seal.  The treaty,  as planned,  laid on and finally 
worded, is certainly calculated to arouse in all European peoples the feeling 
that they are in the same boat. ' 
The Federal Republic would have to make it quite clear that it was 
prepared to accept responsibility for safeguarding the very basis of the exist-
ence of the German people.  The Federal Chancellor had made it quite clear 
that only a united Western Europe, prepared to establish its independence vis-
a-vis its great Atlantic friend and ally,  could overcome the barrier that sepa-
rated German from German and European from European.  The Federal Chan-
cellor deserved thanks for the forthright way he had dealt with the timorous 
voices that warned that an independent European policy could lead America 
from cutting herself  off from Europe.  He had thus exposed the faint-heartedness 
and mistrust displayed in certain quarters  towards our friends the far side of 
the Atlantic. 
- 32-Mr.  Zimmerman considered that Britain's attitude to the thorny 
problem of the non-proliferation treaty reflected a serious lack of West Euro-
pean solidarity.  At all events,  London's approach to the question in no way 
suggested that it was ready to slacken its 'special relationship' with the USA 
in order to devote its energies exclusively to European tasks and interests. 
'It is precisely in this vital sphere of European defence and energy policy that 
Britain has been offered a unique opportunity of proving its solidarity with the 
peoples of the European continent.' 
What was needed was a common external and defence policy of the 
States of Western Europe, without which there could be no  effective technol-
ogical Community and certainly no chance for the entire European family of 
peoples to merge and pool their energies. 
In the course of the debate the Federal Chancellor remarked that 
his statement that Europe's future should not be sought in the fixed framework 
of an Atlantic empire might perhaps have been regarded as 'gaullistic'. He had 
carefully measured his words.  He had not spoken of an Atlantic community  -
which ought or ought not to exist  - but had used those particular words to 
make it clear that Europe  - however friendly it would and must continue to be 
with the United States - must possess enough strength of its own to enable it to 
take a large part of the burden from America's shoulders, help to bring the 
European house in order, and serve as a force for world peace. 
That a long road lay ahead was generally realized, but he believed 
that the road chosen was the right one and was only too happy to find that in 
this he saw eye to eye with French policy. 
As regards the United Kingdom,  Dr.  Kiesinger could only repeat 
that he and his Foreign Minister had gone to enormous trouble over this mat-
ter the previous year.  Throughout the wholeperiodneither ofthem haddoubted 
that the methods they had used were the only ones holding out any promise. 
They had never deluded themselves that they could get rid of the contrast be-
tween the political ideas of France and those of the other member States ofthe 
Community.  Nevertheless they had hoped,  through these methods, to succeed 
in staving off a major crisis in. the EEC and perhaps laboriously,  step by step, 
moving forward.  'I would ask our other EEC partners who,  so far,  has been 
able to get  any further ?  I think  I can even say  that if the agreements  we 
reached in Paris are put into practice, this will be the very first step forward 
ever made.' 
(Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the Federal Government, 
No.  33,  12  March 1968 and No.  37,  19 March 1968; Deutscher Bundestag, 
158th Session,  11 March 1968) 
- 33-United Kingdom 
1.  Lord Brown declares : Britain maintains its candidature for acces-
sion to the Common Market 
In a speech delivered in Brussels on 25 February at the British 
Chamber of Commerce, Lord Brown, Minister of State at the Board of Trade, 
reaffirmed his Government's position regarding Britain's accession to the 
Common Market. 
There was no intention on the part of the British Government to 
change its European policy.  Its application remained on the table of the Coun-
cil of Ministers.  The Government would not seek an alternative solution. Since 
Britain was part of Europe it could not turn its back  on Europe even if it wanted 
to. 
The Minister further made it clear that certain suggestions could  not 
be considered.  There was no  question at all of organizing a grouping of Euro-
pean States directed against France. Britain was not against France : it was 
for Europe.  It would be impossible to take a long-term view of a unitedEurope 
without France just as it would be impossible to conceive of a united Europe 
without Britain.  French participation in any European activity would always be 
welcomed by the British Government on condition  - and that was an important 
condition  - that the French Government should not be given any power to veto 
a discussion or an action.  The British Government had had enough of these 
vetoes for the moment.  Naturally, there was no intention either of injuring the 
Communities in any way whatever.  It would hardly be logical to harm an insti-
tution when one is making such efforts to join it. 
(Le Soir,  16 February 1968) 
2.  Britain's European policy propects as seen by Lord Chalfont 
Addressing on 2 8 March students of Reading University,  Lord 
Chalfont stated that Britain would temp9rarily have to accept the French veto 
whilst,  at the same time, endeavouring to co-operate with the EuropeanStates 
in matters outside the Rome Treaty. 
The Benelux plan and the Italian proposals which had already been 
accepted by the British Government,  afforded not only prospects for practical 
-34-arrangements that would prevent a widening of the gap between the EEC and 
the candidate countries but also a fairly flexible framework for action designed 
to achieve a wider measure of political and economic unity.  The reasons that 
had prompted Britain's application were largely political and the Government 
was delighted to find a political content in the proposals put forward by the 
Benelux countries. 
(Le Monde,  31 March 1968) 
Mr.  Lynch discusses Ireland's relations with the EEC 
Mr.  Lynch,  the Irish Premier, was interviewed on 3 March by SUd-
westfunk (the West German broadcasting system).  He  stated that his Govern-
ment was ready to enter into any arrangement that would eventually lead to an 
enlargement of the European Economic Community.  He added,  however,  that 
the Irish Government would never lose sight of the fact that it was necessary 
to join the EEC as soon as possible.  He hoped that any transitional solution 
that might be envisaged would only be of short duration. 
Mr.  Lynch pointed out that Ireland did not wish to 'act alone'. Its 
trade relations with the United Kingdom were,  as a matter of fact,  very close 
indeed. 
(Le Monde,  5 March 1968) 
Israel 
Statement by Mr. Abba Eban,  Israel's Foreign Minister.  on 
Israel-EEC relations 
In an interview granted on 29  March to a Brussels newspaper 
Mr. Abba Eban sketched out the prospects of a closer association between 
Israel and the European Community.  He pointed out that the principle of an 
Israel-EEC association based on a general preferential agreement had been 
accepted by the Commission which had submitted a recommendation to this ef-
fect to the six Governments.  The Israeli request would be kept on the agenda 
pending an improvement in the present state of affairs.  The Israelis had a 
particular vision of their country as an industrialized State endowed with an. 
advanced technology.  They would never abandon these objectives,  although the 
- 35-conditions at the moment were not suitable for their immediate achievement. 
The situation had, however, improved.  There had, for example, been a con-
siderable increase in the volume of investment and of monetary reserves. 
(Le Soir, 30 March 1968) 
1.  European problems raised in the Chamber of Deputies during the 
debate. on the State budget 
During discussion of the 1968 budget Mr.  Montanti (Republican)ex-
pressed the hope that Italian agricultural policy in the EEC would be adjusted. 
Italy, whose agriculture was showing a deficit, could not afford to finance, 
through the EAGGF,  a robust and thriving agriculture such as the French. 
Nor  should  it be forgotten- said Mr. Montanti -that the EAGGF 
had so far earmarked only a small proportion of available funds for backward 
agricultural structures, while encouraging production in sectors showing con-
siderable surpluses. 
Mr.  Montanti spoke of the widespread resentment aroused among 
producers of citrus fruit and vine-growers·- who had hoped, through the 
Community, to secure wider markets  - by the dampener applied to this pros-
pect by France's veto on British accession.  Similar misgivings were being 
aroused among them by the association of mediterranean countries competing 
in the citrus fruit sector. 
Mr.  Riccardo Ferrari (Liberal) voiced similar anxieties about the 
stiff competition faced in Italy from Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan,  Spanish 
and Greek wines.  The Government's attention  was therefore drawn to the need 
for finalizing the common market in wine. 
Mr.  Leopardi Dittaiuti (Liberal) said that Community policy aimed 
at lining  up farmers' earnings as closely as possible to those of industrial 
workers.  As had been pointed out by Mr.  Mansholt, Vice-President of the 
Commission of the Community, there were two ways of doing this : 
- 36-(i)  price increases -which, however,  meant large surpluses which would 
have to be disposed of on other markets and would therefore entail 
either refunds on exports, or 
(ii)  reducing costs through greater mechanization of farming,  even if this 
entailed further cuts in labour. 
The second method,  subject to certain qualifications, appeared to be 
the best solution. 
Mr.  Dittaiuti favoured enlarging the Community by admitting the 
United Kingdom,  Ireland, Norway and Denmark, even if this were to create 
fresh problems for Community agriculture in general and for Italian farmers 
in particular.  Such problems would,  after all, be offset by undoubted advan-
tages.  Trade within the Community and with non-member States would be 
increased; the area that could be cultivated would expand by about 30 per cent 
and farm labour by only 11 per cent,  so that average farm earnings would rise. 
Moreover, Italian fruit and vegetable growers would reap notable advantages 
while the Community as a whole could market its wheat and milk and cheese 
products in the new member countries. 
Mr.  Pedini, for the Christian Democrats, described as timely the 
Foreign Minister's insistence on the need to act on the technological gap that 
separated Europe from Russia and the United States.  Since, however, the gap 
had also originated in part from the difference in scale of these countries, the 
answer to the problem lay in enlarging the Community.  Nuclear technology to-
day demanded that Europe, too, possess a plant for enriching uranium.  New 
developments in aviation and in the computer industry called  for a broad-base!} 
policy.  This, however,  entailed large-scale markets,  and this indeed was the 
aim of the European Community. One source of anxiety, however, was the 
drawn-out and dangerous crisis in the Community  - a crisis which ought to be 
dealt with not by calling a halt  - even as a justifiable protest  -to the workof 
the institutions and the Community's programmes, but by taking even partial 
measures wherever possible, particularly in fields in which action would have 
to be taken once the era of French 'vetoes  1  was over. 
The Christian Democrats therefore firmly backed the recent initia-
tive shown in the Italian memorandum which outlined the measures that could 
already be taken as between the United Kingdom and Europe,  and hoped that  the 
opportunityof European action,  such as now presented itself in the monetary 
and economic fields,  would not be missed. It was high time that Europe had its 
own currency  - a currency which,  ifworkedouf  dispassionately in conjunction 
with the dollar,  could contribute to the financial security of the free world, 
satisfy Europe's just aspirations,  and lighten the excessive world burden at 
- 37-present weighing on the dollar.  Finally, the possession of such a currency 
could revitalize a Europe of which the United Kingdom would increasingly 
become  - in the  monetary sense too  - an integral part. 
The worst course to follow now would be to lose both England and the 
Community.  The best policy,  on the other hand, would be to bide one's time 
while seeking points of collaboration across the Channel in all sectors possible. 
A stronger Europe was also needed in the face of the delicate situation that had 
recently arisen in the mediterranean area.  The closing of the Suez Canal 
threatened to plunge this area into a political and economic depression that 
might be not dissimilar to that which succeeded the discovery of America and 
which did so much harm to trade on the world seas. Russian presence in the 
mediterranean area constituted a political hazard which,  in the long run, would 
have an effect on its economic activities and on industrial investment.  And yet 
the mediterranean was not only the natural path for the much-needed relations 
of friendship between the African/and European countries but also an area of 
vital importance for the security of the free world.  A mediterranean policy 
would therefore have to be relaunched and moves made to ensure that the Arab 
world would not be left alone at the mercy of political speculations but would 
be brought closer to Europe in an atmosphere of trust and in dignified forms of 
economic association.  The EEC could work out a complete policy along these 
lines and the United Kingdom,  which had practical interests in the mediterra-
nean, could collaborate with the same end in view. 
Mr.  Cattani (Socialist)pointed outthatmanydeputies ofthe majority 
had submitted an agenda  backing the arguments advanced in the 'Monnet motion'. 
In that document, which described Europe's inability to take united action in the 
Middle East crisis which so closely affected European interests and emotions, 
the following proposals had been made for a coherent European policy : 
(1)  that steps be taken to facilitate Britain's admission into the Common 
Market; 
(2)  that no efforts be spared to close up the technological gap separating 
Europe from the United States; 
(3)  that a special committee to further mutual understanding be set up be-
tween the European Economic Community and the United States in the 
basis of the experience gained in the Kennedy-Round; 
(4)  that a committee on co-operation be set up between the EEC and 
Comecon. 
On the first point  - said Mr.  Cattani  - approval of the Monnet 
motion was followed by the French veto on British entry and the consequent 
- 38-It 
diplomatic efforts of the Five to keep the door open for an enlargement of the 
Community.  In this respect the down-to-earth approach of the Italian Foreign 
Minister was worthy of praise, clearly opposed as it was to the unyielding atti-
tude of the French and distinguishable from the position adopted by the Benelux 
countries, which was extreme, and by Federal Germany, which was too 'soft'. 
Britain's sincerity was evident from its abandonment of any trace of imperi-
alism as borne out by the withdrawal of its troops east of Suez. 
As to co-operation between Europe and the United States,Mr.Cattani 
underlined the need for a more flexible Atlantic Alliance that would put the two 
sides on a basis of absolute equality.  Vague desires of the gaullist type of an 
open break between Europe and America would,  however, prove ineffectual. 
Such an  attitude not only ignored the enormous benefits that could be gained by 
Europe from collaboration but  would also mean a return to outdated nationalistic 
antagonisms. 
Increasing readiness by the EEC to co-operate with countries of the 
Eastern bloc also had to form part of any long-term political design.  The day 
would undoubtedly come when the rigid separation of ideological blocs  domi-
nated by the UniteQ States and the Soviet Union would be broken down and a 
common rOle would have to be found for Europe as a whole,  particularly in its 
relations with the developing countries. 
Mr.  Fanfani,  Foreign Minister, recalled the high hopes that had 
been raised throughout Europe  - made secure by theprovisionsoftheAtlantic 
Treaty  - by the signing of the Treaties of Paris and Rome.  These hopes had 
dimmed somewhat over the years, had picked up at the time of Britain's ap-
plication for entry and then subsided again Ylith the French veto. 
In view of the continued French opposition to British entry, which 
had been confirmed at the EEC Council of Ministers' meeting of 18 and 19 De-
cember 1967, Italy had sought, jointly withtheBeneluxcountries andGermany, 
new procedures to surmount the deadlock, bearing in mind Britain's intention 
(attested by Foreign Minister Brown on his Rome visit of 29 and 30 December 
1967) to keep its application on the table. 
At the end of January,  after the Benelux Foreign Ministers had 
drawn up a memorandum on the enlargement of the Community, Italy  had asked 
its partners to submit an exact timetable for the study of these problems. 
Moreover, in view of the fact that at the end of the Paris talks, held on 16Fe-
bruary between General de Gaulle and Chancellor Kiesinger,  a statement had 
been issued advocating arrangements with applicant States for expandingtrade 
in industrial and agricultural products, the Italian Government asked that the 
- 39-study of all the documents mentioned,  and of any other proposals for enlarging 
the Communities, be put on the agenda for the next Brussels meeting of the 
Community's Foreign Ministers. 
Pending that meeting, the Italian Government has sent other mem-
ber Governments a memorandum suggesting that a declaration of intent be 
prepared on the future of the Community. 
Turning to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Mr.  Fanfani recalled 
that the Italian Government had spared no effort, on the lines laid down by the 
Parliament, to brush aside any obstacles standing in the way of negotiations, 
concentrating its efforts on improving certain aspects of the text  - for example, 
the emphasis to be placed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on the 
technological benefits that could be derived from it; the need to safeguard 
Euratom's activities; the balance to be established between the obligations of 
nuclear and of non-nuclear countries; the application of cheques and balances; 
the connexion between the problem of non-proliferation and the problem of 
disarmament, whether of nuclear or of conventional weapons. 
After these negotiations, it had proved possible to revise and im-
prove the 1966-67 proposals and to draw up a technical draft, presented simul-
taneously, but not in identical texts, by representatives of the United States 
and of the Soviet Union on 24  August 1967,  and rounded off on 18. January 1968 
by the insertion of three clauses originally left blank. 
Mr.  Fanfani concluded by saying that the draft text largely followed 
the lines suggested by the Italian Government and limited the term of the 
treaty to 25  years  - a period regarded by some as unduly long,  despite the 
fact that in the original version the treaty was to run for an indefinite period. 
(Chamber of Deputies  - Summary reports of 23 and 28 February 1968) 
2.  Rome visit of the President of the Yugoslav Council 
Mr.  Spiljak,  President of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council 
made an official visit to Rome,  accompanied by Foreign Minister Nikezic, on 
8 and 9 January 1968.  The following are extracts from an official statement 
issued at the end of the talks. 
-40-1  The two sides agreed on the need to do  everything possible to facili-
tate the adoption of balanced practical measures with a view to complete  and 
controlled general disarmament and the conclusion of a non-proliferation 
treaty that takes due account of the international security requirements and of 
the legitimat~ interests of all countries ..... 
. . . . .  In view of the next session of UNCT AD,  a discussion was held 
on development problems and ways and means of speeding up their solution.  It 
was noted that bilateral economic relations were proceeding satisfactorily, 
particularly as regards the expansion of trade.  A furtherimprovementcanstill 
be made,  and this will be facilitated by the new trade agreement concluded 
last summer and the economic talks held at ministerial level in Belgrade last 
December •.... 
The two sides welcomed the increase in trade between the frontier 
areas and exchanged views on the desirability of better communications and 
contacts between industrial and trade organizations of towns on opposite coasts 
of  the Adriatic.  They recognized the importance, not least  for the improvement 
of bilateral economic relations, of the interest shown by Yugoslavia in a trade 
agreement with the EEC. 
1 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  13 January 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Fanfani 
1 s visit to the Somali Republic 
Between 11 and 15  January the Italian Foreign Minister Mr. Fanfani 
paid an official visit to Somalia where he was received by the President of the 
Republic and also met the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister MohamedHagi 
Ibrahim Egal.  The two sides exchanged views on  international  problems of 
interest to both countries. 
The Somali Prime Minister stated that his country had recently ap-
plied for admission to the East African Economic Community,  stressing atthe 
same time that the Somali Government was alive to its responsibilities towards 
the EEC  - of which Somalia is an associate member  - towards Italy,  to 
which it was bound by special relations,  and towards all the other States with 
which it had bilateral agreements.  As regards relations between Italy and 
Somalia, which were becoming closer and closer in all sectors, attention was 
drawn to the valuable contribution that could be  made to balanced progress by 
Italian aid based on the recently promulgated law to remain in  force for several 
years. 
-41-Trade between the two countries was being maintained at a level 
satisfactory to both sides despite difficulties of sea communications caused by 
the drawn-out blockage of the Suez Canal.  The hope was naturally expressed 
that special measures would be taken to expand trade still further.  It was also 
hoped,  of course, that Italy could participate even more closely in Somalia's 
development programmes through measures adapted to the country's economic 
needs and calculated, by helping to step up production and investment, to make 
for increased prosperity for its populations and provide the basis for greater 
economic expansion. 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  20 January 1968) 
4.  Mr. Michel Debr~. French Minister of Finance, visits Rome 
Mr.  Debr~, French Minister of Finance and Economy,  arrived in 
Rome on 20 January 1968 at the invitation of Mr.  Colombo,  Italian Minister  of 
the Treasury.  In the course of the discussions held by the two Ministers,  an 
assessment was made of the measures which the United States proposed to 
take in order to restore the equilibrium of the American balance of payments, 
as well as their foreseeable effects on the economies of the countries of 
Europe.  Mr.  Colombo emphasized the need for the economic policies of the 
countries of Europe to avoid and resist any deflationist trends that might be 
caused by increased income taxes or by the consequences of other internal 
American measures.  He  also stressed the necessity for the countries of 
Europe to study and co-ordinate together the cyclical economic policies to be 
applied in future months. Mr. Debr~, for his part, stated that the measures 
announced by the United States represented an effort made by that country to 
restore the equilibrium of its balance of payments.  He then agreed with Mr. 
Colombo that it was essential to co-ordinate the economic policies of the six 
member States of the Community, in order to counteract the negative effects 
that might derive from  the American measures.  The two Ministers finally 
laid particular stress on the need to seek the most suitable methods for 
reaching these aims.  The surveys and proposals made during these discussions 
will be examined at subsequent meetings to be held by the Finance Ministers 
of the countries of the European Community. 
(Il Popolo,  21 January 196 8) 
-42-5.  Visit of Federal Chancellor Kiesinger to Rome 
On 1 February talks were begun in Rome between Dr.  Kiesinger and 
Foreign Minister Brandt and Ministers Moro, Fanfani and Nenni. 
Four items came up for discussion : Europe and British entry into 
the Common Market, the Middle East, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, 
and relations with countries of the Eastern bloc.  Relations between the Six and 
the United Kingdom were, however, the main topic discussed. 
The official communiqu~ issued immediately after the talks stresses 
the 'broad identity of views on the arguments dealt with', as can be seen from 
the following extracts : 
' The two sides agreed that their Governments should support any ef-
forts made, particularly in the various international bodies, to hasten an ami-
cable solution of disputes and to create the conditions for consolidating peace. 
This also implies a just solution of the German question through peaceful 
reunification.  Both the Italian and German Governments confirmed their deter-
mination to do  all in their power to achieve,  at the earliest _opportunity,the aim 
of European unification,  which is still the basis of the foreign policy of each 
Government. 
The two sides announced the common intention to facilitate action by 
the European Communities and to seek ways and means of avoiding a widening 
of the gap at present separating the UnitedKingdom and other States desirous 
of admission to the EEC from the European Economic Community,  and to 
establish the conditions necessary to speed up British entry,  removing exist-
ing obstacles to negotiations.  In this connexion consideration was also given to 
problems connected with East-West relations, and both sides outlined the steps 
to be taken to ease tension.  It was agreed to step up contacts with the Eastern 
bloc countries and to seek more effective ways and means of extending  and 
strengthening European collaboration. 
The two sides discussed the difficulties in the Middle East and reaf-
firmed their desire to support the action taken by UNO  in that area. 
The crucial interest felt by the two countries in the action taken in 
the Atlantic Alliance was reaffirmed,  as well as their faith in the system of 
integrated defence which makes it suitable for the pursuit of the aims of peace 
and collaboration underlying the West's policy. 
-43-Both sides would continue to work determinedly for complete and 
controlled general disarmament measures, including an agreement on the non-
proliferation of nuclear arms.  The efficacy of such an agreement, of which 
both sides are in favour,  will be bound up with the observance of the needs of 
international security and the legitimate interests of all countries participating, 
as well as the adhesion of the maximum number of nuclear and non-nuclear 
States. Imbued with a spirit of solidarity with the developing countries,  both 
sides confirmed their desire to make a maximum contribution to progress in 
those lands. 
Dr. Kiesinger and President Moro finally noted with great satisfac-
tion that relations between Italy and Germany were proceeding in a highly satis-
factory way in all sectors, and recognized once again the value of more fre-
quent consultations at various levels on the major international problems of 
common interest ....•  ' 
(Relazioni Internazionali, No.  6 of 10 February 1968) 
6.  Official visit of Mr.  Fanfani, Italian Foreign Minister, to Algeria 
Mr.  Fanfani, Italian Foreign Minister,  made an official visit to 
Algeria from 9 to 13 February 1968 at the invitation of Mr.  Buteflika, the 
Foreign Minister. 
A joint communiqu~ was issued in Algiers on the substance of the 
political discussions to which the visit gave rise; this stated, inter alia : 
' .....  In their conversations, the two Foreign Ministers made an 
extensive review of the international situation, with particular reference to the 
various problems concerning the African continent •..•• 
In this connexion, both parties were gratified to note their agree-
ment in stressing the importance that Mrica had assumed on the international 
scene and the r6le that it could play in a balanced and peaceful development of 
the world. 
Mr.  Fanfani drew attention to the progress made in the situation in 
Europe thanks to an easing of tension; he also laid emphasis on the hiatus that 
had resulted in the EEC in regard to Britain's application for membership. He 
-44-explained the action taken by Italy to overcome the difficulties arising for the 
enlargement of the Community and as regards the development of economic 
relations between the Community itself and the other Mediterranean States. 
Both parties agreed to see to it that the relations between the EEC andAlgeria 
constituted a real factor for progress in the context of this action. 
The  problem of the developing countries was one which attracted  the 
particular attention of both parties. They  considered that it was a matter of 
urgency to reduce the growing imbalance in the trade between the ThirdWorld 
countries and the industrialized nations.  Consequently, both parties undertook 
to spare no effort to ensure that the second session of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development that was then in progress in New Delhi led 
to practical results in this field.  In this connexion and in the supreme interests 
of peace, both Ministers recognized the need to strengthen the r6le of the 
United Nations. 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  17  February 1968) 
Luxembourg 
1.  A plan of action for a European monetary policy 
Mr. Werner, the Prime Minister, in a statement made at a confer-
ence of the Economic Council of the Christian Democratic Union held in Saar-
brUcken on 25  January, outlined the prospects of a European financial and 
monetary policy. 
He referred to various factors which were reawakening interest in 
the monetary integration of the Common Market - the common agricultural 
policy, the system of international liquidities, the United Kingdom's applica-
tion for entry and finally the full flowering of a European capital market.  In 
view of the pattern of events and of the importance of the problems referred  to, 
one wondered whether,  in spite of the general policy aspects raised by any 
initiative in the monetary field, the moment had not come for the Community 
to work out a plan of campaign in this sphere. 
Having regard purely to the needs of economic integration and the 
sound operation of the system of international payments,  such a plan could be 
along the following lines : 
-45.-1.  Definition of monetary operations to be taken only after consulting 
the other parties, either on the Council of Ministers, the Monetary 
Committee or, perhaps,  a special body consisting of finance minis-
ters and of governors of central banks. 
2.  Preparation and approval of the definition of the European unit of ac-
count, following harmonization of the formulas used in the European 
Treaties and in various regulations.  The use of this unit of account 
among the Six would spread quite naturally, depending on the need 
for common action either within or outside the Community. 
3.  The Six ought to specify  - with or without reference to the unit of 
account  - their reciprocal commitments for the maintenance  of 
fixed ratios between their currencies. 
Mr. Werner recalled that the six Governments haddefinedtheparity 
of their currencies in relation to gold within the context of their commitments 
to the International Monetary Fund. 
4.  Co-ordination of the monetary co-operation of the Six with that prac-
tised at world level by the IMF was essential to the aims of security 
and free movement of trade advocated by the financial organizations 
created in Bretton Woods. 
Thi~ highlighted the importance of consultation and the co-ordination 
of points of view in relations with these organizations. The procedures followed 
in the previous year would have to be continued on a more systematic basis. 
They would become particularly important once the scheme for new special 
drawing rights on the Fund came into operation. 
5.  For the present an inter-governmental agreement would have to be 
sketched out into which could be incorporated,  at the appropriate 
moment, the extent of the obligations of each country in the matter 
of mutual assistance in pursuance of Articles  108 and 109 of the 
Treaty. 
This assistance could be organized through a community body in the 
form of a European monetary co-operation fund through which two kinds of 
operations would be channelled : 
within the Community,  mutual assistance to restore balance-of-pay-
ments equilibium,  subject to this being tied in with drawings on the 
IMF; 
-46-outside the Community, international credit operations stemming 
either from the common commercial policy or from the aid to be 
given under the international payments system. 
(Ministry of State Information Bulletin, No.  2,  26 January 1968) 
2.  Press Conference of Mr.  Gr~goire, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 
the enlargement of the Community 
On his return from Brussels where he attended a meeting of the 
Assembly of Western European Union,  Mr.  Pierre Gr~goire,  Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, was interviewed by the Luxembourg press regarding the pro-
posals he had made to the Council. 
The Luxembourg Minister pointed out that in the matter ofenlarging 
the Community,  all kinds of feelings were involved.  On the one hand, there was 
the aim to achieve the reunification of Europe and,  on the other, there were 
the many reservations and even the reluctance displayed by certain Govern-
ments which,  evidently,  did not share the enthusiasm of the founders of the 
Community. 
Mr.  Gr~goire wondered whether the time had not come to give u.p 
these reservations, to overcome this feeling of reluctance in spite of the  di-
vergent opinions, in order to strengthen and enlarge what had already been 
achieved.  In his opinion, there was nothing against seeki)lg a solution to the 
problems Europe was faced with in the opportunities offered in the simple and 
appropriate framework of Western European Union.  It  would only be necessary 
to extend the activities of that body and to admit new Members. WEU would 
thus become the preparatory stage to the admission of new States in the Euro-
pean Community.  The great advantage of this solution resided in the fact that 
the problem of the restricted domain of the Rome Treaty would no  longer be 
posed in such an acute manner.  The applicants would have the opportunity to 
submit themselves to a sort of purgatory, to carry out the neccessary struc..-
tural adjustments and to correct their economic policies. With the active sup-
port of the Six,  the applicant States could, within a given period of time, be 
admitted to the Community.  Mr.  Gr~goire agreed that such a proposal might 
mean changes in the UNO  Treaty but this did not imply insurmountable diffi-
culties. 
(Luxemburger Wort,  31 January 1968) 
- 47-3.  Visit to the United Kingdom of Mr. Werner, President of the 
Luxembourg Government 
On their return from the United Kingdom on 13  March, Mr. Werner, 
President of the Luxembourg Government,  and Mr.  Gr~goire, Foreign Minis-
ter, made a statement to the press on the conclusions that the British and 
Luxembourg Governments had drawn on the problem of Britain's accession to 
the Common Market . 
The two Governments considered that an enlargement of the EEC 
and hence Britain's accession to the Community would be desirable.  The United 
Kingdom stated that it would not withdraw its application, come what may. The 
ultimate objective of the efforts made by the two Governments was the full ac-
cession of the United Kingdom. 
The two Governments were aware that, before  achieving this objec-
tive,  a transitional period was necessary. It was desirable,  meanwhile,  to 
find ways of ensuring that divergences between the member States and the non-
member States do not become wider, particularly in the case of those who are 
making ready to become full members of the Community. 
(Luxemburger Wort,  14 March 1968) 
Netherlands 
1.  Debates of the Second Chamber on European policy 
During the debate on the Foreign Mfairs Budget held on 6,  7 and 13 
February the Second Chamber adopted,  in line with the resolutions of the 
Monnet Committee, four motions tabled by  Mr.  Schmelzer (Catholic People's 
Party). These related to the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC,  mergers 
within the EEC,  development programmes in the technological sector, and rela-
tions between the EEC and the United States and Eastern bloc countries  re-
spectively.  They had already been studied in November 1967 by the standing 
committee on foreign affairs and passed to the Second Chamber for approval. 
The Second Chamber also adopted a motion by Messrs.  Vander Stoel (Labour 
Party) and Visser (Democracy' 66)  relating to a European security confer-
ence (1).  Mr.  Visser invited the Government to make this motion one of the 
(1)  See European Documentation No.  5/1967. 
- 48-main planks of its policy.  The Foreign Minister agreed with Mr.  Schuijt (Cath-
olic People's Party) that the United States and the Soviet Union should be invi-
ted to the conference. Mr. Schuijt sounded the Government as to whether the 
smaller countries could look after the arrangements.  Mr.  Luns accepted the 
suggestion and said he would take up the matter wi.th his Hungarian colleague 
on a visit to Budapest in mid-February.  He was convinced of the extreme in-
terest felt by the small countries of Eastern Europe in such a conference,  and 
felt that their guarded attitude merely reflected Soviet coolness. 
Turning to the group of nine -now ten  - small European States, 
Mr.  Luns stated that their political discussions had not yet got underway  but 
that members were already consulting each other on policy.  The Eastern bloc 
countries were stipulating that East Germany  participate in these consultations. 
Mr.  Luns denied that recognition of East Germany had been made a condition 
for convening a security conference.  He was not in principle opposed to a 
measure of participation by the German Democratic Republic,  although every-
thing depended on the way the country was represented. 
Turning to the Benelux memorandum, Mr.  Luns stated that he real-
ized that such a procedure could not of itself alter the situation created by the 
French veto on the opening of negotiations,  and that means other than those 
referred to in Article 237 of the Treaty would have to be deyised to bring the 
EEC countries and the applicant countries closer pending the latter's entry. 
It ought to be explained to applicant countries,  and particularly to 
the United Kingdom,  that the vast majority of members of the European Com-
munities wanted their admission and to do  everything possible to bring it about. 
It was essential to prevent them from being discouraged by the French veto 
and turning their backs on the Communities. It was therefore desirable to 
keep in close touch with these countries and to maintain constant consultation 
on the policy to be followed on either side.  Efforts must be made to bring the 
two sides closer and closer and to ensure that the systems of the applicant 
countries did not depart still further from those of the Communities.  Consul-
tations should be held with these countries on any major changes occurring 
within the Community, even if this is done through each of the Governments. 
Conversely, these countries should enter into consultations with tile various 
EEC member States on the development of their policy. particularly their 
economic policy, in so far as it had an important bearing on-their -ultimate 
accession.  The Governments of the three Benelux countries also considered 
that co-operation should not be limited to consultation. If the damage to Euro-
pean unity was to be kept to a minimum,  it was essential to act in concert with 
the applicant countries pending their admission.  The three Governments there-
fore proposed to vary the number of participants for each project and each ac-
tivity. 
-49-The Benelux Governments had already decided to consult each other 
beforehand on any decision concerning problems of common interest, and on 
all major policy issues, so as to arrive at the closest possible identity of 
views.  This decision concerned above all European political co-operation, 
East-West relations,  and relations with the developing countries.  The Govern-
ments hoped that other European States would associate themselves with their 
efforts.  The Netherlands Government regarded all these proposals as a step 
towards accession under the most favourable conditions. If  this one day proved 
possible, these activities should then coincide with those of the Communities. 
The Benelux memorandum has been sent to each of the six Govern-
ments and therefore also to France.  It was felt that the possibility of getting 
France to take part in the proposed action ought not to be ruled out.  It was 
essential, however,  to be quite certain that France would not again have an 
opportunity of blocking certain activities. 
The Benelux proposals aimed at a further strengthening of the Com-
munities.  Dutch policy was based on the hope that one day the European Com-
munities would serve as a foundation for European unity.  This was a deeply-
felt European conviction which had been shared by successive Governments in 
the Netherlands and had been  unshaken by the setbacks of recent years and of 
the last few months.  The Netherlands had never had any intention of turning 
its back on the European Communities,  and even less of destroying them.  The 
Government has never considered following such a course, even assuming it 
had been possible. 
The events of 19 December had obviously had the effect that the 
Netherlands  - in a Community which had strayed so far from its appointed 
path under intolerable pressure from one member State  - had more reason 
than ever to exclude any chance of a continental isolationism developing, 
whether in the political, financial or economic sphere,  and wherever it might 
appear.  In other words, the Netherlands had to exercise more discretion than 
would have been necessary under more favourable conditions. It had, in par-
ticular, to oppose measures which would obviously be serious obstacles to the 
ultimate accession of fresh members. If that happened,  salvation would have 
to be sought in provisional arrangements rather than in final decisions which 
might pose major difficulties for the future.  This again was a  question best 
judged from case to case. The political line of the Government also implied 
that in spheres that lay outside the scope of the Treaty of Rome and therefore 
lent themselves to co-operation with the applicant countries,  such concerted 
action was not restricted to  the Six. 
(Debates ofthe Second Chamber  - Foreign Affairs  - Session 1967-1968, 
sittings of 6,  7 and 13  February 1968) 
-50-2.  Parliamentary questions 
The Netherlands abstains from voting on the 1968 budget of the 
European Communities 
On 21 December 1967 Mr.  Burger (Labour Party) asked theGovern-
ment why it had abstained,  at the Council session of 13 December 1967,  from 
taking part in the vote on the 1968 budget of the European Communities. 
On 11 January 1968 Mr.  Luns replied that the Dutch Government 
had had nothing in common,  at that Council session, with those who wished to 
weaken the Commission's position to the advantage of member States.  The Dutch 
attitude stemmed from its desire to give priority to strengthening the  Com-
missio~ by making its departments more efficient. 
Mr.  Luns added that the Council could not,  in any case, have final-
ly approved the draft budget in December since the European Parliament and 
the Court of Justice had not been consulted. 
Another difficulty lay in the fact that at the time of the Council's 
discussions - 11 and 12 December - the new composition of the Commission's 
staff had still been unknown,  an overhaul of staff structure having proved 
necessary following the merger. 
The Commission had proposed the adoption of a draft budget based 
on the composition of the staff as it had been at the time  - a draft budget 
under which half the credits earmarked under this head would have been 
blocked.  Subsequently, but before 31 March,  a modified budget would be sub-
mitted on the basis of rationalization schemes still to be worked out.  In  the 
meantime the Commission should restrict  the number of new engagements. 
The Dutch view was that the period the Commission had in mind for 
carrying out rationalization was too long  - extending in fact to 31 March  -
and that it was not inclined to cut it down sufficiently. 
According to the Netherlands Government it should be possible  to 
take advantage of the time needed for consulting the European Parliament and 
the Court of Justice to draw up  rationalization plans. 
- 51-Later Mr. Burger stated that he had detected in this reply no poli-
tical consideration of any kind but only practical arguments whose reliability 
he in no way disputed. 
(Proceedings of the First Chamber, Session 1967-1968, Annex,  Page 75, 
Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant of 26 January 1968) 
Cyclical surveys 
In response to a written question put on 30 January 1968 by 
Mr. Vredeling concerning the participation of the Netherlands in EEC cyclical 
surveys, Minister De Block stated on 22  February 1968 that the Council of 
Dutch Employers Associations was considering the full harmonization of  cy-
clical tests carried out in the Netherlands with EEC surveys.  The difficulty in 
taking such a measure, was the need for preserving the secrecy to which the 
Central Statistical Office was committed vis-h-vis those sectors of industry 
which took part in cyclical tests and the fact that these sectors have a part to 
play in drawing up  statistics which,  moreover, are of a technical nature. 
(Minutes of debates of the Second Chamber,  1967-68 session, Annex 691) 
Official committees 
On 30 January, Mr.  Vredeling put a question concerning the pro-
cedure to be followed in setting up official committees in the EEC.  In reply, 
Mr.  Luns stated on 23  February that the Government maintained its  viewpoint 
and that it was preferable to follow,  in new matters of Community legislation, 
procedures applicable to management committees, without,  however,excluding 
the possibility of settling in a different way the question of delegating powers 
in given cases. With regard to veterinary policy the Government shared the 
view of the European Parliament (l).,i.  During the discussions that ensued in 
Brussels on this subject, the Government had endeavoured to induce the Com-
mission and the other member States to apply, for the permanent veterinary 
committee as well, the procedure followed by the management committees. 
(Minutes of debates of the Second Chamber,  1967-68 session, Annex 697) 
(1)  Lulling Report, Doc.  129/1967. 
-52-Budget of the European Parliament 
On 1 February, Mr. Westerterp asked the Government what attitude 
it proposed to take with regard to the refusal of the European Parliament to 
make reductions in its draft budget for 1968.  He  regarded it as inadmissible 
that the Council of Ministers should take it upon itself to make drastic cuts in 
the budget of the European Parliament. 
Mr.  De Koster, Secretary of State for Foreign Mfairs, replied as 
follows on 27  February :  'The Council has consulted the European Parliament, 
in accordance with Article 203,  2 of the Treaty setting up the EEC, because it 
could not agree to the proposal of Parliament designed to modify the grades of 
a number of officials.  The divergent views of Parliament and the Council on 
the subject are not of recent date.  The Council fears iD: fact that the changes 
proposed by Parliament would result in  disrupting the balance that exists at 
present in the composition of its staff. 
The same problem ar.ises,  as a matter of fact, in other Community 
institutions.  Thus, the Council informed the Court of Justice of its wish that 
such changes should not be made.  Furthermore, the Council suggested to Par-
liament that a number of minor amendments be made in connexion with the pro-
visional estimates of several items of the budget.  In view of the trend of  ex-
penditure in 1967,  the general impression prevailed on the Council that cuts 
could be made in respect of the European Parliament without reducing any of 
its activities. 
The Netherlands Government remains of the opinion that the Council 
should give the most favourable consideration to the estimates made by Par-
liament. The Netherlands Government will take due account of the above-
mentioned resolution when drawing up the draft budget and the final budget of 
the Council.  On the other hand,  it is for the Council,  as the budgetary author-
ity of the European Communities, to follow a general policy in these individual 
cases. In the view of the Government, this did not mean that tlie Council should 
abstain from pronouncing on the estimates made by Parliament. 
(Minutes of debates of the Second Chamber,  1967-68 session, Annex 707) 
3.  A speech by Mr.  Luns in Milan on the Common Market at the 
present moment 
On 27  February Mr.  Luns; Dutch Foreign Minister, spoke in Milan on 
'the Common Market at the present moment' ; he did so at the invitation of 
-53-the Institute  for International Studies  and of the  Dutch Chamber of  Com-
merce in Italy. 
Mr  Luns began by recalling that it was six years since the United 
Kingdom  had first  applied for  membership  of  the  European  Community. 
Five countries had supported this application, while the sixth had opposed it 
for economic reasons.  He went on : 'Be this as it may, these economic argu-
ments would not appear to be justified.  Economists,  in fact,  consider that 
nothing could provide a better stimulus to increasing productivity and to the 
modernization of British industry than the prospect of early accession to a 
market of 250m consumers. It should be added that once the national customs 
barriers have disappeared the competition, which is often keen on the conti-
nent,  could be exercised freely on the British market.  At the same time,  we 
should not forget that the United Kingdom has stated its readiness to couple its 
accession with restoring Britain to economic and financial health.  Hence  - at 
least from the economic viewpoint - nothing should stand in the way of opening 
negotiations. 
It would seem to me that the political ideas of the member State 
which is keeping itself to one side are based on an erroneous assessment of 
European developments. It would be unfortunate if the Six were to move wwaras 
neo-isolationism or supernationalism.  These dangerous ideas are, moreover, 
not in any way new.  In December 1807, here in Milan,  a historic city which 
had, by that time, been an important one for several centuries, Napoleon is-
sued a decree reinforcing the continental system.  Under this,  any ship that 
had touched a British port was purely and simply to be confiscated.  This was 
a hard blow, both for the cities of Northern Italy and for those of the Nether-
lands.  Although the comparison may not seem entirely appropriate,  we  are 
bound to note that 160 years later it is intended to exclude from the economic 
integration process as important a European State as Britain, and this in con-
tradiction of the Treaties and for reasons alien to the principles of integration 
Let us hope that a truer view of realities may soon prevail among all our 
associates. 
The geographical enlargement of the Common Market is therefore, 
in my opinion,  our most urgent task.  Yet I would recall that it is just as im-
portant to strengthen the internal structure of our organization and to keep it 
dynamic as opposed to static.  The member States should accept a realpartic-
ipation on the part of the European citizen in the decisions of the organization 
so as to avoid the European officials  having an ever more pronounced influence 
on the machinery in Brussels. We lack a real European Parliament. On the 
national scale, at least in the Netherlands,  we find at present  that the relations 
between the elector and the elected,  administrator and administered are being 
challenged.  As a reaction against the growing influence of the public authority, 
which is due to the complexity of modern life, there has arisen among  the 
general public a feeling of great uneasiness, which finds expression  in rebellion 
-54-and in demonstrations to obtain greater influence for the elector. There is a 
danger that  a gulf may be created  between the elector and the Government and 
this gulf already exists at the European level. 
It is imperative for direct elections to be held in the near future to 
enable European citizens to make a direct contribution to the creation of the 
united Europe and to feel personally bound to the European Parliament.  This 
Parliament, ought, moreover, to exercise an effective control over the Com-
munity institutions.  Every week in Brussels a great many important decisions 
are taken over which those who represent the European people are not really 
able to exercise any appreciable influence.  The agricultural fund alone already 
absorbs at least$ 500m a year, without being subject to the kind of control we 
have in our national States.  The introduction of an authentic,  democratic con-
trol at the European level would also make it possible to give greater  freedom 
to the European Commission and to widen its terms of reference.  For, if we 
have now reached the present stage, we owe this to the initiative of this 
supranational European Commission and to the impetus that it has imparted  to 
integration. It remains the driving force of our Community and it cannot be 
replaced by any inter-governmental body whose decisions would be taken on a 
unanimity basis. ' 
Mr.  Luns recalled the need to enlarge the CommWlity and said it 
was desirable to avoid discouraging applicant States : 'To this end we  should 
establish close and lasting links with these countries and focus our attention 
on the policy to be pursued on both sides.  We  must move closer together 
economically and see to it that the gulf between their economic systems and 
that of the Community does not become deeper. 
In my opinion,  it would be desirable to set up regular consultation 
machinery, vested with some power to guarantee closer contacts. But this 
would not be enough.  If we wish to soften the blow to the European cause, we 
must, wherever possible, initiate common activities with the applicant States. 
Fortunately, this will be possible in certain fields because, however wide-
ranging the European Communities may be, they have only covered part of the 
gamut of the activities of the European countries. The production and acquisi-
tion of military equipment,  co-operation in science and technology,  assistance 
to the developing countries could allow for new forms of European co-opera-
tion between the applicant States and the member States wishing to take part. 
We  certainly do not intend to set up a parallel or rival Community and we  are 
well aware that this ad hoc co-operation with applicant States cannot,  at best, 
be more than a "brilliant alternative" to be replaced in due course by full 
membership of our Communities.' 
Mr.  Luns concluded as follows : 'Europe is moving forward rapidly 
and there are a thousand currents and cross-currents at work. Wehavehadour 
-55-moments of confusion and we have had our failures but our standing objective 
remains that of a democratic,  supra-national Europe,  which is open to all its 
children.  The present setback is a serious challenge to the strength of Euro-
pean unification but I am firmly convinced that we shall come through this 
trial. For Italy and the Netherlands to maintain their positions in this connex-
ion will be a decisive factor. 
1 
(Relazioni lnternazionali,  No.  10,  9 March 1968) 
The Scandinavian countries 
The Scandinavian countries are keen on taking part in a trade con-
ference with the Six 
Copenhagen,  Oslo and Stockholm have reacted favourably to the 
Benelux move for closer contacts between the Six and States wishing to join 
the EEC pending an answer to the problem of the economic division of Europe. 
On 8 February 1968 the Danish Government published the text of the 
Danish reply to the Benelux countries memorandum.  This speaks highly of the 
efforts of the Benelux countries to smooth the way for entry into the Commu-
nities of the applicant States. Denmark welcomed the concrete proposals made 
for consultations between the European Communities,  the six member States 
and the candidates for entry,  and said it was ready and willing to enter into 
talks on the subject. 
The reply to the Benelux countries handed over on 8 February by the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry welcomed any measures for remedying the divi-
sion of the European market.  Norway therefore approved of the Benelux pro-
posals for closer co-operation between the EEC and applicant States. 
Denmark and Norway attached great importance,  however,  to the 
participation of Sweden which,  because of the non-committal nature of its ap-
plication,  had not received the Benelux memorandum but had been only orally 
informed. 
The Swedish Government has informed the Belgian Government, 
through its ambassador,  of its interest in a conference on economic co-opera-
tion in Europe to be attended by all the States concerned.  Sweden 
1 s  move is to 
be seen against the background of its request for negotiations with the Euro-
pean Community. 
-56-The answers of the Scandinavian States were sent out after they had 
held searching discussions among themselves.  While Denmark stressed its 
interest in full membership of the EEC,  a statement by the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry merely pointed out its favourable attitude towards a European econo-
mic conference should be seen in the light of Sweden's desire to enter into 
negotiations with.the EEC. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  10 February 1968; Le Monde,  11/12 Febru-
ary 1968) 
Switzerland 
Switzerland and European integration 
Speaking for the Federal Council at a meeting ·of the Council of 
States (Standerat) on 6 March, Mr.  H.  Schaffner, Federal Councillor, made a 
statement of fundamental significance on the present state of European integra-
tion. 
He  said that the Federal Council was following the discussions cur-
rently in progress in Brussels with the greatest attention. It was noted with 
satisfaction that an endeavour had already been made in the first EEC Council 
meeting after the occurrence of the difficulties referred to concerning the en-
largement of the European Communities to find new possibilities of a solution 
and it was hoped that there would be a constructive outcome to these discus-
sions. 
Switzerland had not been officially informed of these new plans. It 
would therefore be premature to comment at this stage.  In particular one had 
to wait to see whether agreement was reached between the Six EEC countries 
concerningfutwre progress and,  in any event, what outcome this attempt to 
find a solution might have.  It appeared that this would be based on a new con-
cept in so far as the enlargement of the EEC would not be accomplished in a 
single stage but provision would be made for an interim solution in the form of 
a preliminary 'trade policy' stage. In other words, instead of waiting and 
remaining inactive until the economic and political requirements for an en-
largement of the European Communities were fulfilled  - which would at best 
entail a longer period of time with efforts being concentrated on building the 
economic union and on the anticipated completion at the end of 1969 of the con-
solidation phase of the EEC  - whatever action were now possible should be 
taken in the trade and economic policy field in order to offset the negative ef-
fects of the split across the European economic area. 
-57 -The main points under consideration here seemed to be : 
a)  further reduction in the tariff and non-tariff obstacles to trade between 
the EEC and other European countries; 
b)  measures to increase agricultural trade in Europe, 
c)  the possibility of widening the scope of work being done on a European 
patents agreement,  a European company law and technological co-
operation with a wider circle of States. 
These points could be the basis for a decisive but realistic and gen-
uine move forward towards strengthening and widening the European economic 
area. A prerequisite for this is that there should be no new split.  For this 
reason it was essential, on the one hand, for the EEC as a whole to be readyto 
take part in such measures and,  on the other, for all the EFTA States so de-
siring to be invited to take part.  This is morP to the point in that the customs 
liberation in the industrial sphere which EFTA has achieved already n.:presents 
a significant contribution to the creation of a free European economic area 
which must never be allowed to be cancelled out. 
Switzerland, in common with the four countries that had applied for 
membership in the past year, had a right to expect to be called to such consul-
tations and negotiations which for the present would indeed only involve interim 
solutions.  Under these circumstances, even a temporary postponement  af-
fecting Switzerland would be neither fair nor acceptable for reasons which 
hardly need to be mentioned.  Mter the United States, Switzerland was, with 
the United Kingdom,  the EEC's most important customer; last year the Com-
munity achieved its greatest external trade surplus vis-h.-vis Switzerland, to 
wit : 5, 038m francs.  Switzerland's per capita trade with the EEC was  more 
intensive than that of most EEC States between themselves. It absorbed 12 per 
cent of the EEC's agricultural exports. 
On behalf of the Federal Council, Mr.  Schaffner had made a state-
ment in the National Council last June  - and the EEC States were informedof 
this  - pointing out that Switzerland would in no way rule out any new possibi-
lity of a solution of the kind recently put forward by certain of the  member 
States. When these possible solutions were no longer under discussion, 
Switzerland immediately drew the attention of the EEC Governments to this 
statement once again; this was done through diplomatic channels so that it 
should not give rise to any false idea about a technical priority in negotiations 
as between the Six and the Four. 
Switzerland was aware that possible trade policy arrangements 
should be regarded as an interim stage on the way to the enlargement of  the 
-58-EEC.  Switzerland had, however, never allowed any doubt to arise about  the 
fact that its standing aim was also that of creating an enlarged European mar-
ket and that it would,  in due course, examine the machinery that would operate 
for the participation of a neutral State with a federal structure and it would 
make proposals in this context.  The EEC, too,  did not consider that the time 
has yet come for this.  The proposals now under discussion provided for no 
close institutional links so that they would not involve any special arrangement 
as regards the co-operation of a neutral State. 
The near future would show what degree of seriousness was attached 
to these plans and whether negotiating rules could be envisaged which took into 
account the needs of world trade and GATT principles.  After years of disap-
pointments, it would certainly not be too early for simple and large-scale so-
lutions. 
On 6 March, the statement made by Mr.  Schaffner in the Council of 
States was endorsed by Mr. Wurth, Head of the Swiss Mission to the European 
Communities; in an oral approach to the European Commission he informed 
them that Switzerland maintained its fundamental position regarding European 
integration and joined with the countries that had applied for membershipofthe 
EEC in wishing to participate in forms of co-operation with the Community 
which could be worked out in the near future. 
Mr. Wurth pointed out on this occasion that Switzerland was also 
interested in other aspects of reciprocal co-operatj.on, !Jarticularly  in  the fields 
of the law on patents and of technical progress. Suggestions to this effect were, 
in particular, to be found in the Benelux Memorandum. 
On 7 March, Mr.  Max Troendle, Swiss Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Germany, explained Switzerland's position regarding the efforts 
being made in Brussels to enlarge the EEC to Chancellor Kiesinger.  He  re-
ferred to the statement made by the Swiss Government on 26 June 1967.  The 
objective spelt out on that occasion, i.e. to find an arrangement which made it 
possible for Switzerland,  while maintaining its permanent neutrality, to co-
operate in the further construction of an integrated European Market, still held 
good.  Switzerland expressed not only its keen interest in an arrangement in a 
sense of the German  proposals but also made known its wish to sit at the nego-
tiating table in the event of discussions on working out a free trade or prefer-
ence area. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  8 and 13 March 1968; Le Monde 9 and 13 March 1968) 
-59-IT.  PARTIES AND  PROMINENT POLITICIANS 
1.  German Socialists and Community policy 
The German Social Democrats remain in favour of the admission 
of the United Kingdom and other European States to the EEC. On 5 January 
1968,  the party executive,  following a brief review by Mr. Brandt of the cur-
rent foreign policy situation,  described the statement made in December by 
the Council of Ministers on the applications received from the United Kingdom 
and other States as only an interim result. 
The SPD pointed out that the procedures could be resumed at any 
meeting of the Council. In the weeks ahead,  the problems arising from the 
United Kingdom's application would have to be discussed on a bilateral basis 
between the EEC member States and the Governments of the applicant States. 
Mr. Brandt said that the Federal Government would actively participate in 
these talks. The SPD executive considered that the economic division of Euro-
pe could only be overcome once the existing Communities had been enlarged 
and had established satisfactory relations with other European States. 
(VWD-Europa,  6 February 1968) 
2.  Statement. on European policy by former Chancellor Erhard 
Writing in the SUnday Telegraph on 14 January Dr.  Ludwig Erhard, 
the former German Chancellor,  said that the positive attitude of the five EEC 
States on Britain's accession to the Community entitled the United Kingdom to 
expect a little more than mere lip-service to its cause from the Federal Gov-
ernment. The difficulties with which the United Kingdom was at present wrestling, 
whether as a result of unforeseen circumstances or through some faults of its 
own,  should not lead to Chauvinism in Europe,  nor to any fresh struggle for 
national supremacy. Germany,  which at one time suffered from such a sick-
ness,  could only be exonerated from such a suspicion if it strongly opposed any 
nationalistic trends. Dr. Erhard went on to say that this was what he had en-
deavoured to do and he ventured to hope that history would give him credit for 
it. 
- 61-In an article entitled 'Why no British economic miracle' written at 
the request of the conservative Sunday newspaper concerned Dr. Erhard went 
into the causes of the 'English disease'; in this he described the Socialist over-
emphasis on the welfare State as the main obstacle in the path of a restoration 
of economic wealth.  One important factor in the current crisis was,  indeed, 
that Britain's economic and financial resources had been drained in two world 
wars - not least on behalf of France - but this did not excuse errors and mis-
takes for which British policy alone was responsible and which had today 
brought the country to the brink of the abyss. 
Any attempt made,  without the necessary economic strength,  to 
maintain the discipline and order of the welfare state or,  indeed,  to enlarge 
upon  it ,  could only end in the long run in economic collapse. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  15  January 1968; Industriekurier, 
16 January 1968; Le Monde,  16 January 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Lecanuet on relations between Europe and the United States 
On 25  January,  on his return from the United States,  Mr.  Lecanuet, 
President of the 'Centre democrate' (Democratic Party of the Centre) gave a 
press conference at which he stressed his concern at the deterioration of Fran-
co-American relations:  'When the Vietnam issue became a thing of the past, 
the solidarity of the Atlantic nations would have to rise again; yet it would,  at 
the same time,  have to be built to an entirely new design. In preparing Europe's 
r6le - which had to be an independent one - the choice lay between nationalism 
and collective security. ' 
'The greater and more powerful Europe became,  the less it would be 
subordinated to the United States. The Alliance had to be maintained  for Europe's 
security and it had to be redesigned and rebuilt in a way consistent with the 
economic,  political and military unity which Europe would assume; and Europe 
had to accept the United Kingdom.' 
'General de Gaulle could have been the first President of the United 
States of Europe,  instead of remaining the last sovereign of the French, ' 
Mr.  Lecanuet concluded. 
(Le Monde,  Le Figaro,  26  January 1968) 
- 62-4.  Mr. Jean Monnet discusses the future of Europe 
On 25 January at a CDU  (Christian Democrat Union)  conference in 
Saarbrticken,  Mr. Jean Monnet spoke about Europe in the world of tomorrow. 
He spoke first about the position of the United Kingdom: Britain had 
seen its empire disappear,  its influence in the world diminish and it could not 
settle its problems without Europe. Britain's political view of the world could 
not find a  successful expression unless it became party to a political stand-
point common to the countries of a united Europe and unless the voice then rais-
ed became the common voice of Europe. 
Mr. Jean Monnet then spoke of Europe's technological inadequacy: 
'Taken severally,  the countries of Europe were no longer in step with the elec-
tronic age we were now entering.  In spite of this,  we remained satisfied and 
we were proud to preserve our national sovereignty,  as if we were unaware of 
our own lack of power. In this situation,  we had rejected from our Community 
the only country in Europe which could make a positive contribution to our tech-
nological development as great at least as that of France or Germany. Unless 
Europe merges its resources it will,  in ten years' time, be an under-developed 
continent. ' 
He then dealt with the political aspect of unification and noted that 
from the political point of view Europe was dragging its feet.  Experience had 
clearly shown that it was essential to organize Europe and yet the only voices 
to be heard were either national,  timid or disdainful. 
(Le Figaro,  26  January 1968) 
5.  Mr.  Chaban-Delmas and Mr. de Lipkowski give their views on the 
question of Britain's accession to the EEC 
When  questioned by journalists on  television on  29  January, 
Mr.  Chaban-Delmas,  President of the French National Assembly,  came out in 
favour of Britain's entry into the Common Market,  subject to certain reserva-
tions as to timing. He added that the European objective would not be in the 
line of our sights until certain conditions were met,  namely a common econom-
ic policy and a common international policy. Without these,  the system would 
disintegrate in less than three months. As a convinced  European of long standing, 
he felt quite at home in the Gaullist camp. 
- 63-Mr. de Lipkowski,  President of the Gaullist Group in the European 
Parliament,  was interviewed by 'Le Soir' on 19 January. Speaking of Britain's 
budgetary measures,  he described them as bold. The curtailment of military 
commitments would restore the balance-of-payments equilibrium. These were, 
however,  long-term measures and could only be regarded as the first  step 
towards creating the necessary conditions for Britain's entry into the Common 
Market.  The real problem,  as described by the European Commission,  was 
still the same. 
Discussing the possibilities of a British reaction against American 
investments and of an offer to co-operate with France in the field of technology, 
he considered that Europe ought to help Britain to come closer for it did  not 
seem to him to be possible for Britain on its own to make the gigantic effort 
expected of it without the help of the Six,  to mention only what was involved in 
the common agricultural market. 
This was why he had launched the idea of a  'pre-accession' phase as 
a compromise. This should extend over a four to five-year transition period. 
On the one hand,  a list would be drawn up of Britain's industrial 
products on which the Six would reduce their customs duties and  on the other, a 
list would be made of those agricultural products from the Community which 
the British would undertake to buy. These lists could be subject to an annual 
review by a joint council and they could be lengthened where possible. This 
would be a practical demonstration of the advantages to all of Britain's entry 
into the Common Market and of its ability subsequently to accept all its regu-
lations. 
Mr. de Lipkowski  concluded by saying that this was his own initiati-
ative,  although it did go back to a statement made by General de Gaulle,  to 
which he thought insufficient attention had been paid,  to wit: 'We are ready to 
work out an arrangement to make things easier for the United Kingdom.' 
(Le Monde,  19,  31  January 1968; Combat,  18  January 1968) 
- 64  -6.  The Agricultural Committee of the CDU Slidwlirttemberg-
Hohenzollern and the Common Agricultural Policy 
The decision to fix  identical  prices for EE C farm products,  despite 
differences in production costs,  had led to distortions in competitive conditions 
to remedy which the Federal Government ought to put forward a series of ini-
tiatives in Brussels in the Council of Ministers.  This view was advanced by 
the Land Agricultural Committee of the CDU  Slidwlirttemberg-Hohenzollern at 
a  meeting presided over by Mr.  Bauknecht (member of the Bundestag) held on 
5 February 1968 in Sigmaringen. 
These initiatives should - the Committee felt - be aimed at main-
taining the milk market regulations to the fullest possible extent,  at fixing beef 
and veal guide prices at DM  2. 80 per kg to discourage low-priced imports,  at 
revising the concessions contemplated in the final GATT agreement and at cut-
ting down pig imports from Eastern Germany and Denmark with a view to rais-
ing prices above their present insupportable level. 
The Committee also maintained that cereal prices for the next sow-
ing period should be fixed before 1 August since the considerable rise in pro-
duction costs had also been recognized by experts.  At the same time the price 
relationship between feed-grain and wheat would have to be  still further  im-
proved.  The Committee also pointed out that if egg and poultry production was 
to be carried out economically the quantity of eggs for hatching would have to 
be controlled. In addition,  German fruit and vegetable producers were also 
entitled to market interventions such as had taken place in other EEC  coun-
tries,  and to better measures to deal with imports from non-member coun-
tries. 
At national level the Committee called for the immediate payment to 
farmers of compensation for the fall in 'the cereals price to a total of DM 560m. 
Moreover,  the new arrangements contemplated in the drinking-milk  market 
should be put into effect by supplying top grade milk at a suitably adjusted 
price.  The Committee further urged that a special fund be immediately set up 
for price-support measures on the pig market. 
The Committee finally pointed out that,  while it recognized the im-
portance of the efforts being made to achieve European unification and to ease 
East-West relations,  it did not believe that the concessions these demanded 
should be borne exclusively by the farmers. 
(Deutschland-Union-Dienst,  8 January 1968) 
- 65  -7.  The references to Europe in a joint statement by the Federation of 
the Left and the French Communist Party 
Following talks between the Federation of the Left and the Commu-
nist Party,  a joint statement was issued on 26 February.  The passages rela-
ting to the policy on Europe were as follows: 
'The Federation of the Left and the French Communist Party note 
with satisfaction that they have found new points of agreement in their views on 
foreign policy.  At the same time,  the two groups note that they still disagree 
on some important issues. 
The Federation considers that there should be three basic a.ims in 
French foreign policy,  which should be pursued simultaneously: (a) the organ-
ization of peace; (b)  the construction of a European political entity; (c) the 
growing development of relations with the Third World; it also considers that 
the necessary political and economic structures for achieving each of these 
aims had to be provided. 
The Federation attached capital importance to the construction of a 
European political entity.  of which the Europe of the Six would form the nucle-
-us.  Its view was that the integration of France within this entity,  which alone 
could secure Europe's independance in relation to the two great world powers, 
constituted a  decisive factor in facilitating the establishment of a new form of 
security which could replace the present system of military blocs and bring 
about a lasting rapprochement between East and West.  Until a new situation is 
established in Europe and the world,  the Federation thought that it would be 
dangerous for France unilaterally to break off any of its alliances,  particularly 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
The European construction would make it easier to solve the prob-
lems of developing countries by removing the after-effects of nationalism and 
colonialism and introducing collective assistance to take the place of the too 
frequently egotistical action of the industrialized States. 
The Federation proposed practical measures to accelerate European 
integration. It favoured enlarging Europe territorially,  (particularly by Britain's 
accession),  increasing the number of common sectors (to include planning, 
currency,  technology and public health) and setting up a common political au-
thority,  including a Parliament elected by universal suffrage. This construction 
should make it possible to endow Europe with the means to attain to political 
and economic independence.  Economic planning should ensure its smooth 
- 66-expansion and,  at the same time,  a fair sharing of prosperity~ for this could 
not be left to the uncontrolled interaction of capitalist competition. If devel-
oped in this way,  the European Community would satisfy the needs of consum-
ers in a large market at the lowest cost. It already seemed possible to dele-
gate limited but real powers,  subject to democratic control,  to the existing 
and future institutions of the Treaty of Rome. 
The French Communist Party was in favour of a democratic and 
peaceful Europe. It considered that France should not confine itself within- the 
narrow compass of the little capitalist Europe,  whether of six or atmostseven 
member States; it should develop its economic and technical relations with all 
European countries to their mutual benefit.  In a democratic France,  the na-
tionalization of the key sectors would make it possible to co-operate on major 
projects on a European scale and under conditions that would allow such pro-
jects to become an integral part of the balanced development of the national 
economy.  The French Communist Party reaffirmed its hostility to the setting 
up of a supranational authority that was created and dominated by capital,  that 
would accentuate the division of Europe,  aggravate the untoward consequences 
of the present policy of the Common Market,  as far as workers were concern-
ed,  and place the democratic policy that the Frendh people wanted at the mercy 
of reactionary foreign governments. 
The little supranational Europe would not be independent but would 
be dangerously subject to the hegemony of an expansionist and 'revengist' 
Germany and,  at the same time,  to American tutelage through the agency of 
the Atlantic Pact. 
Despite these differences,  the Federation of the Left and the French 
Communist Party agreed that the Common Market,  now a reality,  was domi-
nated by cartels, trusts and international pressure groups. 
They considered it necessary for the Common Market to have a new 
economic and social content of a profoundly different order and one which was 
consistent with the interests of the workers. 
The French Communist Party proposed to do away with the techno-
cratic character of the institutions governing the Common Market by making 
them more democratic. 
- 67-The Federation of the Left also intended to do away with the techno-
cratic character which the institutions governing the Common Market were 
slowly assuming because no political power had been created and to do this by 
making them more democratic; it intended to ensure that all· the trade union 
organizations were represented in the Common Market institutions and that 
they had real powers; it further intended to ensure that all the political parties 
in the national parliaments were,  without exception,  represented at the Com-
munity level. 
The Federation of the Left and the Communist Party considered 
that the claims of the workers in the countries concerned could be more effec-
tively promoted if they closed ranks in the struggle against the monopolistic 
and technocratic aspects of the Common Market. 
(Le Monde,  27 February 1968) 
8.  Mr.  Malagodi,  National Secretary of the Italian Liberal Party, looks 
for a stronger and more united Europe. 
On 14  March Mr.  Malagodi,  National Secretary of the Italian Liberal 
Party,  spoke in Milan about the action of the Liberals to achieve European 
unity; the  occasion was an international conference on the future of Europe. 
Mr.  Malagodi had just returned from the Conference of European 
Liberal Leaders held in London.  He began by saying he felt sure of the spirit-
ual conviction and complete political agreement of European Liberals as re-
gards reviving European unification.  He went on to say that uniting Europe was 
an ethical and political aim in the context of freedom. It aroused the enthusiasm 
of the fifteen million Europeans who voted Liberal and vast numbers of people 
among the initiate and the public at large which were influenced by Liberal 
thinking.  For this reason,  it met with hostility from the Communists and  au-
thoritarians and with indifference on the part of luke-warm democrats, of  whom 
there were,  alas,  so many in the ranks of the Christian Democrats and  the 
Socialists. 
Today,  he said,  several Liberal parties were in power; others were 
in opposition. All of them,  from Italy to Britain, from the Benelux countries 
to Germany,  from the Scandinavian countries to the French Liberal movement, 
were determined to call for a conference of Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers to set up a new system of consultations and joint action between the 
democratic countries of Europe which,  without excluding France and  without 
- 68-hampering the work  of the  existing Communities,  giving it greater impetus, 
would make it possible to overcome the present difficulties and allow for actual 
progress towards a completely united Europe, 
The joint action involved would cover the spheres of foreign policy, 
defence,  culture and education, technology,  assistance to the new countries 
and the cyclical and monetary policies. Only a Europe which acted  decisively 
in this way so as to achieve its unification could accomplish the work of peace 
and civilization which was its great responsibility towards the rest of the world. 
Only byraising itselfto the level of the United States and Russia could a demo-
cratic Europe ensure,  with the Americans,  its own security and that  of the 
Mediterranean and create,  with the Americans and the Russians, a more com-
plete system of security which would also cover Eastern Europe.  Only by unit-
ing,  could Europe achieve the peaceful reunification of Germany and make a 
decisive contribution to its own social progress and to that of the Third World. 
If the United States had as a partner a Europe that was less divided, 
strong and liberal as opposed to a confusion of interests and differing individ-
ual viewpoints such as obtained within the EEC, the monetary problems which 
today preoccupied all Liberals would not have arisen.  Italian Liberals found it 
a source of comfort and pride to have played a decisive part in the decisions 
taken by the Conference of Liberal Leaders and to have found cordial support 
for their work among their Trans-Alpine friends. 
(Carriere della Selia,  16 March 1968) 
9.  European problems in the election platforms of Belgian political 
parties 
The Belgian General Election took place on 31 March; the political 
parties published their election platforms and leading politicians stated their 
views.  The text oftheprogrammes given below and the statements taken from 
newspapers deal solely with the policy on Europe of these parties : 
1.  The Christian Social Party (PCS-CVP) 
The following text was common to the various lists of candidates 
issued by the Christian Social Party : 
' The Party will remain true to its vocation and to the principles which 
governed its creation;  it will always come out infavour of maintain-
ing and safeguarding peace in the world,  of the peaceful solution  of 
- 69-all disagreements by negotiations or through the action of  inter-
national institutions, of safeguarding fundamental human rights, com· 
trolled disarmament and the spiritual and material development of 
the Third World.' 
(i)  The Benelux countries : 
- It is no part of the CSP' s intention to go beyond the aims of 
the Benelux Economic Treaty. This Treaty must, like  the 
others, be carried into effect. 
- Within the EEC, the Benelux Foreign Ministers have, for a 
long time, endeavoured to approximate their views. 
- The foreign policies of the three States remain those of the 
sovereign States. 
(ii)  The EEC  : 
- Increasing solidarity between countries  having similar  views. 
The Christian Social Party remains in  favour of the economic 
and political integration of the Six. 
- It also trusts that the Community will be enlarged through the 
accession of the United Kingdom and other countries, with all 
due respect to the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Rome. 
- It trusts that under the present circumstances the EEC may, 
as soon as possible, be able to carry  through common, medium-
term economic,  monetary,  social,  and science policies. 
- It trusts that arrangements for co-operation on an equal foot-
ing with the United States will be created. 
- It also trusts that relations between the Six and Eastern Europe 
will improve through the creation of a body on which these 
countries maybe able to discuss those problems which divide 
them. 
(iii)  Defence policy : 
-For as long as the freedom and security of the countries of 
Western Europe are not fully guaranteed, the Party wants 
Belgium to remain in the Atlantic Alliance. 
- Belgium is a peaceful country. Its defence policy  within NATO 
is designed solely to prevent war. 
- 70--In view of Belgium's limited resources it canonly contribute 
towards NATO  as part of its common defence effort. 
-The Party approvestheaction takenby Mr. Harmel, designed 
to endow NATO with a greater political content and to increase 
the influence of the small member States within that body. 
-It  is in favour of a conference between the NATO  countries 
and the Warsaw Pact States on the subject of security in 
Europe. 
- The Party is in favour of developing NATO strategy to effect a 
real change in the nature and scope of the specific tasks of all 
the member States. 
(iv)  The United Nations : 
(v)  Policy on co-operation towards development : 
- The very first international duty of this generation is to help 
young nations to progress economically and socially.  Their 
right to political sovereignty goes handinhandwith the right 
to development. 
- 'Development assistance is the new name for peace' (Popu-
lorum progressio)  .. Peace cannot reign without justice,  that is 
to say without co-operation in development,  accepted and 
planned together so as to restore equality of opportunity in 
development of the poor countries. 
- A comprehensive and continuous political programme for 
co-operation in development, the execution of which must be 
secured by financial resources and adequate institutions 
under a responsible minister, to direct, encourage and guide 
the efforts of the whole nation. ' 
2.  The Party for Liberty and Progress (PLP) 
Among the twenty immediate aims of the PLP, it maybe appropriate 
to refer to two of them : 
(a)  an outward-looking country; 
(b)  the Belgium of tomorrow will live within the framework of 
Europe: 
- 71-- 'The PLP unreservedly supports building  the Common  Market 
which will,  in a political form,  lead to the United States of 
Europe. 
- European integration must extend far beyond the present six· 
partners : Europe must be open to all and first and foremost 
to the United Kingdom. 
- The PLP is in  favour of : 
(a)  closer relations with Eastern Europe,  and 
(b)  multi-lateral agreements with the Third World. 
- The Professional Army : 
The PLP considers that Belgium must keep faith with 
its alliances. 
- The creation which is already in progress of a re-equipped 
and rationalized professional  army wlll  make it possible 
gradually to eliminate national service while providing  a 
defence contribution consistent with Belgium's resources 
within the framework of its commitments. ' 
3.  The Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) 
As regards foreign policy, the Belgian Socialist Party intends to 
make an active contribution towards easing tension in Europe and 
the world, thus enhancing the chances of a lasting peace.  To this 
end it advocates : 
(a)  enlarging the Europe of the Six to include the United Kingdom and 
the Scandinavian countries in particular,  and accelerating  Euro-
pean economic and political unification; 
(b)  stepping up the action of the European Communities in the social 
sphere and strengthening the powers ofthe European  Parliament; 
(c)  an effective and democratic organization of Belgian assistance to 
the developing countries; 
(d)  the development of trade relations and cultural co-operation  with 
the East European countries; 
(e)  stepping up efforts to achieve a phased, controlled disarmament, 
beginning with nuclear weapons; 
(f)  a revision of the NATO Treaty; 
- 72-(g)  the elimination of any recourse to force and, particularly, 
endeavouring to achieve a negotiated peace in South Vietnam, 
preceded by the immediate cessation of bombing raids and  re-
spect for the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determina-
tion; 
(h)  active vigilance with regard to any attempt to bring about a re-
birth of neo-Nazism, whether this be in Belgium or in anyother 
country. 
- As regards defence, the PSB is in favour of a general disarma-
ment policy and of a revision of the NATO  Treaty; it advocates a 
phased reduction in military expenditure,  so as to achieve a 
rational reorganization of the army and the elimination of national 
service. 
4.  The Democratic Front of the French-speaking people of Brussels 
(FDF) 
- The Democratic Front is in favour of a European policy for peace 
throughout the world. 
- On the chessboard of the world, Europe is remarkable for its lack 
of any coherent action, which is something to be noted with bitter-
ness. 
-Brussels has a special European vocation,  substantiated by geo-
graphy and recent history,  and it must opt in favour of all that 
endows Europe with i~s personality and independence. 
- On several occasions in the last two years the Executive Commit-
tee of the Democratic Front has pointed out  - stressing the part 
that a Europe freed from any subjection could  play  in taking action 
for world peace, whether it concerns tension in Europe or  con-
flicts in the Middle East or South East Asia or in  the more or less 
difficult development of the nations of the Third World- that it 
would be possible for the European countries to make an effective 
contribution to peaceful solutions if they really wished to live up 
to their historic vocation. When Europe becomes united and inde-
pendent Europeans may again hope to play that part in the world 
which they have so often had over the course of the centuries. 
- To promote a development in this direction the Democratic Front 
has advocated an easing of tension  between  the countries of Eastern 
and Western Europe and a European security conference;  it has 
opposed any adventurous policy which might gradually involve 
Europe in armed conflicts, of which itcanonlydisapprove. Itcalls 
- 73-for an elimination of the exorbitant expenditure involved for Belgium 
(the only one of the small countries to bear this burden) through the 
presence of its armies in Western Germany; it rejects the idea of 
'  always preparing for the previous war'  and it is opposed to the ex-
penditure of BF 15, OOOm  - 20. OOOm for German tanks which prove 
obsolete on the very day they are delivered; it condemns any racial-
ist action, neo-Nazi movement and any r~gime which fails to recog-
nize the rights and freedom of the citizen~ 
5.  Prominent political figures 
Interviewed by a Brussels newspaper, Mr.  Th~o Lefevre, Christian 
Democrat, former Prime Minister,  discussed the future of Belgium 
and the present crisis. In his opinion,  the Belgian State had not yet 
reached the height of this very serious crisis  ..  There were several 
facts which made the present time really dramatic.  There was, to 
begin with,  the crisis of the traditional State in Europe.  Similarly, 
people were aware that parliamentary democracy was not consistent 
with economic and international realities.  To this could be added the 
crisis facing Christianity in Belgium.  Lastly, there were the diffi-
culties between the Flemish-speaking and the French-speaking 
people in Belgium. 
The Belgium crisis could come to a head during the next legislature 
through a weakening of the traditional parties because this would 
make it impossible to set up a strong governmental coalition. 
Mr.  Radoux,  a Socialist MP, considered that to want federalism at 
this time  'was either incompetent or ignorant.'.  In the Europe of to-
day,  which was that of the nation States, i. e.  one in which national 
sovereignties were almost tntact,  life was difficult for each of the 
members of the 'Community in gestation'.  Every State had to defend 
itself vigorously in the new world that was being designed and where 
national interests clashed. 
It would be dangerous if the links between French-speaking, flemish-
speaking and Brussels people were to be too severely weakened. The 
reality was that, more than ever before, each needed the others. The 
substance that was the Belgian State of today should not be abandoned 
in favour of the shadow that was the nascent European Community. 
It was obvious that all must unite to be stronger in order ~o obtain 
the best position. It would undoubtedly be desirable to refashion 
Belgium but to do this,  'Europe had to be made'. 
- 74-Mr.  Hougardy,  the Liberal Senator,  discussed the Statute of the 
City of Brussels which, he said, had in the view of the PLP  tore-
main the capital  of a united Belgium  and  a natural  meeting-place 
where all Belgian people, whether French or Flemish-speaking, 
might feel at home.  The Statute of Brussels had to be designed by 
and for them.  There could be no question of enclosing Brussels 
within a specific area at a time,  when Brussels aspired  to become 
the capital of Europe : the urban district  had to be allowed to develop 
freely. 
(Le Soir,  14  and 17  March 1968) 
- 75-Ill.  ORGANIZATIONS AND  GROUPINGS 
1.  A report by the Belgian National Council on science policy 
At the end of November,  the National Council submitted a study 
which supplemented the report it put before the Government in January 1965. 
European scientific co-operation was dealt with in the following terms: 
'There is every reason for hoping that the European crisis (in the 
field of scientific co-operation) will be overcome but for this to be done with-
out Europe's having to undergo too long a period of wavering or inaction in 
the field of co-operation,  it is necessary at once to re-organize the European 
activities now  in progress on more solid bases and to refrain from initiating 
new activities without first making sure that the conditions for success and 
cohesion obtain . ' 
' These conditions can be spelled out on the basis of the experience 
gained during the last ten years .' 
'The first condition is no doubt that the European programme should, 
objectively speaking,  be both necessary and useful to all the member States. 
This pre-supposes the inclusion of only that expenditure which constitutes too 
heavy a burden for the national budgets. This is,  in fact,  the case for such 
major items of scientific equipment as the CERN accelerator or such major 
prototypes as the ELDO rockets or the CONCORDE  aircraft. Among the Eura-
tom projects,  on the other hand,  there are hardly any to be found where the 
cost exceeds the resources of one of the larger member States; on the other 
hand,  there are many which are on the small or medium scaJ.e which could be 
financed even by the smallest nations. The Governments are thus easily led 
to believe,  sometimes wrongly,  that they could dispense with the European 
organization and that this would involve them in less expenditure and cause 
them fewer worries. ' 
' The desire to go on paying and the goodwill required to dissipate 
national frictions do not stand up for very long against a state of mind such as 
this. This is why it is wise to refrain from entrusting small or medium pro-
jects to international organizations even if,  taken together,  they make up an 
impressive European programme.' 
' The second lesson to be learned from the past is the need to begin 
- 77-by organizing the subsequent phases in the industrial application of the results 
of research.  The Euratom and ELDO treaties simply provide for a general 
right of access to results for the nationals of the member States; but it is obvi-
ous that when one nears the stage of the commercial prototype,  industrial 
contractors prefer national contracts,  which safeguard their exclusive rights, 
to European contracts which oblige them to make their findings ~enerally  known. 
At this point they add the weight of their influence to nationalist currents to 
reduce the scale of the European programme to the advantage of competitive 
national undertakings. 
1 
1 This appears inevitable if one does not take the precaution of promo-
ting the creation of a consortium for the industrialization of results and if one 
does not do this as soon as the Governments decide jointly to finance the re-
search involved. This was not done for the fast reactor programmes and this 
is why,  so far,  it has not been possible to avoid a reference back to the natio-
nal level of this area of research even though it held a prominent place in 
Euratom's second five year programme.' 
1 A third lesson to be learned from the past is the need to bring  togeth-
er the largest possible number of major projects within the smallest possible 
number of organizations. This is necessary because of the reasonable wish of 
each country to obtain a "fair return" for its subscriptions in the form of devel-
opment contracts and orders for material. This problem is obviously not one 
that can be sidestepped because the money does not come from a European 
tax but from the national budgets.  Every Government  has to present its accounts 
to its Parliament and is anxious to ensure a reasonable balance between its 
subscription and what it obtains in return. 
1 
1 Yet it is much easier to achieve a geographical distribution of the 
work - this remains technically defensible if numerous projects are covered 
by the same general scheme - than if the contracts for each project are divided 
among ten nations. Thus the existence of three distinct European bodies for 
space technology seriously and quite pointlessly complicates the diplomatic 
exercise of dividing up the work involved. 
1 
1 This problem was not recognized at the beginning and it was thought 
preferable to leave it to each country to say whether or no it wished to parti-
cipate in each individual project and subsequently to draw up separate treaties 
for every project. It was thought that in this way a greater number of countries 
could be involved in the construction of Europe.  The result of this was the 
emergence of projects involving 6,  7,  11  and 16 European partners.  1 
- 78  -1 This situation does not make it easy to merge international scienti-
fic organizations nor does it make it easy to strike a balance between subscrip-
tions and what is obtained in return. ' 
'A fourth difficulty stems from the lack of sufficiently detailed deci-
sions concerning the future at the time when a treaty is signed.' 
' There is not much sense in jointly financing the development of 
large passenger aircraft if the national airlines do not intend to buy that type 
of aircraft when it is ready. What is true for aircraft is no less true for nucle-
ar power stations or for space rockets. Yet there was hardly any discussion 
between the Governments which set up Euratom or ELDO concerning their 
future intentions as regards the purchase of power stations or rockets. Today, 
for example,  it seems that no European electricity grid has expressed a clear 
interest in the main reactor string developed by Euratom and that one of the 
main countries subscribing to ELDO does not show a very keen interest in the 
only economically viable application for the EUROPA I rocket,  that is as a 
telecommunication satellite. ' 
1 It is true that problems of this kind which result from inadequately 
prepared decisions or from unforeseen developments also crop up in the con-
text of national programmes. But there is in each country a political authority 
to take decisions about changes of direction without that country's losing its 
administrative and financial cohesion in the process. The same is not true of 
the Europe of today.  The cohesion of associated Governments is sorely tried 
in the event of any recurrence of such misunderstandings. It is therefore 
necessary for the member States to maintain a firm resolve to carry through 
to its conclusion what they have undertaken together. A minimum requirement 
here is that their aims should be clearly defined at the outset,  that the main 
technical choices should have been made and that each country should know 
that it is jointly committed until the complete commercial and industrial suc-
cess of the joint enterprise has been achieved.' 
' Too often,  on the other hand,  vague or ambiguous programmes -
coupled with manifest under-estimates - have been adopted in the enthusiasm 
of constituent conferences.  Misunderstandings have appeared at a later stage 
and these have paralysed the operation of the bodies concerned. 
1 
1 It appears more clearly today that international scientific co-oper-
ation must have its roots in a common determination to achieve economic pro-
gress which gives rise to an integrated policy on research,  and on industriali-
zation and on the commercialization and utilization of the products of advanced 
technology.  Such a policy would not be limited to joint research programmes. 
It  would be aimed at setting up European industrial consortia,  foreshadowing 
- 79-the later amalgamation of firms so that they could a:chieve a competitive size. 
It  would be coupled with a joint policy on public contracts,  the purpose of 
which would be to set up the first market on which the new production would 
be established. ' 
('Recherche et croissance economique' by the National Council on Science 
Policy) 
2.  The Chairman of the Dutch Meat and Cattle Marketing Board discus-
ses common agricultural policy 
In his New Year address on 10 January,  Mr. Van Dijk,  Chairman 
of the Meat and Cattle Marketing Board and former member of the European 
Parliament,  stated that although the regulations on protection for the Euro-
pean cattle breeders would be fully harmonized on 1 April 1968, there was still 
no overall Community design for agricultural policy. 
In his view,  serious consideration had,  in the meantime,  to be given 
to the possibility that the price policy could trigger off an all-round expansion 
in production which would have the effect of keeping unproductive firms in 
business. This could lead to a situation where the growth in consumption could 
no longer keep pace with the expansion in output. 
The EEC  Commission regulations for the common pig-meat market 
were drawn up,  according to Mr. Van Dijk,  in an atmosphere which was char-
acterized even more than in the past by the prevalence of national interests. 
He went on to say that there was some anxiety as regards individual parts of 
the European policy for cattle and meat. As an example, he referred to region-
al  intervention  measures of the type applied in France. If, in future,  there 
were local interventions,  this could lead to a direct clash with the principle 
that production should be promoted in those areas within the EEC where the 
greatest efficiency was possible. This principle was,  he felt,  also being thwar-
ted in the way France had developed its system of producers' organizations. 
The endeavour to give uneconomic production a better chance on the national 
market also found expression,  he thought,  in the constant increase in the 
amounts that were paid out in the various member States as support measures. 
( Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  10 January 1968) 
- 80-3.  Statement by the International Christian Trade Union Federation 
on European co-operation 
On 18 January 1968,  the Executive Committee on the European Or-
ganization of the ICTUF,  which met in Brussels to discuss European co-oper-
ation,  drew the following conclusions: 
(a)  it was greatly to be regretted that,  as a result of the opposition of 
one member State,  the Council of the European Communities had 
not been able to take any decision concerning the opening of nego-
tiations with the United Kingdom and the other States that  had applied 
for membership of the Community; 
(b)  the unfavourable outcome of the Council session of 19 December 1967 
had not only set back the desired enlargement of the Communities 
for a long time to come,  it had also induced certain member States 
to adopt an attitude that could,  for a time,  bring the internal devel-
opment of the Community to a halt. It was to be regretted that this 
trend had found expression on 21  December 1967 at the meeting of 
the European Communities' Council for Social Affairs; 
(c)  however disappointing the Council's failure to reach agreement may 
be found,  this did not alter the fact that it was more important than 
ever to promote the complete integration of Europe in order to 
achieve the political unity of Europe by creating economic unity; 
(d)  the talks between the Six on negotiations with the United Kingdom 
should therefore be resumed and,  in the meantime,  ways should be 
explored of establishing the closest possible contacts with the British 
Government; 
(e)  all further accession problems should be discussed between the 
Community and the applicant States so that a start could be made 
through the medium of negotiations on the basis of the provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome; 
(f)  Community institutions should make a searching analysis of the 
consequences of the devaluation of sterling and the measures taken 
by the USA  to restore their balance-of-payments deficit on economic 
and social developments in Europe,  particularly as regards employ-
ment opportunities and the threat of deflation; 
- 81-(g) 
4. 
it would also be desirable for the Community to make a complete 
review of its external relations,  with particular reference to the 
results of the Kennedy Round,  the second session of the United 
Nations Trade and Development Conference in New Delhi,  the expiry 
(in 1969)  of the Association Agreement with the African States and 
Madagascar and the development of bilateral relations with the East 
European countries. 
Italian statements on agricultural policy 
Speaking in connexion with the twentieth anniversary celebrations 
of Italy's General Confederation of Agriculture,  Mr.  Restivo,  Minister of 
Agriculture,  pointed out that,  although the progress made in agriculture had 
been appreciable  the problems still to be solved assumed no mean proportions. 
These included modernizing farm business structures,  a more wide-
spread use of efficient operating methods, organizing market associations, 
stepping up horticultural exports and updating animal husbandry techniques. 
There was also the problem of prices,  with reference to which Mr. Restivo 
stated: 'I do not think there can be any dispute that market policy,  as an off-
shoot of Community integration,  is going to take on proportions hitherto un-
known in Italy.  For it not only involves those forms of integration which expe-
rience has shown to mean a definite contribution to producer incomes (the 
amount forecast for 1968 being above 140,000 million lire) but also the support 
measures planned for the different sectors. Similarly  where Community 
regulations do not apply,  we are endeavouring to intervene,  analyzing- as we 
did in the case of milk - the short-,  medium- and long-term measures which 
might be selected as the most suitable to regulate the sector concerned. We 
realize that operators need to be able to look forward to balancing the books 
of their own enterprises on the credit side. Yet it is also clear that price po-
licy is deliberately set within well-defined limits because of its foreseeable 
repercussions on markets and on the whole economy. 
This is why the problems of agriculture cannot be tackled in any 
global manner,  exercising pressure on prices alone.  One might almost say 
that it would actually be those of our own areas in greatest difficulty that would 
be most affected. ' 
Mr.  Restivo concluded by saying that: 'The policy of gradual devel-
opment we  are now experiencing accentuates our inter-dependence and brings 
home to us the need for a more active solidarity between individuals and busi-
ness and executive circles.  This calls for a new spirit  a spirit of association 
- 82-which may increasingly characterize the relations between the various cate-
gories,  in the interests of a joint participation in the production process.' 
In addition to Mr.  Restivo's speech,  it is worth noting the one made 
by Mr.  Paolo Bonomi,  President of the Confederation of Smallholders,  to the 
provincial secretaries of the '3P Clubs'.  He said: 'The experience of these 
first few years of the sector regulations in application has shown that the pre-
sent dispensation favours France and the Netherlands, which produce a surplus 
of agricultural products and that it is prejudicial to Italy and Germany in  which 
there is,  agriculturally speaking,  a deficit. 
Thus an absurd situation has developed because an agriculturally 
weak nation like Italy is financing agriculturally strong countries like France 
and the Netherlands.  Nor can it be argued that the situation will improve at 
all radically in Italy's favour in the years ahead because when the financial 
responsibility is extended in the cereals and dairy produce sectors and when 
the contribution towards export drawbacks on surpluses hitherto paid by indi-
vidual states abolished,  this will again favour France and the Netherlands. 
The forecast of a record cereals harvest next year,  due to the increase in the 
area sown with wheat and the continuous increase in French milk production 
(which will border on a record of 300 million hectolitres or twice as·  much as 
Italy's output),  makes it seem likely that the "Guarantee" section of the EAGGF 
will give further special benefits to France. 
This is not to say that I wish to dispute the value of Community 
financial support for agriculture in the member States.  The benefits obtained 
from the Community policy through the application of support prices and levies 
cannot,  however,  excuse us from calling for a  review of the situation to re-
storethebalancebetween Italy's position and that of France. It is true that as 
from next spring,  when the financial responsibility of the EAGGF is extended 
to take in the dairy sector,  the crying imbalance that now obtains between 
France and Italy in this sector should be changed in our favour; yet it is equal-
ly true that,  so far,  the general agreements concluded in 1966 have not yet 
been given practical expression,  even though we hoped that as a result af these 
the balance might be restored to relieve the difficult situation in our own dairy 
sector.' 
The common agricultural policy was also discussed by the Italian 
General Confederation of Labour and the Italian Union of Workers. In a state-
ment issued by the former,  it was noted that the common agricultural policy 
had run into a crisis primarily because the integration of national markets 
within the Common Market had been carried through too quickly without regard 
for the practical exigencies of a balanced and harmonious reorganization of the 
structures,  whether of markets,  production or of land. At the end of 1960plans 
were made to set up a fund which was exclusively to finance the renovation of 
- 83-agricultural structures but this fund has not yet been created. In 1962,  further-
more,  an undertaking was accepted that one third of EAGGF expenditure would 
be ear-marked for structural improvements,  the other two thirds being used 
to support prices; yet so far EAGG F expenditure on structures has not exceeded 
one fifth of the total. 
To prevent any worsening of the crisis and make it easier  to resolve, 
there needs to be a radical change of emphasis in the agricultural policy. The 
common agricultural market's sole raison d'@tre is to guarantee- as the 
Treaty of Rome requires- an increase in productivity,  a fair standard of liv-
ing for the agricultural community,  reasonable prices for the consumers of 
agricultural products and a balanced expansion of world trade. The application 
of the market regulations should be suspended in every case where an unduly 
rapid implementation is liable to cause serious economic and social disturb-
ances.  The  prices system also needs to be radically reviewed,  particularly 
as regards cereals and animal products. 
Similarly,  in Italian Labour Union circles,  there was growing con-
cern about the course of the common agricultural policy. In 1967 there was a 
surplus of grains in the Common Market amounting to around 50 million quin-
tals and emanating almost wholly from France. There were similar surpluses 
in butter and milk. These products were taking up massive amounts from the 
EAGG F so that they could be exported and,  through appreciable price adjust-
ments,  so that they could be diverted to animal fodder uses. France was the 
country which had gained the greatest benefit from the common agricultural 
policy as it stood at present. Italy,  on the other hand,  had been one of the 
main countries which had had to absorb the effects of this policy.  For the 
1964-65 period Italy had an adverse balance with the EAGGF of 15, 000 million 
lire,  the main beneficiaries of which had been the French farmers. 
(II Popolo,  19 January 1968; 
Corriere della Sera,  13 January 1968; 
Avanti,  13 January 1968; 
La Voce Repubblicana,  10-11 January 1968) 
5.  The 'Green Week' in Berlin 
Speaking at the opening of the 'Green Week' on 26  January,  Mr. Jean 
Rey,  President of the Commission of the European Communities,  said that 
Brussels had to seek ways and means of striking such a balance between sup-
ply and demand on the agricultural market as to reduce the financial burdens 
-84-involved.  The financial costs of the common agricultural market were already 
considerable. Hence the Commission  wanted this year to submit the outline 
of a common agricultural policy. 
Agriculture,  he said,  could only be effectively assisted if the real 
problems were tackled. Every effort should be made at this time to develop 
an agricultural policy which would be consistent with the economic and social 
conditions in twenty and thirty years' time. The agricultural factory would not 
be the model but,  at the same time,  the family farm as the basis of agricul-
ture had to be brought in line with economic and technological necessities that 
could no longer simply be talked away. 
The objective would only be achieved when,  without fear of taboos, 
new forms of co-operation involving more than one concern could be sought 
for agriculture on the same lines as were now customary in other branches 
of the economy. The agricultural structure had to be adjusted to the economy 
through bringing into being production units of adequate size. If production 
capacity and manpower stood in a reasonable relationship to each other,  a 
satisfactory level of earnings could also be achieved in agriculture,  in the 
opinion of Mr. Rey. 
Mr. Rehwinkel,  President of the German Farmers' Union,  speaking 
to the press,  called for an equal ranking between structure, training and price 
policy in the context of assistance for agriculture. Improvements in the basic 
services,  the promotion of the equipment of farms and the free trade in land, 
together with the abolition of fiscal provisions standing in the way of improving 
agricultural structures were important. To date there had beenalackofmeas-
ures in  regional and land planning. If more had been done in this field,  then 
thousands of small farms would today have already been bought up or been 
brought together and their owners would already be active outside agriculture. 
Mr. Hocherl,  the Federal Minister for Food,  speaking at  the opening 
of the international 'Green Week' in Berlin,  called for an abolition of all idea-
logical and political barriers. The Federal Government could have no higher 
objective than to remove divisions and restrictions or to serve the cause of 
peace; modern techniques and an international division of work created a 
healthy state of dependence,  he said. New forms of co-operationcouldbedevel-
oped from this. 
(Die Welt,  27  January 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  26  and 27  January 1968) 
- 85-6.  The German Industry and Trade Conference and European policy 
It  would not be possible to eliminate frontier controls within the 
EEC before 1970. This fear was expressed by the German Industry and Trade 
Conference in its annual report for 1967. It regarded the complexity of nation-
al  regulations  and the opposition of national authorities and parliaments as 
being obstacles that were too great to overcome. 
It appeared desirable to the Conference that the merger of the 
Treaties should now follow the merger of the Executives. Business leaders 
regarded this as being one of the challenges of the years ahead,  together with 
the enlargement of the Communities and the completion of the Economic Union. 
Early negotiations with applicant States were necessary in order to build up an 
economic area in Europe of the same order of magnitude as the USA  and the 
USSR.  Only then would it be possible to have large enterprises onanAmerican 
scale without seriously prejudicing competition. Then research would be pos-
sible which would prevent Europe  1 s leeway in relation to the technical develop-
ment of the two world powers from growing constantly wider.  Then,  too,  there 
could be a division of work and productivity which would make it possible to 
bring Europe closer to the American level of prosperity and political independ-
ence.  In  the view of the Conference,  this meant that the German economy 
which was more than any other EEC State orientated towards intensive trade 
with the Scandinavian countries,  would be in increasing difficulties because 
of the customs duty gulf. 
It was obvious,  in the opinion of the Conference,  that the enlarge-
ment of the EEC raised many problems. The Commission had looked into 
these questions and had,  by and large,  come to the conclusion  that the problems 
could be solved,  even though the solutions to many questions could not be fully 
reviewed because there had been no discussions with the applicant States. The 
Conference considered that the difficulties could be overcome if there were the 
political will to reach a conclusion. 
The British Government had,  in the meantime,  shown all the neces-
sary vigour in tackling the main obstacle,  namely the weakness of sterling and 
of the British economy,  by devaluation and the other measures taken in Novem-
ber. If the United Kingdom demonstrated sufficient self-discipline in the near 
future,  so as to solve the new domestic issues raised by devaluation,  its nego-
tiating position would be stronger. It had to be remembered,  in the opinion of 
the Conference,  that the improvement in the economic situation by means of 
devaluation would affect the exports of the EEC countries not only to the United 
Kingdom but also to many third country markets; it had to be remembered that 
many sectors that had reckoned on gaining an advantage through the enlarge-
ment of the EEC would now have to review their position. Even the difficulties 
involved in bringing British agriculture into line with EEC market regulations 
- 86-could be solved as soon as Britain was in a position,  through a stronger balan""" 
ce of payments,  to make its financial contributions. Of course,  the introduc-
tion of customs and levies in the United Kingdom vis-a-vis the Commonwealth 
countries raised special problems. It was in the interests of the continent of 
Europe that there should be no appreciable difficulties arising in these coun-
tries as a result of European integration; transitional measures would thus 
not simply be concessions to the United Kingdom and to the Commonwealth. 
The Conference hoped that the differences of view on British mem-
bership and that of other States would not lead to a crisis in the EEC. An alter-
native to the immediate accession of Britain might possibly be in an agreement 
with the EEC in which the necessary transitional period could take the form 
of something like an association without having any of the exceptionable con-
notations of the term 1 association'. Such an interim period would automatically 
have to lead to full membership after a  specific period  .. 
The Conference considered that a harmonization of national customs 
regulations was a prerequisite for the completion of the customs union on 
1 July 1968. It was convinced that in such a harmonization not all the old and 
partly 'quantity-produced' provisions could be left standing if the differences 
in customs regulations and procedures in the other member States were so 
appreciable as to occasion fears of a deflection of trade. 
When the internal customs restrictions were removed,  it would be-
come more urgent than ever to devise a common trade policy for the EEC, 
particularly with regard to the East European countries. 
At the Annual General Meeting of the German Conference oflndustry 
and Trade in Bonn on 29  February,  Mr. Ernst Schneider,  who was re-elected 
President,  stated: 
'We are out of the red and can now,  once again,  advise in the direc-
tion of the expansion of our economy. 1  He described it as the first favourable 
interim balance-sheet of the new Federal Government,  whose overriding duty 
it had been to prevent any further cyclical regression by means of practical, 
purposeful action,  while contending with critics on many sides. 
Dr. Schneider dealt at length with the economic problems of Europe. 
He reminded Chancellor Kiesinger,  who was also present,  that there was a 
great economic interest in preventing any definitive division of Europe into 
'encapsulated' trade blocs. At present there was unfortunately no real prospect 
of further European integration. He thought the main obstacle to this was the 
kind of attitude of mind that was still prevalent within the frontiers of the na-
- 87-tional economy. He criticized the change in the EEC Treaty engineered by 
France,  which had prevented the application of the majority principle on the 
Council of Ministers. France which is shown so much consideration could also 
hold up developments in areas where the overriding interests of the other part-
ners were involved. It was the duty of politicians to find new opportunities. At 
the same time the close co-operation of European enterprises should not in-
volve any anti-American overtones. 
On 10 January on the 25th Jubilee of the Chamber of Commerce of 
WUrzburg-Schweinfurt,  Dr. Schneider again came out in favour of Britain's 
accession to the EEC. He described the adamant attitude of France towards 
the British application as being shortsighted and prejudicial to Europe. In the 
field of technology,  Europe had no time to lose and had therefore to resolve 
the issue of British membership quickly. Dr. Schneider regarded the devalua-
tion of sterling as a first and important step towards strengthening the British 
economy,  whose permanent restoration to health would only be possible in the 
context of competition within the common market. The German economy had 
therefore to see to it that Britain's economic crisis did not cause discourage-
ment and adversely affect trade relations but rather that these were built up. 
He  recommended that the Federal Government should gear its integration 
policy to long-term plans more than it had done in the past. Dr. Schneider 
gave the assurance: 'We shall use all our imagination in devising interim solu-
tions so that Europe neither stagnates nor disintegrates.' 
(Die Welt,  1 March 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  28  February and 1 March 1968) 
7.  Community steel problems discussed in Taranto 
A conference was held in Taranto at the end of January between 
representatives of the European Communities and local and regional operators 
from Europe's steel ~d  mining areas. 
The need for more incisive action at the European level in the steel 
and mining sector was stressed in a resolution that was passed unanimously 
at the end of the conference. This stated,  in particular,  that it had been found 
that most of the regions under review were faced with serious difficulties. 
These were due to the shortage of processing firms and of activities in the 
service sector because of which the employment problem could not be solved. 
It was also due to the fact that when firms were closed down,  this was not 
planned sufficiently well in advance to allow for the necessary measures to 
redevelop enterprises and to redeploy workers; this,  in turn,  was due to a 
- 88-lack of any planning policy at the 'national and Community levels. The cumu-
lative effects of the coal crisis,  the structural difficulties in the steel industry 
and the slackening of expansion in many countries threatened  the old-established 
industrial regions with serious social consequences. 
The conference,  therefore,  endorsed the resolution passed by the 
European Parliament on 11  May 1967 on regional policy. This deplored the 
lack- on the eve of the abolition of customs barriers- of any Community ac-
tion (notwithstanding the terms of Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome and the 
reports of the European Economic Commission) to consolidate the basic ser-
vices in the peripheral regions of the Common Market which were less eco-
nomically developed. 
Indeed,  in the view of the conference,  assistance provided in the 
steel and mining sectors ought to be coupled with setting up complementary 
industries and the necessary economic,  social and cultural apparatus at the 
regional and local levels. Community aid (EIB,  EAGG F,  Social Fund and 
ECSC  assistance) was,  in fact,  extended to enterprises without sufficient ac-
count being taken of the priority needs of the industrial areas: services, schools 
and cultural facilities. 
(II Sole- 24 Ore,  1 February 1968) 
8.  Conference in Turin on planning for Europe 
A conference on planning for Europe was held in Turin on 1 0 Febru-
ary. Mr.  Pieraccini,  Minister for the Budget,  stressed that it was only at the 
European level that problems of technological development could be resolved; 
he looked to the political world for 'awareness and resolve' and emphasized 
the need for appropriate political action to secure the development of produc-
tion structures and to make good the ground lost in the field of market inte-
gration. 
Professor Petrilli,  President of the ffii,  discussed 'economic plan-
ning,  regional development and European integration'. He drew attention to the 
revolutionary choice represented by European integration; this called for a 
'market policy' which took due account of the close relationship between free-
dom of trade and political co-ordination at the Community level. 
- 89-He went on to say that this co-ordination 'could and should not in-
volve imposing a centralized system on a wider scale but rather a continuing 
dialogue between national and Community authorities- analagous to that be-
tween central,  regional and local authorities - along the genuinely multilateral 
lines that are the basis of the federalist conception of integration.' 
He stressed that a national plan was the only means by which a re-
gional development policy could be dovetailed with European integration. He 
concluded: 'If there is one illusion that reality should dispel,  it is the belief 
that the transition from economic to political integration will follow  automati-
cally. The Treaty of Rome provides the wherewithal for solving this issue 
but everything depends,  in the last analysis,  on the will of the governments 
and on their adherence to the spirit of that treaty. ' 
Dr.  Giovanni Agnelli,  President of Fiat,  submitted a report on 
'private operators in relation to economic planning and European integration'; 
he pointed out that although the European Economic Community was abolishing 
customs barriers ahead of schedule,  it had done little for a true economic in-
tegration and nothing for political unity which also affected the United Kingdom 
seeking to unite with the Community,  not for what it is but because of what it 
will become.  1 
Dr. Agnelli added:  'The main problems facing enterprises are: 
legislation for a European-type company,  a European capital market,  legis-
lation and structures for scientific research and industry. As far as enter-
prises were concerned,  the political unity of Europe was not an ideal but a 
necessity to which there was no alternative.  They could not shirk the challenge of 
their responsibilities but they looked to the political authority to act to strengthen 
their hand,  particularly through provisions conducive to greater freedom for 
themselves and for the whole of European society.' 
Professor Albertino agreed on the need for European planning and 
Professor Uri,  President of the Atlantic Institute,  concluded by arguing that 
to overcome the difficulties,  concerted action had to be taken on the problems 
common to all countries: occupational training,  transport,  scientific research, 
particularly by eliminating imbalances,  in other words what would finally be 
'the true social policy. ' 
(La Stampa,  No.  36,11 February 1968) 
- 90-9.  The French Federation Of Farmers' Unions (FNSEA)  states its 
attitude to the common agricultural policy 
Meeting in Toulouse on 22  and 23  February for its 22nd Congress, 
the French Federation of Farmers's Unions summed up its views in a reso-
lution passed at the close of its discussions on the common agricultural policy 
and on the problems of underdevelopment. 
Common Market 
With reference to the Common Market,  the Congress recalled in 
its resolution that the FNSEA was deeply attached to the achievement of the 
European Economic Community and to the common agricultural policy; this 
constituted its reply to recent criticisms of the Common Market,  its effects 
on French agriculture and the illusions alleged to have been occasioned in the 
farming community. 
The Congress further stated that only a really large-sized market 
could provide French agriculture with outlets commensurate with its potential. 
The fact that French agricultural exports to the EEC were five times greater 
than in 1958 bore this out. 
The solidarity of the six countries made it possible to establish and 
maintain effective protection against the disorder on world markets. 
The higher prices for agricultural products in the other member 
States had led to an increase in French prices which would certainly not have 
been obtained in the purely national context. 
Bearing these positive facts in mind,  the FNSEA was co-operating 
closely with COPA in continuing its efforts to bring a balanced common agri-
cultural policy into being at an early date,  bearing in mind the interests of the 
various regions and types of production. This involved: 
(a)  better organized markets under normal competitive conditions ad-
justed to variations to meet regional requirements; 
(b)  organizing markets in sectors that were still not organized; 
(c)  greater protection against countries practising dumping or state 
trading; 
- 91-(d)  stricter application of Community preference,  particularly as re-
gards cereals,  oleaginous products,  meat,  etc. 
(e)  setting fair prices consistent with the economic priorities of agri-
culture and by reference to an annual report on the state of agricul-
ture and the situation of farmers; 
(f)  participation by the farmers in the discussion on this report and in 
establishing the conclusions to be drawn from it. 
The Congress also wished to point out that it was not enough for 
farmers' representatives to obtain favourable conditions under the agricultu-
ral policy; the profession had as a whole and at every level- in regard to the 
trade unions,  co-operation,  credit,· mutual insurance- to work together to 
take advantage of the opportunities thus opened up to farmers and to help them 
to resolve the problems inevitably thrown up by economic developments. 
It was necessary at the local and regional levels,  therefore,  to 
work out policies consistent with the potential both of the region and of the 
markets and to establish conditions for effective production and marketing so 
as to withstand competition and expand outlets. 
The Congress stressed that the common agricultural policy had to 
be something more than an incomes and prices policy.  The integration of 
agriculture within the Community economy predicated Community action as 
regards agricultural structures. It was desirable for this problem to be tack-
led in the light of the long-term emphasis of the common agricultural policy 
and in the context of the general economic development of the regions. 
In this respect,  the FNSEA would be very attentive. The Congress 
stressed that it would be betraying the spirit of the Treaty of Rome  if the 
common agricultural policy culminated in an inhuman dispensation similar to 
the one that the farmers would have been confronted with had they remained 
faced with world competition while remaining within the national framework. 
The Congress considered harmonization was urgently necessary in 
all areas affecting the creation of normal competitive conditions: taxation, 
transport,  technical assistance and research and the cost of energy. The action 
taken by the Community in these spheres would,  to a large extent,  colour the 
whole future of any genuine agricultural policy. 
- 92-Under-development and morld markets 
The Congress was aware of the disturbing world problems of hun-
ger and under-development and of the urgent issues of organizing world mar-
kets with which the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was 
now confronted. All countries, whether industrialized or developing,  had to 
work together if these problems were to be solved. 
The farmers were ready to make their contribution but they wished 
to point out that such serious problems could not be solved simply by opening 
the European markets; the main beneficiaries of such a move would be the 
major developed countries which exported agricultural products; the resulting 
deterioration in the position of European farmers would have serious reper-
cussions on the prosperity of the EEC States and consequently on the level of 
financial aid that these nations might extend to the developing countries. 
The EEC could and must help to improve the position of the devel-
oping countries,  particularly by contributing to the Food Aid Programme 
under the World Grains Agreement,  which was a first step towards a better 
organization of the world markets. 
10.  Seventeenth Congress of the European Union of Germany 
The European Union of Germany held its Seventeenth Congress in 
Cologne on 4 and 5 March. 
The main speakers at the Congress were Mr. Walter Scheel,  Chair-
man of the FDP,  who spoke about Germany and Europe; Mr. Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber,  editor of 'L'Express', who discussed the American chal-
lenge; and Professor Hallstein,  President of the European Movement and for-
mer President of the EEC Commission,  who drew up an 'interim  balance sheet 
for 19681• 
In his opening address,  Baron von Oppenheim,  President of the 
European Union,  deplored the fact that although the Federal Government was 
pressing General de Gaulle for an acceptable interim solution on Britain's 
entry into the EEC,  it was not showing the same determination as regards 
further political progress in completing the Community. 
- 93  -Professor Hallstein described the difficulties as well as the possi-
bilities of  a political integration of Europe; as President of the EEC Commis-
sion,  he had always laid stress on the political vocation of the Community. He 
advocated  not only standing  firm  by economic integration  but  also came out in  fa-
vour of promoting political integration with perseverence; this had to embrace 
both  the geographical enlargement of the Community and defence policy. If  one 
came to accept the stagnation of the European Union, this tended to give the upper 
hand to the false arguments of those who opposed the political unity of Europe. 
In this connexion,  Professor Hallstein referred to the French plan 
for the security of central Europe. This plan involved both parts of Germany 
and Poland but it would,  in his opinion,  mean the end of the European Com-
munities. He  described the French plan as unacceptable and said that it was 
high time for the countries concerned to give their answer on the subject of 
such plans. He came out decisively against the draft non-proliferation treaty. 
He thought it would not only destroy the European Atomic Energy Community 
but would also make Europe defenceless because it would have to assume an 
increasing responsibility for its own defence. 
Mr. Scheel,  Chairman of the Free Democrat Party,  spoke in favour 
of a new German policy. He said that the restoration of the German Reich and 
the borders of 1937 had the support of none of the Federal Republic's neigh-
bours. A common future for the German people had therefore to be built along 
different lines: 'We shall have to come to an understanding with the German 
Democratic Republic and use our common German nationality as a lever. '  The 
actual reunification of Germany would have to come as part of or at the end of 
the integration of Europe. 
The French writer Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber quoted as an 
example of the mistrust of Europeans when he described a responsible politi-
cian in his country as saying that the strike force should primarily give pro-
tection and security against Germany. His book,  'Le Defi Americain' (The 
American Challenge),  had been published in Germany with a preface by 
Mr. Franz Josef Strauss; the gist of his arguments was that the European 
ideas of the postwar years were similar to some current today; whereas at 
that time Europe was reacting against the threat from the East,  the European 
idea today was a reaction against the economic supremacy of America,  which 
was based on such modern key industries as electronics,  space travel and nuc-
lear power. He interpreted the unrest among students as the effect of a feeling 
of absolute impotence in relation to what was going on in the world. The exis-
tence and the policy of General de Gaulle was no reason for inactivity; Europe 
could already take action in the fields of technology,  industry and science 
policy in conjunction with the United Kingdom and other European countries. 
-94-At the close of its two-day conference,  the European Union of Ger-
many called upon the Federal Government to work both for the further develop-
ment and the enlargement of the existing Communities,  to take in other coun-
tries and also to take new initiatives in those areas not covered by the Com-
munity Treaties. 
In a policy statement,  the discrepancy between the words and deeds 
of members of the Government and parliamentarians was regretted. The draft 
of an action programme of the CDU  (Christian Democrat Union)  and the SPD 
(Social Democrat Party)  showed that the leaders of those parties had still not 
put through any detailed ideas for a constructive European policy. The Euro-
pean Union saw a dangerous tendency towards a renascence of nationalism. 
The enlargement of the Communities was held up by the opposition of General 
de Gaulle. Its inner cohesion was at present threatened because the comple-
tion of the economic union called for an increasing political commitment. 
To further the development of the Communities the Federal Govern-
ment was called upon to press forward in the field of technology and monetary 
questions. The economic integration of Europe would remain incomplete with-
out a  common monetary policy,  which would preclude the risk of exchange 
rate fluctuations.  The European Commission should therefore immediately 
draw up a multi-stage monetary policy plan on the basisof the proposals work-
ed out  by the European Union; this would culminate in a common European 
currency. 
The Congress in Cologne adopted such a multi-stage plan. It advo-
cated,  with reference to technology,  that the responsibility of the Community 
should be extended to long-term planning,  the division of work and Community 
financing. 
In its statement,  French policy was strongly criticized. The veto 
that had stood for five years had put Community enthusiasm to the severest 
test. Without specifically referring to France,  it went on to say that the future 
should not be open to question any longer as a result of the negative attitude 
of one member St.ate. 
With regard to foreign policy,  the European Union advocated as a 
first step that there should be a co-ordinated policy vis-a-vis the developing 
countries and those in the Middle East and consultations within the United 
Nations and,  with regard to defence policy,  it proposed that there should be 
closer European co-operation on NATO. 
- 95-In its view,  the objective remained the advance from economic  union 
to monetary union and then to political integration involving all the democratic 
countries wishing to take part. The rejection of nation-State policies above all 
by the Federal Republic was advocated. 
The statement read: 'Greater integration in the West cannot be re-
conciled with a purely nation-State policy vis-a-vis the East. This is particu-
larly true for the policy on Germany and on the East of the Federal Republic. 
It is the Union's special responsibility to ensure that European policy becomes 
increasingly a policy for the peace of the whole of the continent  which, by over-
coming the division of Europe,  also overcomes that of Germany. ' 
(Die Welt,  4,  5 and 6 March 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  5 and 6 March 1968; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  6 March 1968; 
Industriekurier,  5 March 1968; 
Handelsblatt,  5 March 1968; 
Le Monde,  6 March 1968) 
11.  Joint economic action at the European level is discussed by  the 
President of the General Confederation of Managerial and SUpervi-
sory Staffs 
Mr. Andre Mal  terre,  President of the 'Confederation generale des 
cadres' (General Confederation of Managerial and SUpervisory Staffs),  took 
part in a  'dinner debate' organized in Strasbourg on 5 March by the junior 
branch of the Chamber of Economic Affairs. He was asked about the possibi-
lities of joint economic action at the European level; Mr. Malterre,  who is the 
rapporteur on cyclical matters in the Economic and  Social Committee, replied in 
the affirmative. It was, however, necessary, if  this was to be achieved, for each 
of the Community countries to agree to keep faith with the spirit and letter of the 
Treaty of Rome, under which they had severally renounced any idea of hegemony. 
With reference to the 1 July 1968 deadline,  Mr. Malterre pointed 
out that joint economic action was already a fact in the sphere of drawing-up 
the medium-term plan. SUch joint action was,  moreover,  essential if one 
sought to develop the EEC in a current that had become irreversible. The com-
mon agricultural policy and the short-term economic policy were also results 
of this joint action which had been developing all the time. 
- 96  -Mr. Mal  terre added that it was no longer possible to have a purely 
national plan and it would be necessary, when the Sixth French Plan  was drawn 
up,  to do the utmost to bring it within the scope of the Community's medium-
term planning. 
Mr. Pierre Pflimlin,  former President of the Council and mayor 
of Strasbourg,  took the floor after Mr. Malterre and he emphasized the great 
weight to be attached to the comments of such an expert on economic and cy-
clical affairs as Mr. Mal  terre when he averred that realism led to European 
action. Mr. Pflimlin,  however,  did not consider that joint action was enough 
and felt that only a common political resolve could lead to any really appreci-
able progress in such fields as that of transport policy where Europe was still 
marking time. 
He further said that European solidarity was liable to be ineffective 
if it did not widen out into Western solidarity. 
(Cote Desfosses,  6 March 1968) 
12.  Belgian professional organizations and the common marketfordairy 
produce 
The National Federation of Professional Agricultural Unions stated 
its opposition to the proposals made by Mr. Mansholt to set the price of milk 
below FB 4. 55  per kilogram. It considered it inadmissible for the price of 
milk to be lowered and subsequently remain the same for three years after the 
incomes disparity,  from which agriculture was suffering,  had been officially 
recognized. The Commission's position,  according to which the taxation of 
margarine would be limited to the level set in the decisions of 1963,  appeared 
in the Federation's view to reflect the power of the cartels more than it did an 
appreciation of realities. The Federation also considered that granting a bonus 
on the slaughter of cows in stables in which there were not more than five was 
an unworkable measure. 
It trusted that an attempt would be made to strike a better balance 
between animal production in the bovine sector by recourse primarily to an 
adjustment in the price of meat to bring it into line with the need to promote 
meat production. It was gratified at the attitude taken by the Belgian Minister 
of Agriculture,  who sought to safeguard ways of actually obtaining a price of 
FB 4. 55  per kilo for 3. 3 per cent of fats for the 1968-69 farming year as 
- 97-well as the quality bonus. It drew the attention of the European Commission 
and of the Council of Ministers to the total support that it would give to any 
move made by COPA,  should this prove necessary,  as a reaction aimed at 
safeguarding and promoting the earnings of the agricultural community. 
(Le Soir,  9 March 1968; 
La libre Belgique,  15 March 1968) 
13.  Dutch farming organizations and the Community's dairy policy pro-
posals 
The three main Dutch farming organizations have issued a statement 
to the effect that they were disappointed at the European Commission  proposals 
to establish the price of milk at a lower level than that originally set by the 
EEC Council. They again stressed the standpoint of the Dutch farming organi-
zations,  as stated on 6 March by the Federation of farming organizations and 
endorsed on 7 March by the European farming organizations co-operating with-
in the COP  A framework. 
In their respective statements,  the farming organizations asked that 
the guidance price of 35.3 ct at production established two years previously 
should be maintained and that it should be coupled with all appropriate measures 
likely to ensure that this price was enforced.  · 
The organizations had taken note of the resolve of a number of far-
mers from other EEC countries to show in Brussels their dissatisfaction with 
the Commission proposals and make clear that their concern was shared by 
farming at large. They disagreed with the view of the European Commission 
and considered that the situation in the last two years had not altered to such 
an extent as to call for fundamental changes in the agricultural policy. They 
trusted that the Council would not adopt the European Commission proposals 
but that its decision would also take into account the wishes of the agricultural 
community. 
(Handels en Transport Courant,  13 March 1968) 
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I.  GOVERNMENTS 
1.  Benelux memorandum on the enlargement of the Community 
On 15 January the Benelux Foreign Ministers,  meeting in Val 
Duchesse (Brussels),  adopted a concerted approach to the difficulties facing 
the European Community following the French Government's refusal to enter 
into negotiations with the United Kingdom.  The approach decided upon was set 
out in a memorandum reading: 
' At the end of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European 
Economic Community on 19 December,  it was agreed to make a joint study of 
any proposals to get over the impossibility of reaching a decision to open nego-
tiations on the applications for membership of the European Communities re-
ceived from the United Kingdom,  Ireland,  Denmark and Norway. 
The Benelux States feel they must pass on to their partners in the 
European Community,  to the European Commission and to applicant States the 
results of their discussions on the subject. 
Objectives: 
In making their suggestions the Benelux States have been guided by 
the need: 
(1)  to carry on their efforts for the construction of Europe,  a task 
which,  under the provisions of the Treaty,  involved the development 
and enlargement of the European Communities; 
(2)  to ensure that their activity conforms to the letter and spirit of the 
Treaty of Rome; 
- 99-(3)  to tighten the links existing between the member States of the Euro-
pean Community and the States that have applied for entry. 
In considering the European idea it is essential to cast one's mind 
beyond mere words and beyond the present stage of economic development in 
the European Community.  Europe is more than six States united by the pro-
visions of the Rome Treaty;  it should also pursue unification in sectors as yet 
not covered by common decisions. 
Having regard to the arrangements set out below, the Benelux 
States advocate a go-ahead programme for the building of Europe in the eco-
nomic and political spheres. 
Proposals in the economic sphere : 
(1)  the Benelux States have decided to take an active part in the pro-
gramme for the development of the European Communities; 
(2)  they advocate the introduction of a practical procedure for consul-
tation between the Community member States and candidates for 
entry, particularly in view of preventing disparities between them 
from becoming wider. 
Several courses are suggested : 
(a)  continuation of the Commission's investigation into the difficulties 
and advantages of admission of the applicant States, pursuing, joint-
ly with these States, the study of questions with which the Commis-
sion was unable to deal with completely in the Opinion submitted by 
it.  The Council of Ministers of the Community could assign this 
task to the Commission,  asking it to report, at regular intervals, 
on the conclusions arrived at.  If this suggestion cannot be taken up, 
it  will still be necessary to carry  out this analysis in some other way; 
(b)  adoption of a clear-cut procedure for consultation between Commu-
nity member States and candidate States with a view to bringing 
them closer together and preventing the disparities between their 
respective systems from growing wider.  This consultation would 
cover both questions that have been settled both as to principle and 
as to method of implementation by the EEC and questions that have 
so far only been settled as to principles or which have not yet been 
- 100-tackled in the Community, although expressly  provided  for in the Trea-
ties. Mention may be made in this connexion of  fields on which a start 
has been made in the Community and which could lead to agreements 
embracing the candidate States,  i.e. European patents,  'European' 
companies,  measures in the insurance sector. 
At procedural level,  the Benelux States suggest that the agreement 
of 21 December 1954 on relations between the ECSC  and the United 
Kingdom should be taken as a guide.  Now that there is only one 
Council and only one Commission,  it would be worth while extending 
this procedure - at present limited to questions of common interest 
concerning coal and steel - to questions of common interest  concern-
ing the Treaties of Rome and Paris. If the extension of this agree-
ment cannot be ratified by a  Council decision,  another procedure 
for achieving this end will have to be found; 
(c)  joint steps by European States in spheres not covered by the Treaties. 
These will have to relate to specific aims,  the number of partici-
pants varying,  perhaps,  with the projects; e. g.  joint development, 
production and purchase of military equipment~ co-operation in the 
technological and scientific fields,  aid to development countries. 
Proposals in the political sphere: 
The Benelux States consider that these proposals aiming at relaunch-
ing Europe would be incomplete if relations in the field of political unification 
are neglected. 
The three States have decided to step up their political co-operation 
and to consult one another before adopting any decision or position on questions 
of common interest and on major foreign policy issues,  with a view to arriving 
at similar positions.  Consultation will be carried out in such a way as to res-
pect the undertakings already given,  particularly in the Treaties of Washington, 
Paris and Rome,  and will cover,  notably,  the following items: European poli-
tical co-operation,  political and economic relations with east European coun-
tries,  relations with the development countries. 
Without wishing, at the moment, to create a new institution, the 
Benelux States have decided to tighten up their consultation procedure with a 
view to bringing their positions into line.  They hope that other European States 
will join them in their efforts and thus give fresh proof of their desire to work 
towards European political unification. 
The Benelux States hold themselves at the disposal of their Com-
munity partners, the European Commission and the candidate States, to answer 
- 101-and go more deeply into any questions that may arise from these necessarily 
schematic proposals. 
1 
(Le R~publicain Lorrain,  28  January 1968) 
2.  Italian memorandum on the enlargement of the Community 
A memorandum sent by the Italian Foreign Minister,  Mr.  Fanfani, 
to the member States of the European Community includes a number of propos-
als for bringing forward the United Kingdom 
1 s  accession to the Community. 
Five points are listed in the memorandum. These cover the action 
decided upon by the Italian Council of Ministers,  immediately after the meet-
ing of the Six of 19 December,  to further the policy of enlarging the EEC. 
This relates to Community activities,  measures to prevent the gap between 
the Six and the applicant States from becoming wider,  measures to narrow this 
gap,  and the harmonization of such measures with the Community's external 
relations and steps to further the policy of European unification. 
Community activities:  The Italian Government proposes that the 
Six (i)  do their utmost to introduce within the Community,  at the stipulated 
dates,  freedom of movement of industrial and agricultural products; (ii) con-
tinue to work out measures for achieving economic union; (iii) consolidate, 
within one year,  the bases of the joint centre in the nuclear sector,  and (iv) 
examine,  when the time arrives,  the report which the Commission has been 
asked to submit on the merger of the Communities.  (It should be noted that 
the Italian Government proposes that the merger of the three Communities be 
shelved for the time being,  pending developments as regards the enlargement 
of the Community itself). 
Preventing the gap between the Six and the Four from widening: 
The Italian Government proposes that any measures concerning economic 
union should take account,  through consultations with the countries concerned, 
of the situation existing in the applicant States (United Kingdom,  Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway)  and any changes in it. It further proposes that in the 
process of establishing economic union the Six should take care,  when taking 
any decisions,  not to add fresh and serious obstacles to the future accession 
to the EEC of the applicant States. 
- 102-Measures to narrow the gap:The Italian Government considers that 
the Six ought to invite the Executive Commission of the EEC to proceed,  in 
consultation with the parties directly concerned,  with the study of ways and 
means of facilitating entry into the Community of other European States.  The 
results of this investigation should be placed before the Council of Ministers 
of the Six without delay,  and they should be taken into account in formulating 
proposals for the merger of the three Communities.  (This is a point of out-
standing interest because,  in practice, it is proposed to use this investigation 
by the Commission as a means of 'getting round' the French veto at the start of 
the negotiations between the Six and the United Kingdom - an investigation 
which,  undertaken with contacts in London,  already establishes an initial link 
between the EEC and the British Government .) The Italian Government also 
proposes that the Executive Commission  of the EEC get in touch  with the OECD 
with a view to establishing co-ordination of short-term  economic policies,  and 
that the Monetary Committee of the Six arrange joint meetings with the steering 
committee for the European monetary agreement.  It also suggests that a joint 
meeting of the Council of the WEU  (to which the Six and the United Kingdom be-
long) be devoted to examining the European economic situation with a view to 
co-ordinating the short-term economic and monetary policies of member 
States.  (These measures aim at avoiding a tariff war between European coun-
tries, whether inside or outside the Common Market, and at  framing common eco-
nomic and monetary policies of wider scope than the simple tariff agreements 
suggested in the Franco-German declaration.  Moreover,  consultation with the 
OE CD  also makes it  necessary to enter  into a discussion with the United States •  ) 
Harmonization of EEC policy and external development: It is pro-
posed that,  simultaneously with the entry into force of measures freeing re-
strictions within the EEC,  negotiations and agreements should be sought for 
new associations with the EEC,  and the Yaounde Convention with the African 
countries renewed so as to preserve a measure of equilibrium between the 
Community's internal development and its external relations.  (The aim,  there-
fore,  is to prevent the EEC from becoming a closed organization in conflict 
with non-member countries and thus widening the gap that already exists,  par-
ticularly with the developing and Eastern bloc countries ·) 
Progress towards European unity: -Italy propose& that the Six draw 
up a declaration of intent on European policy which can be signed in turn by 
countries who have applied,  or may still apply,  for entry into the EEC.  The 
Italian Government further feels consideration ought to be given to calling 
together the Foreign Ministers of the EEC States and applicant countries at a 
meeting to be attended by the Community's Executive Commission,  for the 
purpose of agreeing on a procedure for closer co-operation between their go-
vernments with a view to facilitating the economic and political unification of 
Europe. 
(Avanti,  24  February 1968; 
Corriere della Sera, 
La Stampa,  24  and 25  February 1968) 
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1.  Discussions between President Johnson and Mr. Jean Rey, Presi-
dent of the European Commission, on the problem of co-operation 
between Europe and the United States 
At the invitation of President Johnson,  Mr.  Jean Rey,  President of 
the Commission of the European Communities, went to the White House on 
7 February. At the close of the discussions between the two Presidents, a 
joint statement was issued, in which the belief of the United States in the 
need for continued progress toward the unity of Europe was confirmed. 
An extract of the abovementioned statement is given hereafter : 
'President Johnson  reaffirmed the support of the United States for 
the progress of the European Communities. A strong and democratic Western 
Europe working as an equal partner with the United States would help to build 
a peaceful, prosperous and just world order.  Both the United States and the 
European Communities recognize their responsibilities to the developing 
countries in expanding export earnings and develc;>pment. 
The President reviewed his  balance of payments programme with 
Mr.  Rey and emphasized the firm intention of the United States to  take the 
necessary action to restore equilibrium.  The President and Mr. Rey recog-
nized the need for both surplus and deficit countries to continue and intensify 
their individual and common efforts to achieve a better equilibrium in the 
international balance of payments. 
The close co-operation between the United States and the European 
Communities is necessary to ensure that international adjustment takes place 
under conditions of continued economic growth with financial stability. In 
particular, they agreed that the achievements of the Kennedy Round must be 
preserved, that protectionist measures should be avoided and that further 
progress should be made in the elimination of barriers to trade. ' 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  17  February 196 8) 
- 105-2.  Mr. Rey discusses the Franco-German Plan and the Benelux Plan 
Speaking to journalists  in Brussels at the  beginning of  February 
Mr.  Rey confirmed that he was opposed to any solution from the outside to the 
crisis caused by the French veto of 19 December 1967.  Solutions involving 
2,  3, 5 or 9 partners were not sound ideas.  They had little substance;  they 
would increase tension and they would also reduce the scope for action of the 
European Communities.  He recognized, however, that suggestions made  in 
the Benelux Plan might be feasible provided they  were set in a  Community 
context and that they were neither binding nor systematic;  otherwise they 
would have a paralyzing effect.  He  regarded three of  the proposals as  con-
structive, viz.  : 
and 
a)  setting up consultation machinery similar to that between the ECSC 
and the United Kingdom; 
b)  a survey by the Commission of the problems raised by accession 
c)  co-operation in certain spheres. 
Addressing an audience convened by several Belgo-American asso-
ciations in mid-February, Mr.  Rey came out in support of the Benelux Plan, 
insofar as this advocated co-operation with the United Kingdom in those areas 
not covered by the EEC Treaty.  He said that the Benelux Plan seemed to him 
to be a reasonable attempt to reach a compromise and that the United Kingdom 
had also reached the conclusion that the memorandum could be a good starting 
point. 
Mr. Rey was more guarded in his views on the Franco-German Plan. 
Speaking to the 'Vlaams Economisch Verbond' (Flemish Economic Union)  on 
21 February, he said with reference to the problem of Britain's accession  to 
the Common Market: 
'  If the Plan drawn up in Paris were to constitute an entirely different 
arrangement from that of phased accession, it is more than likely that this 
would not help solve the problem.  If,  on the other hand, what has been done in 
Paris constitutes one of the features in a basic compromise and if this compro-
mise is such that we may endeavour to build with it an entity for the Six  that 
we may propose to the Seventh and the friends of the Seventh, then it is reason-
able to express satisfaction at the talks which have been held and not to  con-
sider them from too critical a standpoint. 
- 106-The Commission unanimously considers that we must work out a 
reasonable compromise. It thinks that this compromise is possible. This com-
promise should include an ''internal section" dealing with the internal policies 
we wish to pursue and which I have tried to define; it should also include an 
"external section" as was the case,  under similar circumstances,  in 1963. 
We  had then together worked out an arrangement under which those 
who were most attached to the internal development of the Six obtained a com-
mitment on the common agricultural policy and those most attached to a widen-
ing of the political views of the Community obtained a commitment to take 
part in the Kennedy Round and,  to return to more specifically British problems 
to adopt an attitude allowing us to keep in constant touch with our British 
friends.  This compromise of 1963 worked for four years and at the end of this 
compromise,  which was respected by everyone,  we had an agricultural policy 
and we  had the Kennedy Round. ' 
(Le Figaro,  3-4 February 1968; 
Handel & Transport Courant,  15  February 1968; 
L'Echo de la Bourse,  22  February 1968) 
3.  An interview with Mr.  Mansholt on the problems raised by modern-
ization in agriculture 
This was the title of an article in the Bulletin of the International 
Christian Union of Directors,  the substance of which was an interview with 
Mr.  ¥ansholt,  Vice-President of the European Commission in which the lat-
ter discussed the problems raised by modernization in agriculture and by 
industrialization,  both in the Community and in developing countries. 
Mr.  Mansholt did not consider that European agriculture,  where 
earnings were far below those of industry,  could be subsidized. It had to be 
restructured. At present,  when something must be doneaboutstructures, poli-
ticians who have accepted the responsibility for agriculture still did not seem 
sufficiently aware either of the size or the seriousness of this problem Clear-
thinking was needed and the hesitation of those who for political and psycholo-
gical reasons were still attaching to the family farm -without specifying what 
this meant - had to be borne in mind.  A bold,  clear assessment was needed in 
determining whether,  for example,  a farm of 20 hectares or 30 or 40 ares was 
still viable.  Mr.  Mans  holt asked whether the farmers concerned were happy 
and living under normal,  human conditions. 
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to 50 hectares; this was Community agriculture's great difficulty. 
Hence the European Economic Community had to make a considera-
ble effort in terms of a systematic guidance and structures policy. 
The third world could develop its agriculture by reference to what 
was proposed for the industrialized states. Mr.  Mansholt considered that all 
the developing countries could increase their production considerably to satis-
fy their needs; but the slow pace of their industrialization was liable to cause 
widespread unemployment if through industrialization and mechanization in 
agriculture,  a large number of workers were made redundant and then unable 
to find employment in other branches of the economy at the operative moment. 
The European Community had to come to the assistance of the third 
world.  Mr.  Mansholt stated: 'We,  the prosperous countries,  have a great 
responsibility which should now find expression in specific measures: (a)  to 
buy everything possible from the developing countries; (b)  to abolish all inter-
nal taxes on tropical products (our failure to take action here is a scandal); 
(c)  to promote the industrialization of these countries (our planet could feed 
7, OOOm.  inhabitants if the areas now arable were utilized rationally,  although 
this would require the adoption of modern farming methods and equipment 
which is not possible with holdings of half a hectare); (d)  to make available to 
these countries all that has been achieved in science and technology and all the 
potential,  in terms of research and innovations,  of our prosperous countries 
and (e)  to organize and promote the teaching of farmers •1 
Measures to increase the EEC's consumption of products from the 
third world would be desirable; but the EEC should not be the only one to make 
sacrifices. Mr.  Mansholt supported world agreements for the basic commodi-
ties so as to stabilize prices and divide the world's work in a better way. He 
regretted that the Kennedy Round had not been used to conclude any such agree-
ment. 
He added:  'Under its present constitution, the United Nat  ions Confer-
ence on Trade and Development does not appear to me to be sufficiently well-
equipped to take up this challenge successfully. It is actually  a body without 
powers,  a debating club. Obviously its structure and terms of reference need 
to be carefully analysed. Having made this point,  it is tobehopedthatUNCTAD 
and GATT will in future work together to induce the United States, Western 
Europe and the other industrialized countries to work with the developing na-
tions in organizing world trade on the basis of economic realities and over a 
period of several decades . ' 
- 108  -Referring lastly to the Yaounde Agreements,  Mr.  Mansholt stated: 
'The Yaounde Agreements were concluded under the EEC's policy of associa-
tion with the African countries; in 1958 they were necessary,  bearing in mind 
the bilateral commitments between these countries and certain member States 
of the Community. 
Today,  at a time when we are drawing close to the date of expiry of 
these Agreements (1969),  it may be thought that they constitute a discrimina-
tion against other developing countries. 
It may be thought that Britain's entry into the EEC would ease ten-
sion because the developing countries of the Commonwealth would probably 
enjoy the same preferences as those covered by the Yaounde Agreements, 
which would make the realization of world agreements easier. 
In a world economy there is no longer any room for discrimination, 
for that is a bad policy.' 
(Bulletin of the Union internationale chretienne des dirigeants d'entreprise, 
No.  16,  January-February 1968) 
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1.  European Liberal leaders pass a resolution on Britain's entry into 
the Community 
Meeting in The Hague on 6 and 7 January,  Liberal leaders from 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom looked into the prob-
lem of  Britain's accession to the European Community.  At the close of their 
meeting,  Mr. Malagodi,  Secretary of the Italian Liberal Party,  made the 
following statement: 'The crisis has been aggravated by the fact that the 
Gaullist veto is only one aspect of an overall policy which threatens not only 
to hamper the operation and progress of the EEC but also to stand in the way 
of the development of an adequate European presence in the affairs of the West 
and of the world.  This presence is indispensable to maintaining peaee and 
freedom and to the economic and social progress of the European countries. 
It is also essential if an effective and positive contribution - which no indivi-
dual European State can make on its own - is to be made to the Atlantic Alliance 
to easing tension between the West and the Communist  world  and to the progress 
of the developing countries. ' 
' To contend with the serious dangers of stagnation and disintegra-
tion inherent in the situation,  the Liberal leaders urge that a conference be 
called in the next few weeks between the Five and the United Kingdom with a 
view to agreements initiating close,  standing,  political co-operation having as 
its ultimate object a supranational European organization. Similar agreements 
directed at establishing close co-operation and ultimately integration should 
also be concluded in respect of defence,  monetary matters,  technology,  cul-
tural and educational organization and assistance to developing countries. 
Such agreements should be open to all the democratic countries of 
Europe. They should not be directed against the EEC or against the real inter-
ests of France, whose presence in the European Community the Liberal lead-
ers consider indispensable. At the same time,  the creation of closer relation-
ships between the continent and the United Kingdom would help the British 
people and Government to uphold their application for membership of the EEC 
and,  in the meanwhile,  to make the necessary internal adjustments without 
delay.' 
(La Nazione,  8 January 1968) 
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of the European Movement 
On the occasion of his election as President of the European Move-
ment in Rome on 19 January 1968,  Professor Hallstein delivered a speech in 
which he stated,  inter alia : '· .•  In political terms,  the activity of the States 
in the economic sphere has moved far in the direction of a federal or co-oper-
ative form.  The Treaties of the Communities are living constitutional docu-
ments,  the beginnings of a European constitution.  The advantage of,  indeed 
the need for,  common institution md a common policy have been shown to be 
genuine and are undisputed. War within the Community has become impos-
sible.  No  tactical exercise by a General Staff can weaken this truth. 
But more has been achieved than just  a situation which brings certain 
benefits. This situation is not static,  it exerts a dynamic force.  Nobody wants 
and nobody is able to give up the togetherness which has become an irreplace-
able  element of economic  and political interest. Our economic interest is 
carrying us forward.  Economic logic is developing its own motive power. The 
merger of the Executives of the three Communities is removing losses due to 
friction and increasing the impact of the European campaign. 
All this is true. Unfortunately, it is not the full truth. The complete 
picture  also  includes the internal and external dangers which threaten the 
work we have achieved. 
The internal dangers,  to mention them first,  are nationalism, so-
called realism and the unfinished, partial nature of our European construction. 
Of these,  the danger of nationalist infection is the greatest.  Like 
others,  Europeans find it difficult to learn the lesson of history. Are two 
world wars in the twentieth century not sufficient to prove the unsuitability of 
a European political order which,  through the short-lived alliances of sover-
eign States,  through the alternation of hegemony and balance of oower,  has for 
centuries exposed Europe to war after war,  and which,  if renewed,  is bound 
to make Europe the Balkans of the modern world? 
If  the views of the nationalists are narrow,  the realists are stupid. 
They are cramped by their day-to-day interests,  and to deal smartly with 
these interests is for them the purpose of policy.  The realities which they take 
as their guide are too small,  too trivial; the man who takes them as a guide 
for his actions is in fact giving up the attempt to exercise his will in shaping 
the course of policy,  and he falls an easy prey to any passing political vogue. 
It would almost seem as if to him action to change existing realities were not 
- 112 -the essence of all true policy. It is because Europe is divided and lacks homo-
geneity that there is a European Movement. 
The third internal source of danger is the fact that today Europe's 
political unity is limited to economic and social policy,  while defence policy 
and foreign policy outside the economic field are still conducted autonomously. 
This is an unhappy situation. 
Added to these there are the dangers from without. 
Economically speaking the Community has been a success not only 
at home,  but also in its dealings with the outside world. After the success of 
the Kennnedy Round and the World Monetary Conference at Rio de Janeiro 
Europeans could no longer fail to see the advantages to 'be gained when the 
Community acts as a unit. But the Community's trading partners throughout 
the world have also ceased to speak of an "inward-looking Community". 
From the political angle,  however,  the picture of the conditions sur-
rounding us is much darker,  it is truly disquieting.  A look at the relationship 
between our Europe and the two super-powers of the present world,  the United 
States of America and Soviet Russia,  provides evidence enough. 
Until about 1964,  the United States of America,  which acquired a 
right to the lasting gratitude of the Europeans through the massive support 
given from the very outset to Europe's efforts at unification,  had in its foreign 
policy given priority to European affairs. By today,  under the influence of the 
war in Vietnam,  the atomic stalemate,  the anticipated easing of tension and 
the comparative quiet on the European front,  the situation has changed. There 
is also a growing feeling of disappointment and doubt about the Europeans. Are 
they at all able to get together,  and if so,  are they ready for an alliance with 
the United States? Inevitably there are areas of friction due to the realities of 
the economic and political situation,  and these are a further contributing fac-
tor. All this does not mean that America's interest in the unification of Europe 
has faded.  America's attitude is marked by uncertainty rather than negation, 
so we can describe it as an attitude of ''wait and see". It is therefore essential 
that communications should be improved with a view to dealing with the mis-
taken assessments,  the misunderstandings and hasty judgments which are 
encouraged only too well by occasional strident anti-American pronouncements. 
We also need a framework into which to fit the relations between America and 
Europe,  a concept such as still existed at the time of President Kennedy. 
If then we are inclined to complain,  in our relations with the United 
States,  about their taking too small an interest in our affairs,  the situation is 
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Soviet Union is a negative one. Undoubtedly,  theRussianpopulationhasenjoyed 
rapid social  development as  a  result of  unparalleled  I efforts in the cultural 
and educational fields.  But it would be illusory to expect that this could lead 
to a radical weakening,  let alone an abandonment of the socialist basis of 
Soviet policy. What this policy means for Europe,  however,  becomes clear if 
we look at the concrete aims the Soviet Union is pursuing as part  of its medium-
term programme for Europe. Under this policy,  the Russians do not only want 
to consolidate the status guo resulting from the second world war,  they also 
want to put a stop to any military,  economic and political integration in West-
ern Europe,  which includes in particular the wish to destroy the integration 
achieved among the Six and thus to place the Soviet Union in a dominant posi-
tion in Europe,  including the Baltic and,  as has become increasingly clear in 
the last few months,  the Mediterranean. These are the dangers which must be 
countered,  internally by strengthening the non-communist part of Europe in 
all fields,  and in our external relations through the constant demonstration of 
our good will and of our good intentions. Integrating Europe means creating a 
peaceful order,  the only one we have established today,  internally and exter-
nally. 
The conclusion from all this is that the reasons which after the sec-
ond world war led to the policy of European unification and  inparticular to 
economic integration have not only not been superseded but have become 
stronger and more numerous. These reasons were the need for the creation 
of a vast economic area,  the maintenance of peace in Europe,  security for 
Europe and a say in world politics. 
But what then are we to do,  in concrete terms? ••• 
We want to activate our movement. We want to rejuvenate it-physi-
cally too,  by  bringing in younger men. We need the younger generation. But 
the younger generation needs us as well; we want to fill their minds and their 
hearts with something constructive,  something grand. 
Our grand design is that of the European political community. It is 
the organic completion of what we have started and what we have,  despite all 
obstacles,  carried forward to its present state. This is why we must take to 
heart the lessons to be drawn from what has been done. 
The experience gained since the end of the war shows that it is only 
by means of common institutions that progress towards European unification 
can be made and maintained.  These are institutions which are able and willing, 
independently of the individual member States,  to formulate the political inter-
ests and political aims of Europe and can uphold them in a continuous dialogue 
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agreement between the member States in political thinking and action. They 
help create a situation where the feeJingof European solidarity and the reali-
zation that ours is a European cause end by being generally accepted in all 
Governments and all the way down the c1vil services. To achieve this by diplo--
matic conferences or other conventional methods of bilateral diplomacy is 
just not possible. The process of unification is,  of course,  particularly diffi-
cult when it impinges on the delicate,  central spheres of sovereignty,  of for-
eign policy other than economic,  and of defence policy.  This only increases 
the need for institutional experience gained in economic integration to be ap-
plied in these fields also. 
When the requisite organization is established. its competences and 
methods must be governed by three principles: 
(1)  Its decision-taking process must in no circumstances be allowed to 
replace the procedures used by the Communities that are already 
operating in the economic and social fields,  with a view,  perhaps 
to forcing these Communities into a position of dependency. It should 
rather develop on lines parallel to those of the European Economic 
Community and should make up the leeway in integration that exists 
in the spheres concerned. 
In due course- let us say around 1980- the merger proper,  that is 
the merger of all economic,  military and political Communities, 
can take place,  and this would mean establishing the federation of 
Europe. We  may leave it to the future (and the Specialists in consti-
tutional and international law) whether this is to be brought about by 
a treaty between the member States or by a  constituent act  of a Euro-
pean constituent assembly. 
(2)  The procedures adopted in the new fields must from the outset com-
prise a consultation mechanism which is not limited in its scope 
and which in urgent situations is capable of functioning sufficiently 
fast to deprive the partners which are less enthusiastic supporters 
of integration (and experience has shown that these are the bigger 
ones) of the usual pretext that the urgency of the matter made it 
impossible to consult the Community in time. 
(3)  The procedure must aim at permanent evolution and revision of the 
constitution in favour of a steadily rising degree of integration in 
fact it  must make such a development ineluctable. 
Frotp. the very  beginning of our work on the unification of Europe 
we have assumed that security and defence policy cannot be excluded from this 
- 115-process. The solution may lie in a European defence community bullt up with-
in the  framework of a NATO which has developed in a bi-polar direction. 
Here too. as everywhere in our work for the European cause,  we will not only 
have to think in terms of all-embracing solutions but in terms of a pragmatic, 
step-by-step approach. This may include: 
(i)  A strategic planning community (European general staff) for conv~n­
tional and nuclear weapons and for every geographical region 
where Europe has military interests. 
(ii)  A European armaments community and a system - at long last an 
effective one - for the standardization of weapons. 
(iii)  The beginnings of a nuclear defence system capable of organizing 
defence against threats which might come from nuclear China or 
any country which might be prepared to accept weapons from China. 
The completion of such a comprehensive defence community with 
weapons of all types at its disposal is,  of course,  not conceivable without a 
full federal constitution which gives the institutions of the European federation 
sufficient powers in the field of European security policy and in defence matters 
as elsewhere. 
But today all European States should already consider it a European 
duty to do nothing that may impede or delay this development. To my mind, 
this means that even now we are bound to oppose the non-proliferation Treaty 
in its present form. Its section on control arrangements destroys the achieve-
ments of Euratom.,  And an even more serious defect is the lack of any clause 
which upholds the nuclear defence interests of Europe. Not even for its own 
defence would Europe be entitled to have nuclear explosives at its disposal!  It 
may sound harsh,  but it must be said in its power pattern this Treaty is objec-
tively the continuation of the policy of Yalta,  that is,  of the shameful division 
of Europe into spheres of interest. This is not changed by the purely verbal 
ahd therefore completely insufficient consolation which the Treaty offers by its 
reference to disarmament  •••• ' 
(Extract from a European Movement document) 
- 116-3.  The Fifth Anniversary of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship 
On 22 January,  Chancellor Kiesinger and President de Gaulle ex-
changed messages on the  occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the conclusion 
of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. They emphasized the signifi-
cance of Franco-German co-operation and reiterated their common resolve 
further to develop this co-operation. 
Chancellor Kiesinger,  in his address to President de Gaulle,  de-
scribed  the Treaty as an expression of the solidarity that was a prerequisite 
for the unity of Europe. The Treaty had offered  both Governments better oppor-
tunities for working together,  for overcoming difficulties and ending the divi-
sion of Europe. It would prove to be one of the forces which would bring  about 
the unity of Europe in peace and freedom despite all difficulties. 
On 22 January,  Mr. lllerhaus,  Chairman of the Christian Democrat 
Group in the European Parliament,  described the Treaty as a form of official 
authentication of the work of reconciliation which Konrad Adenauer and Robert 
Schuman had initiated. The Treaty had,  indeed,  been described as an obstacle 
to the integration of Europe but close Franco-German co-operation was the 
basis and precondition for any European unity. 
The Social Democrat Party press service wrote that the conclusion 
of the Treaty had been one of the most important achievements of the post-
war period. Despite many difficulties,  Franco-German relations had been 
strengthened. It was,  however,  to be noted with disappointment that doubts 
had arisen as to whether the French partner wished to take what had been done 
so far in the direction of European unification any further. 
The French Foreign Minister thought that there could  be no progress 
towards European unity without agreement between France and the Federal 
Republic. In his view,  the differences between Bonn and Paris about the future 
of Europe and Germany could not quickly be solved. Yet there was no doubt 
that German policy had come closer to French policy.  The Germans had rec-
ognized that the German question too could not be solved in a cold war climate. 
Mr. Couve de Murville said that,  as regards the question of Britain's entry 
into the EEC,  there were no fundamental differences of view between Bonn and 
Paris. All were agreed in principle on the admission of the United Kingdom. 
Yet on French television,  Mr. Brandt,  German Foreign Minister, 
said that efforts to achieve political co-operation in Europe would not have 
any chance of success until the question of the enlargement of the EEC had 
- 117-been cleared up. Only through political unity,  however,  could the voice of 
Europe make itself heard in the world. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  23  January 1968; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  24 January 1968; 
Die Welt,  22 and 23  January 1968; 
Industriekurier,  23  January 1968; 
Le Monde,  23  and 24 January 1968) 
4.  Mr.  Bohlen,  U.s. Ambassador in Paris,  in favour of European 
unification 
On leaving France on 25  January 1968,  Mr. Charles Bohlen,  U.S. 
Ambassador,  made some interesting comments on the occasion of a luncheon 
offered by the American Club of Paris. He recalled that in 1962 the United 
States was very much in favour of unifying Western Europe: 'We would have 
liked to see it,  we would still like to see it' he said. 
Mr. Bohlen mentioned three main reasons. which in his opinion made 
it necessary to unify Europe: 'In the first place,  Europe could better provide 
for its own defence,  lightening America's burden in this part of the world. 
Secondly,  European unification would provide a framework into which Germany 
-hopefully united,  or any Germany -could be comfortably adjusted and would 
reduce the possibility of a German adventure.  Finally,  and most importantly, 
a united Western Europe would begin to approach the dimensions of United 
States power in the world. ' 
(Herald Tribune,  26 January 1968) 
5.  The 1968 'Euro-forum' in SaarbrUcken- an international CDU Confer-
ence 
On 21 January,  the Economic Council of the CDU  (Christian Demo-
crat Union) held its international conference - the forum on Europe for 1968 -
in SaarbrUcken. Dr.  Hallstein,  former President of the EEC Commission, 
said that the time was particularly appropriate for discussing what form Euro-
pean integration was to take in future.  On the one hand,  the customs union and 
the common agricultural market would come into being by the middle of the 
year and,  on the other,  the Community was in the throes of a crisis which had 
- 118-arisen as a result of the veto on the applications for membership of third coun-
tries. It was a question of finding a  solution. 
The Conference aroused widespread interest in German business 
circles as can be deduced from the fact that there were around 600 people 
taking part. In addition to the leading representatives of the European Com-
munities,  experts from the member States,  economists from the EFTA coun-
tries and from the USA expressed their views on the pressing issues of the 
EEC and its enlargement. 
On the first day of the Conference,  speakers from the Community 
countries,  the United States and Yugoslavia drew attention mainly to the dan-
ger that the six Community States could block any further progress towards 
economic and monetary union by a regression to national practices,  particu-
larly as regards those issues that were not settled in the EEC Treaty. 
Mr. Von der Groeben,  a member of the Commission,  quoted as one example 
the approximation of patent law and company law.  Feasible solutions had been 
on the table,  as it were,  for two years but no one had yet decided to discuss 
them in detail.  The Ministers had indeed argued diligently on the Council of 
Ministers in favour of early solutions but their initiatives were held up by the 
national authorities.  Mr. Von der Groeben pointed out that the oft-lamented 
technical leeway in relation to the United States could only be made good if 
the Common Market were changed into an internal market secured by means 
of viable politically-based institutions.  The inclusion of Britain and the Nordic 
markets in this integration process could only improve the international pros-
pects of this economic area. 
Professor Petrilli,  President of the Italian Council of the European 
Movement agreed with Mr. Von der Groeben in describing the following as the 
most important harmonization measures in the field of the whole customs dis-
pensation: (a) removing obstacles to the trade in goods as quickly as possible; 
(b)  gearing investments to the needs of the Common Market; (c)  avoiding ex-
cess capacities; (d)  facilitating concentration within the Common Market; 
(e)  co-ordinating trade policy towards the developing and East European coun-
tries. 
Mr.  Pierre Werner,  Prime Minister of Luxembourg,  argued,  with 
reference to monetary policy,  in favour of gradual and organic progress in 
the context of the action plan,  at the end of which there should be a standard 
European means of payment and a European fund for co-operation on monetary 
questions. 
Professor Wallich of the USA had strong words about the relation-
ship between the EEC and the rest of the world; the weakening of the world 
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and restrictions on capital movements could radically change the economic 
landscape. He referred to the circumstances of the 30's and spoke of a new 
American isolationism.  Like the USA,  the EEC had so far only pursued its 
own immediate interests. If it continued in this way theworldmonetarysystem 
would soon collapse. A self-centred Community policy-andProfessorWallich 
was obviously thinking mainly of the speculation and measures directed  against 
the dollar- could not long be tolerated by the United States. 
Mr. Jean Monnet,  former President of the High Authority and Pre-
sident of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe,  made a special 
plea for the admission of the United Kingdom to the European Community. He 
described the situation as tragic. On the one hand Europe had rejected Britain 
which needed help particularly in the form of support to solve the monetary 
problem; on the other,  the admission of the United Kingdom to the Community 
would bring technological benefits which could pave the way for a lasting devel-
opment for all the European countries together.  In the present situation Europe 
would become,  to an ever increasing degree,  dependent on America. 
Mr.  Leo Mates (Belgrade),  the Director of the Institute for Inter-
national Policy and Economy,  said that relations between the EEC and 
COMECON in Eastern Europe had improved in recent years although there had 
been no official or direct contact between the organizations. This development 
was obviously the result of the easing of tension in East-West relations.  The 
relaxation of tension in political relations had not put an end to the division of 
Europe inherited from the past, yet  some of the main obstacles which had hither-
to precluded effective co-operation could be cleared out of the way.  The 
COMECON area was,  however,  still regarded as hostile territory. The future 
development of economic relations depended,  above all,  on the state of current 
political relations. Any worsening of the political climate could reduce the vol-
ume of trade. 
Spokesmen from the United Kingdom and Sweden explained why their 
countries wanted to enter the EEC in surprisingly frank terms which,  to some 
extent,  astonished their listeners. Without beating about the bush,  Professor 
Johnson of the London School of Economics,  explained that Britain,  after los-
ing the world leadership that it had had in the nineteenth century could now re-
gard  its historically developed talent for tasks of international leadership as 
a useful asset for a united Europe.  Economically speaking,  it was hoped that 
by diving into free competition with the EEC countries that the Britisheconomy 
would 'shake itself awake'. With extraordinary self-assurance Professor 
Johnson further remarked that Britain did not need to wait at the door because 
there were,  fundamentally,  many attractive prospects.  He  referred to giving 
a new impetus to EFTA and to its enlargement into a free trade area with the 
United States and Canada  ;similarly Britain  could again rely more on the Common-
wealth whichwas, in his opinion, a faster-growing market  than that of the EEC. 
- 120 -Professor Ohlin,  speaking for Sweden,  came out in favour of the 
greatest possible liberalisation of world trade. It  was of little interest to the 
Scandinavian countries to seek protection behind the customs wall of the EEC. 
With the applications for accession in mind,  the r6le of the United Kingdom 
was viewed with growing coolness in Scandinavia. It did not have the impres-
sion that Britain had taken the trouble to take the other EFTA members into 
consideration. In some Scandinavian circles the United Kingdom was criticized 
he said,  for having taken an unrealistic step that was doomed to fail and that 
it was the height of folly for it to refuse now to consider any form of associ-
ation. 
Professor Tinbergen (Netherlands) described the position of  the EEC 
in relation to the developing countries. With reference to the development 
policy of the industrial States he said that this must,  in future,  be more orien-
tated towards the welfare concept. In the international sphere, there also needed 
to be a greater transfer of income between the industrial and developing coun-
tries.  For this reason the repayment of debts had to be revised. 
The industrial States should,  wherever possible,  place no import 
duties on the products of the developing countries.  Market regulations were 
needed for such sensitive markets as those of cocoa and sugar. In the case of 
sugar,  the protection of EEC agriculture had gradually to be reduced.  For 
other export products from the developing countries,  price fluctuations should 
be offset by additional payments from a fund. 
Professor Fritz Machlup (Princeton) described keener competition 
as the most important result of enlarging an economic area; the corollary to 
this was that inflationary increases in  wages were held in check.  The USA had 
had no success with their  wages and price guidelines when there was a reduction in 
unemployment; similarly the United Kingdom was not making any headway with 
its restrictive measures. In the Federal Republic,  efforts in the form of con-
certed action had indeed been successful,  presumably because of Germany's 
inflation. 
On 26  January,  after detailed discussions,  the Conference drew up 
its guiding principles on European policy; these were articulated by Mr. Klaus 
Scheufelen,  Chairman of the Economic Council of the CDU,  at the close of the 
forum.  The European Federal States had to remain the goal of European policy. 
After the creation of the customs union and the completion of the agricultural 
market in the EEC in the middle of 1968,  the next stage,  that is the economic 
and monetary union,  had to be realized and foreign defence policies had to be 
co-ordinated. 
Economic and monetary union required close co-ordination of eco-
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ital  market and a common structural and research policy. In merging the 
treaties of the European Communities,  the requirements of the economic and 
monetary union had to be taken into account.  The Commision had to be able to 
operate as the 'dynamo of the Community' in every field. 
European integration policy was explicitly described as a peace po-
licy. In its relations with the East European States the Community had to pro-
mote co-operation in every suitable sphere. The member States had to decide 
on a common trade policy in relation to these countries. As regards develop-
ment assistance,  a common policy had to emerge from the start that had been 
made and this had to be understood as help to others to help themselves.  The 
Conference said that relations between the EEC and the USA had to take the 
form of a reciprocal partnership based on equal rights. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  26,  27  and 30 January 1968; 
Die Welt,  26  and 27  January 1968; 
Le Monde,  27  January 1968; 
Industriekurier,  27  January 1968) 
6.  Mr.  Marjoribanks,  British Ambassador to the Communities,  dis-
cusses relations between the United Kingdom and the Community 
Addressing the Federation of Belgian Chambers of Commerce 
abroad on 5 February,  Mr. Marjoribanks,  British Ambassador to the Com-
munities,  said with reference to Britain's application to join the Common 
Market that Britain had taken tough but necessary measures to restore its eco-
nomy.  This was why the breakdown in the negotiations had been a hard blow 
for Britain. It continued,  however,  to be confident that its application would 
meet with success in the long term. 
Mr.  Marjoribanks said that Britain's reaction to the French veto 
could have been one of diplomatic inaction.  The British could also have con-
sidered the other forms of association proposed.  But this was not consistent 
with their idea of the political union of Europe. It was,  moreover,  not possible 
for them to accept a minor rale. Their view was that negotiations for an as-
sociation would take much longer.  They had therefore chosen to maintain and 
consolidate their existing links with the Community.  There were,  indeed,  al-
ready many points of contact and Britain's application remained on the agenda 
of the Council of Ministers. 
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no part of British policy either to exclude France or to hamper the develop-
ment of the EEC.  The British wanted discussions with all their European 
neighbours. 
Mr.  Marjoribanks stressed the importance of the contribution that 
Britain could make in regard to technology.  Domestic measures introduced by 
the British,  such as merging firms,  rationalizing industry,  were still insuffi-
cient and ought to be carried out on a much wider European scale. 
The present situation showed that Britain had suffered a setback 
and that urgent action had to be taken. 
Useful meetings had already been held among Europeans inciden-
tally to the WEU meetings.  The Benelux countries had taken the initiative. 
Fields in which collaboration was possible were those of patents, 
economic standards and company law. 
Mr. Marjoribanks concluded by saying that Britain was realistic by 
tradition.  The British understood the difficulties but they were also patient 
and tenacious. Having set themselves an aim,  the British would not give up 
easily. 
(Le Soir,  La Derniere Heure,  6 February 1968) 
7.  Consolidating the Benelux Union and the European Community 
On 7 February 1968,  the Benelux Committee held a conference in 
Brussels at which Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers,  signatory for Belgium of the 
Treaties of Rome,  outlined the part that the Benelux Union could play in the 
European Community. 
He began by recalling how the Benelux Union came to be founded: 
'In the Benelux context,  we were content with an intergovernmental system 
resting on the reciprocal interests of the partners. It did not appear either 
desirable or possible to create supranational institutions.  The Benelux coun-
tries found they were held back by the customary complexity of trilateral feder-
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mon Market made it reasonable to hope that the essential federal system, which 
was the only way in which Community solutions could prevail,  would be there-
sult of the success of the Common Market and would enable the Benelux coun-
tries to dispense with it.  Today the ill-success of the European Community 
institutions and the deep-seated crisis in Europe in 1968 force us to review this 
matter and invoke Article 233  of the EEC Treaty,  under which the Benelux may 
pursue its integration on its own and in advance of  the other Community partners.' 
He noted that the Benelux Union had not fulfilled the hopes reason-
ably vested in it: 'The Benelux institutional system remains one of an intergo-
vernmental type and if we look at its operation since 1958,  we are bound to 
confess that its achievements have not been commensurate with our expecta-
tions. Apart from the fundamental issues that had already been solved before 
1958,  the 1958 Treaty provided for a transitional period,  during which those 
spheres where there was insufficient harmonization and where the free move-
ment of goods,  services,  individuals and capital was still not complete were, 
within a period of not more than 7 years from the entry into force of the Trea-
ty,  to attract definitive solutions. These 7 years have nowpassedand, although 
some progress has been made,  it must be acknowledged that in certain impor-
tant spheres in the life of the Economic Union solutions have not been found. 
In many cases the Governments have passed resolutions which could have led 
to early solutions but these have not actually been applied and many measures, 
which should have resolved the problem,  have not been put into force.  A cer-
tain apathy has crept into the operation of the Benelux institutional system and 
it is worth taking a closer look at why we  have not really been able,  as we 
were in the past,  to give an example of integration to the rest of Europe and 
why we have not been able,  through a more rapid operation,  to find solutions 
and to show the possibilities that exist through working together. 
If the Benelux group has not managed to progress beyond a certain 
point in terms of integration,  this may be attributed to two things: the first is 
the size of the Benelux territory and the second is the unduly summary nature 
of the institutional machinery. The first inadequacy is not absolute; the short-
age of space in the Benelux area is only relative and the relaxation of the inte-
gration drive after 1957 was attributable mainly to a concentration of efforts 
on the development of the Common Market. It was reasonable to hope that,  in 
the wider context of the Six,  disparities between the agricultural,  financial, 
social and other systems could be favourably resolved with the three Benelux 
countries theoretically taking part together. It was useless to negotiate in two 
directions at the same time. The failure of the Common Market to which we 
have come today was not foreseen. 
The institutional inadequacy is more serious. It is not possible to 
go beyond a certain stage in integration with a purely intergovernmental sys-
tem.  The most difficult political viewpoints find protection against integration 
by recourse to a veto.  National authorities,  furthermore,  raise technical 
obstacles. 
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Market institutions to carry integration forward both in the Benelux countries 
and within the context of the Six.  Today we can wait no longer.  The gradual 
degradation of the European institutions is,  of itself,  a specific danger which 
the Benelux Union must parry. 
• • • • There is no question of changing the statutory powers of the 
Committee of Ministers. It would,  indeed,  be impossible to establish a major-
ity voting procedure in a trilateral organization.  This is the eternal problem 
of trilateral federalism.  Nor can there be any question of changing the r81e 
of the Council of the Union,  the General Secretariat,  nor the other bodies set 
up by the Treaty in 1958. On the other hand,  it is clear that in contrast to the 
machinery of the Common Market,  the Benelux Union needs a permanent body 
similar to the European Commission to complete its work. One might well 
imagine a group comprising three leading figures appointed for a specific term 
and who would be independent of the Governments,  who would have a joint right 
of initiative to complete the work of the Benelux Union and who would have a 
team of officials at their service.  They could sit on the Committee of Minis-
ters in a consultative capacity and see to the execution of its decisions.  They 
could refer to the Court of Justice in the event of any infringement or failure 
to comply with the rules of the Treaty. The members of this new body could 
be called upon by the Interparliamentary Council to take part in its debates. 
It would have to make a periodic report on the execution of its mandate and on 
the state of the Union.  This new body would,  in the nature of things,  personify 
the Benelux Union in the minds of the general public. It could act as the  keep-
er of its conscience. 
To effect this reform all that would be needed would be an additional 
act to the Union Treaty which would be ratified by the three Parliaments. If 
there were the political will to take such a step,  it could be accomplished in a 
matter of months. 
I am convinced that this action should have priority for the Euro-
peans in the Benelux group. They know what kind of crisis Europe is under-
going.  They know that the Benelux is marking time and they have known, for 25 
years now,  that the Benelux has been essential to the construction of Europe. 
They know that time is against us and that every month that passes sees the 
emergence of new pockets of nationalist resistance. The time has come to pull 
ourselves together and to complete the work of the Benelux Union in order to 
further the cause of Europe. 
1 
(Document of the Benelux Committee) 
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The European market was the central theme of discussion at the 
conference of the Nordic Council - of which Denmark,  Finland,  Norway, 
Iceland and Sweden are members - held in Oslo between 17  and 22  February. 
It was not for the time being decided to adopt a uniform Nordic approach. Uni-
form governmental decisions would be worked out at a meeting of the prime 
ministers,  foreign ministers and ministers for Nordic co-operation- to be 
held in Copenhagen in April 1968 in the light of information in the meantime 
to be collected. 
The general debate in Oslo was dominated by the same theme and 
raised no new aspects of the question.  All speakers,  however,  shared the 
conviction that the European dialogue would not be silenced,  as in 1963,  by 
de  Gaulle's  second veto.  It was  agreed that a  Nordic  approach to  the 
EEC was at present out of the question.  Swedish Prime Minister Erlander 
wanted to wait for the results of the Franco-German talks in Paris. Should 
all six member States agree to reduce,  or eventually to bridge,  the gap sepa-
rating the two West European economic blocs,  this would heighten the chances 
of coming up with an overall solution to European trade problems and of pre-
paring the way for negotiations which all Nordic and EFTA States could attend. 
Norwegian Trade Minister Willoch also saw no point in a Nordic 
move while the Six were still discussing what attitude to adopt towards non-
member States.  Like Mr. Borten,  he brought EFTA squarely into the centre 
of the discussions.  On the Danish side,  it was Mr.  Nyboe Andersen,  Econom-
ics Minister,  who ruled out a special Nordic initiative. Only Bertil Ohlin, 
former leader of the Swedish Liberals,  recommended soundings by the Nordic 
countries to get a better idea of what General de Gaulle meant by certain hints 
regarding special agreements between them and the EEC. He too later agreed 
that this did not mean that the Nordic countries should pursue a separate inte-
gration policy. 
The discussion devoted to closer economic co-operation between 
the Nordic countries was rather more fruitful.  Danish Prime Minister 
Baunsgaard invited the Nordic countries to a summit conference to be held on 
the subject in Copenhagen the following April. 
The statements of Mr. Baunsgaard and Mr. Nyboe Andersen sug-
gested that Denmark was particularly anxious to secure better conditions for 
agriculture in the Nordic context,  but also (i)  to discuss financial question and 
(ii) industrial and technical co-operation in so far as this would not hamper 
ultimate entry into the Common Market.  Mr. Baunsgaard also proposed trade 
co-operation between EFTA,  the Eastern bloc and the developing countries, 
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greatest interest in a concerted approach.  Copenhagen clearly wants to keep 
its hands free. 
The Norwegian representatives expressed themselves in somewhat 
guarded terms. It is difficult for them to accept economic co-operation among 
the Nordic countries over and beyond that provided for in EFTA,  particularly 
if it is to include agriculture.  Prime Minister Borten warned against exagger-
ated hopes,  adding that EFTA and the Nordic countries should be strengthened 
simultaneously. 
The Nordic Council approved the Danish move for closer economic 
co-operation among the Nordic countries and recommended the Governments 
to devote greater attention to this in their joint plans and to ensure that it was 
organized so as to serve the major economic interests Of each of the Nordic 
countries.  The Council recommended that co-operation should be such as to 
facilitate participation by the Nordic countries in a broad-based solution of the 
problem of European integration and to be reconcilable with their obligations 
towards the other EFTA members. 
The Danish attitude aroused some surprise in Oslo although 
Denmark has always been prepared,  in the interests of its farmers,  to enter 
into closer relations with its Nordic partners provided this involved no com-
mitment that might impede a rapprochement with the EEC.  The Swedish re-
presentatives warmly welcomed the Danish proposal,  which is after all in line 
with their constant desire to weld the Scandinavian countries into a single tra-
ding unit which could facilitate Sweden's accession to the Common Market. 
Early in the year Sweden had worked out new moves along these lines but its 
representatives in Oslo gladly gave precedence to the Danes. 
Some years ago Sweden put forward a blanket arrangement  for closer 
co-operation in fields in which the various Governments were particularly 
interested.  These included agriculture,  fisheries,  tariff harmonization,  ques-
tions regarding capital,  etc. In the absence of any tangible results,  however, 
the talks and investigations had been dropped. 
Denmark's attitude had so far been one of scepticism. The tariff 
harmonization proposed suffered from the snag that industry would have had 
to pay more for its raw materials.  Moreover,  Danish integration policy was 
geared to a  swift approach to the EEC. A number of circumstances have now 
induced the Danish Government itself to advocate closer economic co-opera-
tion among the Nordic countries even wider in scope than that contemplated in 
the Swedish blanket proposal. Apart from the fact that it is in the new Govern-
ment's interest to show a sense of initiative - and that the Nordic idea has a 
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highly dubious about the prospect of Denmark's joining the EEC in the fore-
seeable future.  The problem of agriculture,  however,  is of burning interest 
and anything likely to help solve it is therefore highly welcome.  Economic 
co-operation in EFTA with neighbouring Nordic States had reachedsuchascale 
that the prospect of breaking it up is not only painful but practically impossible 
to entertain.  Denmark therefore feels itself today far more closely bound to 
Sweden,  its main outlet for industrial products. The Nordic market last year 
absorbed 24 per cent of Danish exports,  as compared with 14 per cent in 1959, 
the greatest success being scored by manufactures. 
Although a similar development took place in Norway,  Trade Minis-
ter Willoch and other Norwegian speakers - as,  for example,  the leader of the 
Labour party,  Tryggve Bratteli - made no attempt to hide their disinclination 
to bind their country more closely to the Nordic group.  Concessions to Danish 
agriculture at the expense of their own farmers were flatly rejected.  Despite 
Danish denials,  it is feared in Oslo that if Denmark's plans succeed, it will 
in the long run make it more difficult to protect Norway's agriculture. 
On the other hand,  it  is not known in Oslo what 'appreciable economic 
advantages'  Norway  can secure from closer co-operation with the  Nordic 
countries. Easier access to the Swedish capital market is regarded as only 
a modest advantage. 
The Nordic Council passed a resolution drawn up by its Economic 
Committee and recommending the Governments: 
1.  To keep close track,  jointly with the other EFTA  Governments,  of 
European market questions with a view to exploiting any possibility 
of helping to solve this problem; 
2.  To seek ways and means of preparing a Nordic move for stepping 
up co-operation in EFTA; 
3.  To take other aspects of reciprocal economic links between the Nor-
dic countries into consideration,  so as to ensure that any improve-
ment in co-operation served ·the essential economic interests of each 
of the Nordic countries,  and to ensure that attention was also paid 
to the organizational aspects of the problem; 
4.  To seek for some form of economic co-operation between Nordic 
countries which will make it easier for them to participate in a 
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obligations towards other EFTA countries. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  20  and 24 February 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  20  and 21  February 1968; 
Agence Europe,  9 February 1968; 
Le Monde,  20  and 28  February 1968) 
9.  The European Left and Europe 
Two organizations,  the 'Mouvementde la gauche europeenne' (i.e. 
the European Left Movement) and 'Les rencontres socialistes de Grenoble' 
(the Socialist Group of Grenoble) held a conference on 24 and 25  February 1968 
at Cachan (a district in the Paris region).  The subject under discussion was 
the Left and Europe. 
Speaking for the European Left,  Mr. Raphael Squercioni submitted 
a report pointing out that since the Treaty of Rome came into application the 
balance sheet was a healthy one as regards customs policy. It did,  however, 
leave a lot to be desired in the commercial,  scientific and social fields.  He 
viewed with favour the British application,  considering that Britain's presence 
would certainly be beneficial to the Community and he considered that nego-
tiations should be initiated. 
Referring to what the attitude of a united Europe should be towards the 
two giants,  he dealt firstly with relations with the United States. He considered 
that a revision of the status guo regarding American investments should be one 
of the main points of attack of the Left.  In the political field,  the difference in 
orders of priority for the various problems would accentuate divergences and 
induce a united Europe to break free from the United States.  To continue with 
a divided Europe,  on the other hand,  would prevent the European countries 
from pursuing anything but an ineffective type of diplomacy,  such as that of 
General de Gaulle,  vis-a-vis the USA.  A Socialist-led Europe would affirm 
its economic and political independence from the United States. 
The spokesman for the Grenoble Socialist Group,  Mr. Robert 
Fossaert,  noted that a European economy was coming· into being but he pointed 
out that this was not subject to any authority which could put an economic policy 
into application. 
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which were not preventing Europe from losing its identity in an Atlantic free 
trade area and the liberal formulae which would without doubt reduce Europe's 
independence in its development in relation to the United States and that of 
France within Europe. 
Mr.  Fossaert expressed full confidence in the dynamism of Europe 
and of socialism; he thought that if the Left came to power in France,  it could 
bring about a valid compromise between European States having different forms 
of government. An absolute guarantee not to nationalize any European assets 
in France,  for example,  (or to do so only subject to compensation to be deter-
mined by the European Court of Justice) could be given by France in exchange 
for a financial and monetary co-operation agreement which would give France 
the help of its European partners in stemming the outflow of capital. 
Mr.  Franc;ois Mitterrand,  President of the Federation of the Left, 
spoke of his impressions of the European Parliament. He said that 'the smal-
ler countries represented there lived somewhat as if they were in a cocoon. ' 
He observed that the very word 'socialist' appeared shocking. It was,  he said, 
not accepted -custom. 
He considered that a socialist experiment in France,  far from jeop-
ardizing the European construction,  could have the effect of a ferment. Why, 
he asked,  should France not have the strength to carry others along with it. 
On behalf of the Socialist Party (SFIO),  Mr.  Guy Mollet addressed 
a message to the conference in which he said that after more than ten years' 
experience,  one was obliged to note that a Europe without supranational power, 
without a common rule that bound governments,  without independent institu-
tions,  without either majority machinery or procedures and without protection 
against the technocratic danger,  could not solve any one of the problems with 
which it was now confronted and which stood in the path of all the forces of 
progress throughout the world. 
One fundamental issue was at the centre of the conference debates 
and that was the fear that the European construction might culminate in a con-
solidation of capitalism. If the Europe that one wanted was,  in fact,  built on 
the bases to which he had just referred in broad outline,  not only would this 
concern appear groundless but,  on the contrary,  it would afford a brighter 
prospect for securing its development and its progress along the paths of so-
cialism.· 
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sions from the conference in an article which appeared in the 'Populaire' on 
1 March.  He asked whether the defensive measures that a socialist govern-
ment would have to take to face up to the difficulties that capitalism would not 
fail to provoke,  were compatible with the Common Market. 
As expressed in this way,  the problem did not have a  solution. It 
would first be necessary to specify whether it was a question of building social-
ism in Europe or of giving life to a  socialist regime of a purely national type. 
The construction of Europe was an end in itself provided,  of course, 
one had its progress towards socialism always in sight. 
(Le Mende,  24 and 25  February 1968; 
Combat,  26  February 1968; 
Le 1\Ionde,  3 and 4 March 1968) 
10.  Austrian Socialists' three-stage plan for an arrangement with the 
EEC 
The Socialist Party of Austria (SPO)  arranged for a group of social-
ist economists and managers to prepare an 
1 Austrian economic programme 
1 
which was laid before the party council by its executive on 29  February. This 
will be disussed until autumn within the party before the party conference 
gives it its official approval.  This wide-ranging economic programme, because 
it is also intended for use during the 1970 parliamentary elections, is far more 
flexible and conciliatory in tone than the official party programme of 1958, 
\\'hich bristles with the rigid ideolog'ical views of the still basically marxist 
SPO. The shocked feelings ofleft-wing SPO officials and supporters were soothed 
by  the  assurance.  published  in  the  party's  central  organ, that the economic 
programme was not meant to replace the party programme (which included a 
demand that the essential means of production should be put into the hands of 
the Community) but \\'as only a first step towards the new classless society. 
A highly interesting passage is devoted to 'Austria and the EEC'. 
The need for Austria to come to an arrangement with the EEC is not disputed -
in itself something \Yhich may be regarded as a  step forward.  A pragmatic 
policy covering three stages is recommended: 
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the EEC for important Austrian exports, so as to offset the discrimination prac-
tised against Austrian exports in the EEC countries. It is assumed in the pro-
gramme that the remaining EFT  A countries would in turn come to some arran-
gements with the EEC,  so that,  during the second stage,  Austria would be able 
to take over any solutions arrived at between the EEC and EFTA countries. 
In the third stage Austria would have to strive for a close relation-
ship of a  'special' nature with the EEC,  one that would have to be consistent 
with the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty and the country's neutral sta-
tus. At the same time Austria should continue,  first and foremost,  to exploit 
the possibilities offered by EFTA to the full.  As an indication of the success 
so far achieved through co-operation in EFTA,  the programme mentions that 
Austrian exports in EFTA rose between 1960 and 1967 from 3, 600  million to 
10, 600 million schillings,  and EFTA's share of total Austrian exports from 
12.5 to 22.5 per cent. 
Austria should also actively participate in East-West trade talks in 
the Economic Commission for Europe and give full backing to all attempts to 
put East-West trade on a multilateral basis. The programme also calls for 
greater emphasis on overseas markets,  added that export policy ought to be 
revitalized,  the financing of exports stepped up and the network of external 
trade organizations expanded. 
(VWD-Europa,  27  February 1968) 
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